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Preface
Systems or policy analysis (the latter expression being used more frequently
when public problems are addressed) is a form of applied research designed to
acquire a deeper understanding of sociotechnical problems and to bring about
better solutions. The questions systems analysts investigate are enormously
complex, yet the data, tools, and theories at their disposal are often inadequate
or untested. The multidisciplinary character of the systems approach is a
source of strength, but it is also a source of delicate problems of communica-
tion and understanding. Consequently, it is easy for the analyst to lead himself
and the policy makers for whom he works into conceptual errors or pitfalls.
The purpose of this book is to point out some of these pitfalls so that eventually
a well-marked path may be charted to avoid them.
The editors, and hence the format of this book, were influenced by dis-
cussions at a small workshop on the pitfalls of systems analysis held during
August 1977 at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(nAsA) in Laxenburg, Austria. AIl but two of the contributors participated in
that workshop, at which the decision to produce the book was made. The
editors are indebted to the Institute for its sponsorship of the workshop, for its
support in the production of the book, and especially for the stimulating in-
tellectual atmosphere it has provided throughout our stay.
That this volume appears in the International Series on Applied Systems
Analysis sponsored by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
reflects nAsA's interest in applying systems analysis to international and global
problems and at the same time advancing the state of the art of systems
analysis.
This volume is addressed to an audience of practicing systems analysts and
of users of systems analysis. The international nature of the institution where
v
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this book was conceived and took shape is apparent, we hope, not only from
the affiliations of the contributors, but also from the effort to discuss problems
that are important to practitioners and users of systems analysis in all
countries.
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1 Introduction
The quality of a systems analysis studyl can be assessed in terms of two dis-
tinct but related sets of criteria: internal, process-oriented criteria of adequacy
relating to the technical competence of the work; and external, outcome-
oriented criteria of effectiveness relating to the impact of analysis on the policy
process.
Internal criteria are generated within systems analysis itself, or related dis-
ciplines, and answer such questions as: Was uncertainty handled explicitly or
assumed away? How strong is the evidence? Were the conclusions tested for
sensitivity to simultaneous changes in the critical parameters, or was sensitivity
testing done merely for changes in single parameters separately? Were exten-
sive tests undertaken to establish the credibility of the models used?
External criteria are imposed from the outside, by the clients of the study, by
the general public, and by objective limitations of time and resources. They
answer questions like: Have the conclusions of the study been presented in a
clear and persuasive manner, and in time to assist the decision maker? Was the
study read by those for whom it was designed? Did they give any sign that it
affected their reasoning? Have all legitimate interests been taken into con-
sideration? Were the conclusions of the study found acceptable by the im-
plementing organization?
Although both sets of criteria are needed to assess the overall quality of a
study, there is a widespread tendency to raise one or the other to a position of
unique importance. On one hand, analysts raised in the scientific tradition tend
to assume that the high technical quality of a study is a sufficient guarantee of
its practical effectiveness. This view does not explain why many good studies
have had no visible impact on policies, while technically inadequate analyses
have occasionally been quite effective in focusing public attention on certain
problems and in stimulating suitable responses. On the other hand, the users of
2analysis generally find outcome-oriented criteria intuitively very appealing.
After all, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. If analysis does not
demonstrably contribute to the success of a policy, what is the good of it? They
forget that the process-outcome distinction, which is clear enough when results
can be evaluated objectively and unambiguously, becomes blurred when we try
to apply it to professional work. Even in the case of medicine, "[mluch,
perhaps most, of what a physician does must be categorized as process, and
process not even calculated to affect outcome,"2 and the same is true, in
varying degrees, of the work of all professionals, including systems analysts.
Moreover, the relationship between what the professional does and the final
outcome is always indirect and uncertain, for there are always many factors
that he or she cannot control or even foresee. In sum, tests of adequacy and
tests of effectiveness are equally necessary, but not sufficient when used
separately, to control the quality of a study, and in both types of testing the
notion of pitfall plays a crucial role. Every problem has its characteristic
pitfalls-its hidden dangers and snares-and no analysis of it can be of
acceptable quality unless it recognizes and avoids them.
This volume contains extensive discussions of many conceptual and prac-
tical pitfalls that experience has shown to be particularly dangerous in the con-
duct and implementation of analytic studies. Of the chapters that compose the
volume, some are primarily concerned with questions of adequacy, others with
questions of social effectiveness.
Let us first briefly consider the question of adequacy. An analysis is
adequate if it meets the particular tests that are appropriate to the nature, con-
text, and characteristic pitfal1s of the problem. But the process leading from the
initial formulation to the implementation of a recommended solution is so com-
plex that a global test is quite impossible. Rather, the analysis must be broken
down into distinct components, each of which will be tested for adequacy.
An anatomy of the analytic process is described by Majone in the first
chapter. Analysis, he observes, usually begins with a problem situation-an
awareness that things are not as they should be, but without a clear idea of how
the situation may be corrected. The problem situation has to be translated into
a problem; this is the process of problem setting. Data must then be obtained
and transformed into more useful and reliable information. The information is
manipulated and interpreted by means of different tools and models and is used
as evidence. The evidence is embedded in an argument supporting a particular
conclusion. Finally, the conclusion is tested, communicated, and, it is hoped,
implemented.
This stylized description is only a first approximation to the ful1 complexity
of the analytic process. It traces a simple linear path in an intricate network of
interdependent operations. Yet even this simple path conceals a great variety of
possible pitfalls. These must be detected, and safe paths around them clearly
marked, if analysis is to meet minimal criteria of adequacy.
3Critics of policy analysis cite as a reason for its frequent lack of influence the
tendency of analysts to tackle questions of marginal interest to policy makers
with models that produce unusable information. Serious abuses in problem
identification and in building and using models, particularly large-scale multi-
purpose computer models, are discussed by E. S. Quade in his chapter, "Pit-
falls in Formulation and Modeling." Quade first charts a path for avoiding the
pitfalls encountered in turning a problem situation into something tractable and
relevant-traps such as starting model building and calculation with undue
haste, unquestioning acceptance of stated goals, or measuring what is easily
measurable instead of what is important. In model building and model use,
some pitfalls to avoid are viewing the models as more important than the ques-
tion, adopting academic rather than policy goals, attempting to duplicate reali-
ty, and trying to substitute a model for the decision maker.
The pitfalls that await analysts who collect and process data and the policy
makers who are the consumers of the information produced from that data are
the subject of Stanley Altman's "Pitfalls of Data Analysis." He emphasizes
that data analysis provides the user with evidence from which conclusions can
be drawn, not with conclusions themselves.
Often, some of the most important information produced by an analytic
study is information about costs. It is commonly imagined that cost estimation
is both objective and simple, at least in comparison with the estimation of
benefits. But if the correct measure of the costs of an alternative is the forgone
benefits of the next best alternative, then, Robert Bickner argues in "Pitfalls in
the Analysis of Costs," costs, like benefits, are inevitably a matter of conjec-
ture. Hence good cost analysis requires imagination, as well as caution in using
traditional concepts of cost.
Among the tools and methods used in analysis, optimization techniques oc-
cupy a position of special significance. The chapter by Martin Beale presents a
classification of optimization techniques into five groups and an overview of
their strengths and weaknesses. One serious pitfall of large-scale optimization
models, Beale points out, is that the detailed formulation and implementation
can easily become unintelligible to anyone except their authors, thus greatly
reducing the value of the models as evidence. A first step away from this pitfall
is the adoption of a systematic way of documenting models, and the author
makes some positive suggestions in this direction.
The second group of chapters is concerned with issues relating to the effec-
tiveness of analysis and external criteria of evaluation. Decision makers are
often dissatisfied with the usefulness of analytic studies not so much because
the work is incompetent as because it appears misguided and irrelevant.
Laurence Lynn, Jr., introduces the user's perspective in the seventh chapter of
this volume. After a short discussion of different conceptualizations of decision
making in the public sector, Lynn proceeds to an identification of pitfalls in
analysis from the perspective of a government official facing a complex policy
4decision. The central conclusion from this survey is that analysis often does not
matter in decision making because analysts do not know what matters to deci-
sion makers.
Good communication is an essential condition of social effectiveness. Com-
munication is defined by Arnold Meltsner in his "Don't Slight Communication:
Some Problems of Analytic Practice" as the act of gaining acceptance and
asserting a claim on another person's beliefs. While accepting inadequate infor-
mation is a serious problem for the client, a more familiar problem, and the
author's chief concern, is the domination of the social aspects of the analytic
process by the substantive: high-quality studies are rejected because com-
munication is slighted. Meltsner discusses errors involved in three aspects of
communicating analysis: the choice of audience (recipients), the argument
(content and form), and the means (technique and media).
For policy effectiveness, the objectives, as listed by Eugene Bardach in his
essay "On Designing Implementable Programs," are (a) to achieve the goals
defined by the policy; (b) to hold delay to a reasonable level; and (c) to hold
financial costs to a reasonable level. These goals are not easily attained, for we
understand only imperfectly the limitations on those institutions and in-
struments we normally rely upon to implement policy. Bardach analyzes the
most common obstacles to successful implementation and makes some positive
suggestions about how they may be overcome.
Systems analysis is now increasingly employed in many countries for
program evaluation, Le., for assessing a program's past or current perfor-
mance, usually to determine the impact or effectiveness of that program. Harry
Hatry, in "Pitfalls of Evaluation," discusses the many pitfalls peculiar to this
particular application of systems analysis. These include letting people whose
work is being evaluated, in effect, evaluate themselves; not looking outside the
program for other plausible explanations of the effects; and focusing only on
the overall (average) results without considering the component effects.
In the final essay of the volume, Kathleen Archibald sketches some of the
ambiguities and pitfalls of the language analysts use. Archibald shows how the
meaning of analysis itself has changed as analysts increasingly face phenomena
of culture and behavior that do not fit easily into the standard logical or em-
pirical modes of explanation. Yet the language of systems analysis still derives
largely from these two modes of explanation. By loosening up the working
language, analysis becomes more capable of coping with today's "wicked"
problems.
We have not attempted to treat all pitfalls, or even an classes of pitfalls,
associated with systems analysis. There is, for instance, no thorough discussion
of the pitfalls associated with the problem of choice. The difficulties with
criteria, particularly ratio criteria and the use of wrong concepts of cost and
gain, however, have been wen treated elsewhere by HitchJ and Hitch and
McKean.4 Similarly, we think that pitfalls of statistical inference and
5econometric analysis are sufficiently well covered in the literature and do not
require detailed treatment in this volume.~ Other omissions are the class of pit-
falls associated with the treatment of uncertainty, with the use of suboptimiza-
tion, and with managing a study. Good discussions of these topics can be
found in Hitch and McKean,4 Quade,6 and Holling.' We have also included no
discussion of the pitfalls associated with the use of analysis itself--delays in
reaching decisions, the tendency for the recommendations to call for increased
centralization and concentration of decision making in top-level staff, increased
dependence on complex processes (for example, computerized information
systems) that require continuous attention by expensive talent to work well,
and even the elimination of inefficiency and redundancy that often serves to
meet unexpected contingencies.
A discussion centering on pitfalls is necessarily critical of widespread
methods and practices. This may leave a negative impression on the reader,
tending to obscure the substantial accomplishments of systems analysis. To
minimize this danger, we should perhaps add a few words about the positive
uses to which such a discussion may be put. Because of the nature of the work,
it is impossible to eliminate pitfalls from systems analysis. But the experience of
mature disciplines and professions shows that pitfalls can be largely avoided
once they are identified, and standard methods of avoiding them become part
of the craft knowledge of practitioners. Also, carefully selected examples of pit-
falls, like good counterexamples in the teaching of mathematics, are an effective
way of introducing students of systems analysis to the more subtle aspects of
the craft. More generally, as Ravetz points out,
A recognition and systematic use of the phenomenon of pitfalls might be very effective
in the teaching of those simple but essential craft skills which are involved in scientific,
scholarly, or administrative work. An exposition of standard techniques in terms of the
pitfalls they are designed to circumvent, with examples, could go far to make them
meaningful and obviously worth mastering.8
Avoidance of pitfalls guarantees minimal standards of quality, nothing more.
It does not imply originality, depth, or any other of those intangible qualities
that distinguish the brilliant from the merely competent study; nor can it ensure
the success of the proposed solution. And yet, even meeting these minimal
standards is not an easy task in a world of increasing complexity, pervasive un-
certainty, and fallible knowledge. This volume will have achieved its goal if it
succeeds in suggesting some useful ways of fulfilling this task.
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2 An Anatomy of Pitfalls
Giandomenico Majone
A pitfall is a conceptual error into which, because of its specious plausibility,
people frequently and easily fall. It is "the taking of a false logical path"l that
may lead the unwary to absurd conclusions, a hidden mistake capable of
destroying the validity of an entire argument. Logicians distinguish between a
fallacy-the violation of a logical principle-and a simple falsity or error of
fact. A single statement may be false, but what is fallacious is the transition
from inadequate premises to a conclusion. To fall into a fallacy is to make a
mistake in reasoning, not in what is reasoned about.2 Similarly, in systems
analysis, pitfalls should not be confused with blunders or factual mistakes that
may affect, say, the numerical value of a solution but do not vitiate the basic
structure of the underlying argument.
The earlier literature of systems analysis has devoted considerable attention
to the treatment of pitfalls, and some of these discussions have attained the
status of minor classics of the field. 3 The present chapter attempts to extend
previous work in two ways: by categorizing analytic pitfalls in terms of the
detailed operations by which a problem is investigated and solved; and by
examining in some depth their conceptual roots, particularly in the case of pit-
falls whose newly recognized significance reflects the complexity of the tasks
facing systems analysts today.
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS CRAFT WORK
The real significance of the category "pitfall" is best appreciated in connection
with the craft aspects of analytic work. These aspects have been neglected in
methodological discussions primarily concerned with establishing the scientific
status of the systems approach, or its usefulness as an aid to decision making.
To justify the claims to scientific status, methodologists have stressed at-
tributes, like quantification, objectivity, and formalization, that could be used
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8as criteria to demarcate systematic analysis from informal analysis by intuitive
judgmental processes. Such distinctions may have served a useful role in the
early stages of development of the field, but they overlook the fact that even the
most theoretical forms of knowledge presuppose an extensive matrix of per-
sonal judgments and practical skills. In the words of Jerome Ravetz, "without
an appreciation of the craft character of scientific work there is no possibility of
resolving the paradox of the radical difference between the subjective, intensely
personal activity of creative science, and the objective, impersonal knowledge
which results from it."·
On the other hand, the role of systems analysis in assisting choice is general-
ly discussed in a language that tends to obliterate the distinction between
analysis and decision making. The same categories-objectives, alternatives,
prediction, control, optimization, and so on-are used in both cases, thus set-
ting up a one-to-one correspondence between the stages of the decision process
and the stages of the analytic process. This approach has considerable intuitive
appeal and economizes on terminology, but it has several disadvantages. First,
it mixes description with prescription: what purports to be a description of
analytic operations immediately becomes a prescription for rational decision
making. Second, the decision-making paradigm is modeled on one particular
mode of inquiry-normative prospective analysis. For other, equal1y legitimate
uses of analysis-diagnosis, evaluation, and advocacy, for example-the
categories of decision making are not particularly relevant. Finally, and most
important for the present discussion, this paradigm emphasizes outcome at the
expense of process. Practical decisions are evaluated in terms of actual results,
not by their compliance with procedural or professional standards. Evaluation
by results makes sense when outcomes can be unambiguously classified as
either success or failure, as in the case of goods and services sold on the
market. What counts in the market are the ultimate characteristics of the goods
and services offered for sale, not the process by which they are produced. The
situation is almost reversed in the case of professional work. Because success
depends on many factors outside the control of the professional, and because
the causal link between process and outcome is indirect and uncertain, process
becomes intrinsically important. In health care, for example, "[ mluch, perhaps
most, of what a physician does must be categorized as process, and process not
even calculated to affect outcome.'" Consequently, the criteria of evaluation
used in al1 the mature professions rely heavily on procedural considerations
and craft judgments of adequacy.
In the case of systems analysis, the problem of evaluation is, if anything,
even more delicate. For here it is necessary not only to distinguish between the
quality of an argument and the outcomes of a decision, but also to avoid the
pitfall of relying on the same standards of quality that are used in some of the
older academic disciplines, like physics or mathematics. Analytic arguments
cannot be shown to be true in the sense of mathematical theorems or empirical
9propositions, but only to be adequate in relation to the special features of the
problem, the quality of the data, the limitations of the available tools, and the
needs of the client. Such criteria of adequacy are derived from craft experience,
not from abstract logical canons.
Craft judgments playa significant role at every stage of analysis. Formalistic
accounts of analytic methodology may give an idea of the wealth of tools and
techniques that are available today, but they have little to say about how
choices are made among alternative assumptions, data, and methods of
analysis. These crucial decisions are not guided by theory (since usually no
theory is available), nor merely by intuition (which some methodologists use as
the deus ex machina for anything that cannot be reduced to rule and
algorithm), but by the craft knowledge of the analyst.
The notion of craft suggests an analogy between the work of the analyst and
that of the traditional artisan. In both cases, successful performance depends
on an intimate knowledge of materials, tools, and processes, and on a highly
personal relationship between agent and task. Good analytic work cannot be
produced mechanically any more than handicraft can be mass-produced. Style
plays as big a role in determining the value and acceptability of the analytic
product as it does in the results of the artisan's work. This analogy, like all
analogies, cannot be pushed too far. There are obvious differences: the artisan
uses concrete materials in order to produce objects having an appropriate
shape and serving well-defined purposes; the analyst operates with data,
technical tools, and conceptual constructs to produce arguments supporting
certain conclusions. Despite these differences, the classical Aristotelian analysis
of the craftsman's work in terms of four basic constituents (material, efficient,
formal, and final causes, in Aristotle's terminology) may be usefully extended
to intellectual crafts.6 In the case of systems analysis this leads to identifying
the material component of the analyst's task with the data, information, and
other conceptual inputs used in formulating a problem. The technical tools and
methods used by the analysts represent the efficient component, while the for-
mal component is an argument in which evidence is cited and from which a
conclusion is drawn. The final component is the conclusion itself, with the
related activities of communication and implementation. Accordingly, in the
following discussion, pitfalls of analysis will be grouped, in correspondence
with the basic constituents of the analyst's work, as follows: (a) problem set-
ting, (b) data and information, (c) tools and methods, (d) evidence and argu-
ment, and (e) conclusions, communication, and implementation.
PROBLEM SETTING
Analysis usually starts with something less structured than a problem, namely,
a problem situation. This is an awareness that things are not as they should be,
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but without a clear understanding of the nature of the difficulties and of how
they might be solved. Problem setting is the intellectual process by which a
problem situation is translated into a specific problem. Typical stages of this
process are systems definition, systems diagnosis, and goal setting.
Since the questions asked and the methodological decisions taken in effective
formulation of a problem shape the final conclusions, one can speak of a
phenomenon of preselection-a term introduced by Gerald Holton in dis-
cussing Plato's formulation of the problem of planetary motion. In moving
from problem to solution, Holton writes, "There are many constraints which
have been placed from the beginning on the possible solution in an almost im-
perceptible manner; constraints on the 'facts,' on the hypothesis, and the cor-
respondence between analogon and facts by which we are relieved of the
feeling of puzzlement, by which we 'understand.' "7
Often these constraints are the most difficult ones to detect because they are
deeply embedded in the cultural, institutional, and professional backgrounds of
client and analyst. For example, it seems "natural" for an environmental agen-
cy working on a specific pollution problem to consider only alternatives falling
within its jurisdiction. Even the competent analysts of the Delaware Estuary
Comprehensive Study (DECS) chose to confine their inquiry to the Delaware
estuary for which they were directly responsible instead of considering other
and probably better alternatives for outdoor recreation.8 This exemplifies
the phenomenon of suboptimization and the related pitfall of assuming
that the scope of analysis should coincide with the scope of decision-making
authority.9
The next task facing the DECS analysts was to define the nature of the pollu-
tion problem on the Delaware River. Traditionally, the amount of dissolved
oxygen (DO) in the water has served sanitary engineers as the principal in-
dicator of water quality. It is therefore understandable that the DECS engineers
would take recourse to the received wisdom of their profession. But this
technical decision had major policy consequences. Once DO was accepted as
the relevant indicator, the section of the river experiencing the most serious
pollution problem and urgently requiring public action was automatically iden-
tified: it was the heavily industrialized region between Philadelphia and
Wilmington that was suffering the most acute oxygen sag. Although there was
no reason to believe that raising DO to economically feasible levels in this critical
section of the river would make the Delaware more suitable for recreational and
other uses, this became in fact the focus ofthe technical analyses. And because the
economists responsible for the cost-benefit analyses accepted the engineers'
formulation of the problem uncritically, the policy alternatives from which the
agency had to choose came to be expressed in terms of different DO levels.lO In-
cidentally, this instructive example reveals another pitfall whose importance
has not been sufficiently recognized in the literature. It is often said that any
analyst who accepts the client's initial formulation of the problem uncritically is
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heading for disaster. The case of the DECS shows that it is an equally serious
mistake to accept uncritically the initial problem formulations of technical
experts.
The same lesson can be learned in many other policy areas. Thus, the
assumption that medical needs can be determined objectively on medical
grounds has often led health planners to approach health service decisions as
problems of ascertaining and meeting arbitrarily predetermined needs of the
community, rather than as problems of allocating scarce health resources
among competing programs. The conception of sickness as an objective and
absolute state is largely responsible for the absence of effective rationing
mechanisms in the existing national health systems.u Similar pitfalls in military
planning and systems analysis have been discussed at length by Hitch and
McKean, who also point out other common errors in the selection of choice
criteria.12
An important but often neglected aspect of problem setting is determining
who constitutes the affected group with respect to the policy in question. A
narrow focus on the direct impact of a proposed policy on the decision maker
or the client organization leads to overlooking externalities (such as pollution
and congestion) that may cause more serious problems than those the original
decision attempted to solve.
In defining a system, only a few of the elements and interrelationships that
could be considered can in fact be included. The necessity of preselection and,
at the same time, its inherent dangers become particularly obvious when con-
straints are introduced in order to make the analytic problem more
manageable. The reasoning behind such postulated constraints must be
examined very carefully, for poorly chosen constraints can easily lead to un-
acceptable solutions or to dramatic increases in systems costs. There is, for
example, the often-cited case of a weapon-systems study in which an arbitrary
limitation on acceptable casualties led to solutions in which 100 million dollars
was being spent, at the margin, to save a single life. Many more lives could
probably have been saved with the same amount of resources: the opportunity
cost of the stipulated constraint was high indeed. In some cases it is possible to
calculate such implicit costs by varying the constraints parametrically. Even
when formal calculations are not possible, a rough estimate of the implications
of different feasibility conditions may be enough to avoid serious errors of
judgment.
Because of the unstructured character of a problem situation, the production
and interpretation of data at this stage of the analysis present peculiar
problems. Thus, information obtained through opinion polls or attitude surveys
is particularly sensitive to the way the questions are framed, which in turn may
depend on how the problem is conceived. The distinction between facts and ar-
tifacts, always a tricky one when social and economic data are involved,
becomes particularly difficult when one tries to find out what the problem is.
12
To say, for example, that 4.7% of the labor force is unemployed is only to say that the
result of applying certain operations embodied in a questionnaire and the answers
thereto gave 4.7%. Any economist knows that this number is sensitive to the question-
naire: a simple change in one question may produce a change of half a million in the
number unemployed. 13
Similarly, a reported drop of one or two percentage points in a country's
gross national product used to be viewed as a most significant indication of a
serious problem requiring immediate government action. In fact, national in-
come figures are known only up to an error of ± 10 to ± 15 percent, and com-
parable or greater uncertainty is present in foreign trade, price, unemployment,
and growth statistics."
Finally, in defining a policy problem one should avoid formulations that are
either too broad or too narrow. As some of the examples discussed above
suggest, the second mistake is probably the more common one among
analysts. One reason for this is the mistaken assumption that the amount of
detail that is useful at the problem-setting stage must be the same as that
needed in the phase of problem solving. Actually, even the styles of thinking
differ somewhat in the two cases, with imagination, judgment, and analogical
reasoning playing a larger role in formulating a problem than rigor and
technical skills.
DATA AND INFORMATION
Once the policy problem has been specified, new types of data come into play,
and with them come new types of possible pitfalls. Consider some of the data
problems of econometric analysis. Since model builders do not usually collect
the primary data but rely on figures from a variety of sources, problems of in-
terpretation can be quite serious. Social and economic statistics are collected
according to classification schemes that are often dictated not by logical or
theoretical considerations, but by expediency-the availability of data, the
feasibility of making estimates, the operating procedures of the data-gathering
office. The ad hoc nature of much socioeconomic accounting is seldom
publicized by the data collectors and is often overlooked by the data users.
Professor Streissler tells the story of the econometrician who made the rather
surprising discovery that in Austria profits rose, over a certain period, exactly
as much as wages and salaries. He had apparently forgotten that in the early
days of Austrian national income accounting, profits were assumed-for lack
of data-to move in proportion to wages and salaries.B
Problems of interpretation are compounded by the fact that the data utilized
by the analyst have already gone through several stages of manipulation. Alan
Coddington has vividly described this process:
Economic statistics are the result of the bureaucratic compounding of enormous quan-
tities of fragmentary and even ambiguous pieces of information: the components are
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thrown up as a result (or even as a by-product) of the general administrative processes
of society, from tax-returns, sample surveys, censuses, and so on; the components are
assembled and aggregated by teams of statisticians who have not themselves collected
the information. 16
Sometimes the analyst is in the fortunate position of being able to collect the
primary data, or at least of suggesting an appropriate sampling design. Even
then, the original data are usually much too raw to be used in a model or in an
analytic argument without first being refined into a more reliable and useful
form. Such refining requires craft skills that are rather different from those used
in problem setting and data collection. This new phase of analysis, the transfor-
mation of data into information, is exemplified by a number of familiar
operations, such as calculating averages and other statistical parameters, con-
structing indices, or fitting a curve to a set of points. The operations performed
on the original data may be technically involved or quite simple, but they
always represent a crucial step. From here on, the primary data are no longer
used, except for an occasional check, and analysis is carried out exclusively in
terms of intellectual constructs-with all the advantages and potential pitfalls
of abstract language.
Two basic craft judgments are involved in the production of information:
that the equation or model fits the data sufficiently well, and that this particular
transformation of the data, out of the many theoretically possible, is the signifi-
cant one. There are, of course, standard statistical tests for judging goodness of
fit, but a purely statistical validation provides weak evidence in the absence of
good theoretical reasons for the choice. It is always possible to try empirical
equations in succession until one is discovered that fits the data to any desired
degree of accuracy. Alternatively, one can always improve the fit simply by
adding to the model variables exhibiting the requisite type of behaviour-
although the substantive significance of such variables may be quite doubtful.
These possibilities explain the frequency of alleged discoveries of beautifully
simple laws governing an amazing variety of social and natural phenomena.
William Feller makes the point with his usual brilliance:
An unbelievably huge literature tried to establish a transcendental "law of logistic
growth." ... Lengthy tables, complete with chi-square tests, supported this thesis for
human populations, for bacterial colonies, development of railroads, etc. Both height
and weight of plants and animals were found to follow the logistic law even though it is
theoretically clear that these two variables cannot be subject to the same distribution.
Laboratory experiments on bacteria showed that not even systematic disturbances can
produce other results. Population theory relied on logistic extrapolations (even though
they were demonstrably unreliable). The only trouble with the theory is that not only
the logistic distribution but also the normal, the Cauchy, and other distributions can be
fitted to the same material with the same or better goodness offit. In this competition
the logistic distribution plays no distinguished role whatever; most contradictory
theoretical models can be supported by the same observational materialsY
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The second kind of judgment, concerning the relevance of a particular piece
of information, is more delicate than any goodness-of-fit test. Quade gives an
entertaining example of a pitfall involving a judgment of relevance: the use,
during World War I, of the arithmetic instead of the harmonic mean in com-
puting turnarounds of troop and cargo ships of different speeds. 18 The mistake
is admittedly rather trivial, though fairly common even today, but it is precisely
its elementary character that shows how easy it is to stumble into pitfalls in
even the simplest aggregation of data. As a more advanced example, one can
mention the so-called "ecological fallacy," well known to statisticians and
social scientists but less familiar to systems analysts despite its importance,
particularly in regional and urban planning. The pitfall consists in using
ecological correlations (i.e., statistical correlations in which the variables are
properties of groups, such as percentages or means for each of the 50 states of
the United States) as substitutes for the usual individual correlations. But
ecological correlations are not appropriate substitutes for individual ones since,
as Robinson has shown,19 the two correlations in general are different (they
may even differ in sign), and the values of ecological correlations depend
strongly on the type of grouping used.
There are few formal tests of relevance comparable to the statistical tests of
goodness of fit, and these few are of limited use in systems analysis.20
Theoretical considerations can provide some guidance, but basically the judg-
ment of whether a curve, an equation, or a model is of the right type depends
on the craft experience of the analyst.
TOOLS AND METHODS
The tools of systems analysis may be roughly classified according to their func-
tion in the production, manipulation, and interpretation of data. Having dis-
cussed some of the pitfalls encountered in the production and manipulation of
data, we can go on to consider the category of interpretive tools, which in-
cludes tool disciplines like mathematics, statistics, and economics that are con-
stantly needed in analytic work.
This heavy dependence on tool disciplines creates special problems for the
teaching as well as for the practice of systems analysis. Today, students of
systems analysis are exposed to academic curricula that vary from school to
school and that represent tentative compromises among different intellectual
traditions. Sometimes the compromise is reached more at the level of language
than of deep understanding. There results a sort of jargon that, because of its
composite character and lack of depth, tends to mask ambiguities and subtle
differences in meaning that are at the root of many pitfalls. Also, concepts and
techniques removed from their broader disciplinary context quickly become
stereotypes, and their limitations are not easily perceived by people primarily
interested in immediate applicability.
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The danger of misuse of the formal tools of analysis is made particularly
acute by the "prevailing metaphysics,"21 according to which the scientific
character of a field is assumed to be in direct proportion to the degree of its
mathematical or statistical formalization. In this perspective, quantification and
algorithmic elegance almost become ends in themselves, not only at the cost of
what cannot be easily quantified but also at the expense of a deeper under-
standing of the substance of the problem. A related point has been raised by
Myron Tribus. He argues that the statistical methods routinely employed in the
study of cloud-seeding experiments are unsatisfactory because they assume
that all that counts are the experimental results while paying insufficient atten-
tion to the elucidation of the underlying physical mechanisms. 22 His con-
clusions have general relevance for systems analysis: when the system under
study is complex and highly dependent on what happens at a particular branch
point, one cannot learn much about systems behavior by merely looking at
some simple measures of the outcome; statistical and other formal techniques
of analysis cannot replace detailed investigations of the fine structure of the
system.
In disciplines with a long intellectual tradition, the introduction of new tools
usually opens up lines of research that were previously inaccessible. In newer
fields, technical innovations often give rise to the phenomenon of "new-
toolism," a disease to which systems analysts seem to be particularly
predisposed. Those affected by this disease become "possessed of and by new
tools (various forms of mathematical programming, vast air-battle simulation
machine models, queuing models and the like), and they look earnestly for a
problem to which one of these tools might conceivably apply."23
Formalism, new toolism, and mechanitis-"putting ... machines to work as
a substitute for hard thinking"24-are characteristic symptoms of a stage of
disciplinary development in which generally accepted criteria of adequacy are
still lacking. Powerful methods developed in different contexts and by other dis-
ciplines are adopted enthusiastically and uncritically, only to be abandoned
after a few years when the hoped-for results fail to materialize.2$ In the effort of
bringing the field toward maturity, the temptation to adopt the criteria of
adequacy of successful academic disciplines, along with their methods, is un-
derstandably strong. But experience shows that such imitations are seldom
fruitful and if carried far enough may lead to the production of vacuous results.
The reason is that the criteria of adequacy of an intellectual craft are intimately
related to the characteristic pitfalls of the problems investigated by its prac-
titioners, and these pitfalls are very particular to the data, tools, and patterns of
arguments used in that field.26
The composite nature of systems analysis, in which descriptive, prescriptive,
evaluative, and advocacy elements are so intertwined as to be virtually in-
separable, increases the difficulty of establishing useful criteria of adequacy;
this is shown by the abortive attempts to define principles of professional prac-
tice that might provide guidance to analysts involved in policy argumentsP
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EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT
The argument is the link connecting data and information with the conclusions
of a study. The structure of an analytic argument is typically a complex blend
of methodological considerations, factual statements, interpretations, evalua-
tions, and recommendations. Along with mathematical and logical deductions,
it will include statistical and empirical inferences, guesses, references to
previous studies and expert opinions, discussions of alternative criteria of
choice, and caveats and provisos of different kinds. This unavoidable complexi-
ty rules out the possibility of any formal testing, and hence any possibility of
proving or refuting the final conclusions. Whatever testing can be done at this
stage of the work must rely on a variety of disciplinary standards, correspon-
ding to the different techniques and methods used in the argument, on the
plausibility and robustness of the results, and on the client's criteria of
usefulness.
The nature of the evidence plays a crucial role in the process, since a wrong
assessment of the strength and fit of evidence before it is included in the argu-
ment can lead to pitfalls in the drawing of conclusions. As the term is used
here, evidence is not the same as data or information. Rather, it is information
selected from the available stock and introduced at a specific point of the argu-
ment in order to persuade a particular audience of the truth or falsity of a state-
ment. An inappropriate selection of data or models, their placement at a wrong
point in the argument, a style of presentation inappropriate to the audience at
which the argument is directed-any of these can destroy the effectiveness of
information as evidence, regardless of its intrinsic cognitive value. Hence,
criteria of assessment of evidence are different from those applicable to "facts."
While facts can be evaluated in terms of general logical canons, the acceptabili-
ty of evidence depends on a number of factors peculiar to a given situation, like
the nature of the case, the type of audience, the prevailing "rules of evidence,"
and even the persuasiveness of the analyst.
The category of evidence has received little attention in the natural sciences,
and, perhaps because of this, it has also been neglected in methodological dis-
cussions of systems analysis. But the two situations are different in this as in
other respects, and what is justifiable in the one case is a serious pitfall in the
other. Ravetz points out that neither descriptive nor theoretical natural sciences
require highly developed skills in testing evidence, beyond the tests already in-
volved in producing information, for here one usually has either a large mass of
information with a relatively simple argument or a complex argument needing
evidence at only a few points. However, there are fields where problems
typically involve both complex arguments and large masses of data and where
the reliability and relevance of information itself cannot automatically be
trusted. Law and history are two such fields, and here evidence has been
explicitly recognized as an autonomous conceptual category.
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Although complexity of argument and large amounts of data of doubtful
reliability are also characteristic features of systems studies, suitable rules of
evidence have not yet been developed by the analytic profession. However,
some of the preceding discussion is relevant in this context. For example, in
judging the acceptable level of accuracy of a set of data used as evidence, one
must keep in mind that different standards apply to different kinds of data.
After all, even in the natural sciences an error of a bil1ion years for estimates of
the age of the earth is found acceptable, while a basic physical constant may be
quoted with a possible error of, say, \0-14.
Again, the contemporary fashion of using mathematical arguments on every
possible occasion produces a tendency to accept numerical results as facts
rather than evidence. The sensitivity of those results to changes in the data, in
the model, or in the estimation procedures is easily forgotten. Worse sti1I, we do
not even know which of these changes may have a greater effect on the results.
Thus, one study comparing two estimation procedures for a five-equation
econometric model using two sets of data concludes that "[t]he variances due
to the estimation method are greater than those due to the data revisions, which
indicates that the choice of estimating procedure has more effect on the
parameter estimates than the choice of data."28 On the other hand, the authors
of a study also comparing ordinary least squares with two-stage least squares,
but for a much larger model and using three sets of data, find that "[ vlariations
in parameter estimates are generally much greater between different sets of
data than between different methods of estimation, at least for the model and
methods used in this paper,"29
The value of large-scale models as evidence is often very doubtful. Poor
documentation makes it almost impossible for anyone but the modelers
themselves to reproduce the results, On the other hand, a complete documenta-
tion would be too voluminous to be properly digested even by an expert
evaluator. Sometimes a model is kept proprietary for commercial reasons and
the customer is allowed to see the results but not the assumptions. 30 Summing
up the state of the art as it stood a few years ago, Lee writes:
Large models are not simply constructed and operated; they must be "massaged" into
being, first to make them operate at all and then to get sensible output. Inevitably this
requires numerous special features in the computer program that keep the model from
going out of bounds, so that output described as "reasonable" is a self-fulfilling
tautology. The model produces reasonable results because its builders imposed con-
straints on the model's operation that prevented it from producing anything else.
Because the models contain large but unknown amounts of error and they are too com-
plex, and there are no evaluation measures, modelers have little choice except to fudge
the models into shape.31
Like legal arguments, analytic arguments cannot be properly evaluated un-
less they are set out in a sequence of steps conforming to certain basic rules of
procedure. The evaluation of evidence is an activity that always involves for-
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malities. The legal scholar asks: What different sorts of propositions are uttered
in the course of a law case, and in what different ways can such propositions
and the supporting evidence bear on the soundness of a legal claim? Without
the large number of distinctions recognized by legal doctrine (statements of
claims, different kinds of evidence, testimony, proof of facts, presumptions, and
so on) it is impossible to understand the nature of the legal process.32 To adapt
the legal analogy to our case, reliance on mathematical modeling and other
analytic techniques is not a guarantee that an argument is "in proper form." A
mathematical style of presentation is not incompatible with a black box ap-
proach, and may even encourage it. No amount of technical virtuosity can
compensate for carelessness in drawing the necessary distinctions between
assumptions, data, facts, evidence, and conclusion, or for a lack of sophistica-
tion in understanding their respective roles in the overall economy of an
argument.
CONCLUSIONS, COMMUNICATION, IMPLEMENTATION
The conclusion of an analytic study may be a forecast, the clarification of an
issue, a recommendation, an assessment of ongoing policies, a new idea, or a
different perspective on an old policy problem. Whatever its nature, a conclu-
sion is not concerned with directly perceived "facts," but with the intellectual
constructs that have served as the objects of the argument. A different concep-
tualization of the problem, a different choice of analytic tools, a few different
assumptions made at crucial points in the argument can easily lead to quite
different conclusions. Thus the contact with the external world is always in-
direct and elusive. This is true for any kind of intellectual inquiry, including the
natural sciences. But in science the pitfalls encountered when a conceptual
system makes contact with reality can be detected, before too much harm is
done, by various means, including controlled experiments, that reduce the
abruptness of the impact. In systems analysis, where the possibilities of
experimentation are severely limited, the lack of certainty of the conclusions
lies at the root of the deeper problems of communication and implementation.
The current emphasis on implementation problems is a useful counter-
balance to the excessive reliance of many analysts on normative decision
models and on the pure logic of choice, on analysis rather than on synthesis
and design. The decision theorist does not need to distinguish between decision
and action: if the decision does not lead to the corresponding act, it is because
something occurred to prevent it, and a new decision problem arises.33 But this
is a purely formal solution, of no help whatsoever for designing policies with
fewer things that can go wrong. As a stage of analysis, implementation may be
thought of as a gedankenexperiment performed by the analyst in an attempt to
recognize in advance the many pitfalls and obstacles on the path that leads
from decisions and plans to deeds and results.34
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The contact between a conceptual system-the conclusions of an analytic
study-and external reality is also problematic in another sense that cor-
responds to the second meaning "implementation" has in systems analysis: the
ability of an investigation to improve systems behavior by redirecting or rein-
forcing the beliefs and attitudes of policy makers, managers, operators, and
other relevant audiences. Here we are faced with a dilemma that, although it
turns out to be more apparent than real, can easily confuse the analyst and
thus represents a serious potential pitfall. Rational arguments are only partial
determinants of attitudes: an element of persuasion is involved in any attempt
to suggest one rather than another view, judgment, or course of action. Thus in
order to be effective, an analyst must also be an advocate. But he is also a firm
believer in the virtues of the scientific method, and this belief is generally
associated with a distaste for problems of communication and persuasion,
while favoring the pitfall that Kahn and MannB have called hermitism.
One way to defuse the conflict between practical effectiveness and scientific
integrity is to note that many outstanding scientists have not been loath to use
persuasion when the situation seemed to require it. Thus, eminent historians of
science like Duhem and Koyre have likened the work of Galileo to
propaganda.
But propaganda of this kind is not a marginal affair that mayor may not be added to
allegedly more substantial means of defence, and that should perhaps be avoided by
the "professionally honest scientist." In the circumstances we are considering now,
propaganda is of the essence. It is of the essence because interest must be created at a
time when the usual methodological prescriptions have no point of attack; and because
this interest must be maintained ... until new reasons arrive.36
Discussing Adam Smith's principles of division of labor and free exchange, two
well-known economists write:
It is interesting that Smith's book did not contain a logically correct exposition; instead
it contained a masterfully persuasive statement of the results of free exchange. It was
Robert Torrens, who some forty years after the idea had been "sold," demonstrated its
logical validity. Possibly, had Smith tried to give a logically air-tight demonstration, in-
stead of a suggestive plausible interpretation, he would never have made his "point"
popular.37
George Stigler adds Mill, Jevons, and Bohm-Bawerk to the list of famous
economists who "have employed the techniques of the huckster."38
In systems analysis, as in science and in everyday reasoning, few arguments
are purely rational or purely persuasive. A careful blend of reason and persua-
sion is usually more effective than exclusive reliance on one or the other. Style,
elegance of expression, novel modes of communication (like Galileo's brilliant
use of Italian instead of Latin) are often important means of winning support
for a novel idea and overcoming preconceived hostility and institutional inertia.
The practical question, therefore, is not whether to use persuasion, but which
form of persuasion to use and when. It has been suggested that analysis should
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be done in two stages: a first stage to find out what one wants to recommend,
and a second stage to make the recommendation convincing "even to a hostile
and disbelieving, but intelligent audience."39 This is sound advice, as long as it
is not interpreted as implying that communication and implementation are dis-
crete and separable parts of analysis, rather than integral components of a con-
tinuous process. Of systems analysis, more perhaps than of any other intellec-
tual activity, it can truly be said that "creation of a thing, and creation plus full
understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts ofone and the
same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process
to a stop."40 For this reason, the conceptual and institutional separation of
thinking from doing, of planning from deciding and implementing, must be
considered the most serious pitfall of applied systems analysis.
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3 Pitfalls in Formulation and Modeling
E. S. Quade
Problem formulation, or problem setting, and modeling, particularly for predic-
ting the consequences of a possible action, are closely related activities in
systems analysis. Problem formulation, involving as it does the simplification
of a subset of the real world selected for study, may, in fact, be considered part
of the modeling process because the assumptions about the problem setting
affect the predictions of the consequences, with the model being the analyst's
conception of the factors and relationships significant to his investigation. Craft
judgment, much more than theory, governs both activities.
The purpose of this chapter is to call attention to some of the pitfalls to be
found in problem formulation and in modeling and to offer comments that may
help others to recognize and avoid them.
FORMULAnON
The initiation of a systems or policy analysis usually means that someone is dis-
satisfied with the current or projected state of affairs. He may, however, have
only the vaguest ideas of where the "problem" lies. An analyst, seeking to help
find ways to improve the situation, particularly when the issue is a public one,
almost always finds himself facing not a "problem" but something between a
cluster of problems (what the French call a problematique) and a mess.' To
help, the analyst must identify the problem to be studied and define its scope in
such a way that he has some hope of finding an acceptable and implementable
solution within the economic, political, technological, and other constraints
that exist, including the limitations imposed by the policy maker's span of con-
trol and the time available for decision.
Problem formulation is concerned with such things as determining the goals
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or objectives to be achieved by a solution, setting boundaries on what is to be
investigated, making assumptions about the context, identifying the target
groups, and selecting the initial approach the analysis is to take. Much depends
on the judgment of the analyst. Checkland (1978) points out one major reason
for this:
Problems ... in the world are unbounded, in the sense that any factors assumed to be
part of the problem will be inseparably linked to many other factors. Thus an apparent-
ly technical problem of transportation becomes a land-use problem, which is seen to be
part of a wider environment-conservation problem, which is itself a political problem.
Do these then become part of the original problem? Can any boundary be drawn?
How can the analyst justify the limits that practicality forces him to impose?
But there are other difficulties and thus numerous opportunities for the analyst to
go astray.
INSUFFICIENT A'ITENTION TO FORMULATION
One great pitfall is to be in such a hurry to get started on the "real work" of
analysis that one pays insufficient attention to formulation and ends up
working on a problem that has little relation to the real issue, or on which no
real progress can be made with the time and resources available, or in which no
one has any interest. As Brewer (1975) remarks: "The simple question, 'What's
the problem?' is often never asked at all by the analyst; it is assumed."
First, proper formulation is important. A large share of the effort of the
leaders of a project (up to 40 percent is an estimate by a number of analysts;
more, if we are to believe the old saying that "a problem well-put is half
solved") needs to be invested in thinking about what problem is the right
problem, exploring its proper breadth, and trying to discover what the objec-
tives should be. Wellington (1887), a forerunner of modern systems analysis,
clearly recognized the importance of problem formulation:
As the correct solution of any problem depends primarily on a true understanding of
what the problem really is, and wherein lies its difficulty, we may profitably pause upon
the threshold of our subject to consider first, in a more general way, its real
nature--the causes which impede sound practice; the conditions on which success or
failure depends; the directions in which error is most to be feared Thus we shall more
fully attain that great prerequisite for success in any work-a clear mental perspective,
saving us from confusing the obvious with the important and the obscure and remote
with the unimportant.
Many analysts, trained in the quantitative techniques of operations research
rather than in the craft aspects of policy analysis, have the feeling that until
models are constructed and calculations are started nothing really analytic has
been done. But for what purposes are the calculations to be carried out, and
with what models? It is of very little use for analysts to compare alternatives
that the policy makers cannot adopt because they involve action outside the
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policy makers' sphere of influence or because they have features that any
political observer could see to be unacceptable. The analyst, to be helpful, must
select a formulation that is useful to the decision maker.
How the problem should be formulated depends on the use to which the
analysis is to be put. For identifying policies that are feasible and desirable, one
must be able to screen many variations rapidly and inexpensively (in terms of
computer and human costs) in ways that are responsive to suggestions. If, on
the other hand, the purpose is implementation, say of a particular means of
transportation once the general type has been selected, the analysis must, and
can, be detailed and concrete since the alternatives are ordinarily relatively
similar and differ in detail rather than in concept. The pitfall is to take the latter
approach when the former is wanted. If the decision makers really want the
analysis as an excuse for inaction and delay or.as a facade for promoting their
preconceived ideas or if they do not care what is produced"... as long as they,
the research sponsors, get credit for having been modern, management-
oriented, and scientific ..." (Brewer, 1975), they may lead the analyst into this
trap.
UNQUESTIONING ACCEPTANCE OF STATED GOALS AND CONSTRAINTS
Another pitfall is uncritical acceptance of the client's or policy maker's state-
ment of his objectives and of the constraints on the actions to be considered.
(Incidentally, the opposite action would be an equaJly serious or even greater
error-to pay no attention to the client's statement about what he wants and
how he wants it. But it cannot be considered a pitfall, for it is not a trap into
which an analyst could fall blindly; at the start of an analysis there are too
many circumstances that keep the analyst's attention on the policy maker's
words. Later, of course, memory may weaken, particularly if the policy maker
loses contact with the study effort. Indeed, almost every pitfall we mention has
an opposite number, which may, or may not, also be a pitfall, for to concen-
trate on any aspect of the analysis to excess is an error. Thus, to delay too long
in starting a study would be an error, but it is not something an analyst is likely
to do inadvertently and without good reason. Sponsors seldom want to allow
time for a thorough job to be done anyway; hence there is always pressure to
get started.)
To compound the difficulties with formulation, the clearly identified decision
maker of the early days of military systems analysis, who was assumed
(sometimes erroneously even in those days) to be a goal-oriented individual
who actually made decisions that stuck by taking into consideration the
probable consequences of his possible courses of action, has largely vanished.
Instead, with today's spread of systems analysis into less disciplined areas, the
policy maker or client is usually no more than a key participant in a process
that involves numerous decision-making bodies, using the analysis for argu-
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ment and evidence. Decisions may thus be taken several times or not at all.
Public opinion has emerged as an intermediary between analytic results and the
policy makers. As a consequence, packaging is often proving more significant
than the product.
In fact, the analysis needs to be carried out and presented in such a way that
its results are accepted by the multitude of decision makers, and in such a way
that their decision is implemented in the way called for. To be fully successful,
from the analyst's point of view, the analysis must provide help on how to do
what should be done.
To help a decision maker, it is crucial to know what he wants. To be
"rational" in his choice of action, the chooser has to know what he wants to
achieve. A policy maker will usually have an idea of what he wants done, but
his objectives may not be very well thought out; not only may they be so vague
that no way exists to tell in the end whether they have been achieved or not,
but they may also be inconsistent, encompassing clearly conflicting goals.
Also, until considerable analysis has been done, the decision maker may not be
aware that the implications of his objectives include things he does not want or
ought not to want.
The point is that objectives cannot be taken as given but must be in-
vestigated. Means are sometimes confused with ends: a decision maker may
say his problem is where to place a new comprehensive health center in his dis-
trict, but his real goal may be to improve health services in his community. In
that case, a better way to do so may be to provide several smaller
neighborhood health centers or to provide services through other mechanisms
(e.g., hospital outpatient clinics, group practices). Perhaps programs focusing
on maternal and child health services should be considered, or attempts to
screen apparently well people to discover heart defects. If, in these cir-
cumstances, the analyst sets out merely to find the optimum location for the
health center, he is not using the full potential of analysis, and other studies, or
advice from other sources, or even the mere idea that a better alternative may
exist, are likely to push his work aside.
An illustration of an analysis that avoided the means/end trap is found in the
New York City Rand Institute Fire Department Deployment Study. Here the
analysts succeeded in switching their primary effort from the decision makers'
desire for a computerized communications system designed to relieve the
workload problem to a direct attack on the workload problem itself, finding in
the process that computerizing the communications system would bring
negligible improvement.2
It is a pitfall to believe that goals should, or can, be set independently of the
means to obtain them. There is considerable evidence that, on the contrary,
operationally significant objectives are often the result of opportunities offered
by means that become available rather than the source of their discovery. The
goal of landing a man on the moon was not set until it became feasible to do so.
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The reason: it is usually impossible to select satisfactory objectives without
some idea of the cost and difficulty of attaining them. Further, not all of the
consequences of the various actions that may be necessary to attain an objec-
tive can be anticipated before analysis; there may be unpleasant side effects
that render these actions, and thus their goals, completely unacceptable.
The constraints imposed by the client or the decision maker are in the same
category as goals, for it is doubtful if any real distinction can be made between
goals and constraints of this type (Simon, 1964), for goals are little more than
constraints selected for special attention because they motivate the decision
maker or because it is convenient for the analysis. (There are, of course, other
constraints imposed by nature or sometimes by higher-level decisions that are
unambiguous and irremovable.)
A client's constraints can sometimes be arbitrary and ill-founded. In a case
cited by White (1975), "the senior executive, ... refused to consider certain
alternatives, probably not because they were not worthwhile, but probably
because someone else thought they were worthwhile, and he wished the study
to emanate from his own ideas."
The translation of a decision maker's desires into something operational
-that is, into measurable objectives or into a set of constraints-is a path full
of pitfalls. For example, once a constraint, a limit value, is established by, or in
concurrence with, the decision maker, it can distort the results significantly.
Majone (1978, p. 20) points out:
... the opportunity cost of a proposed policy constraint must be carefully considered
before the constraint becomes firmly embedded in the analytic structure. As Hitch and
McKean (1960, p. 196) write, "casually selected or arbitrary constraints can easily in-
crease system cost or degrade system performance manyfold, and lead to solutions
that would be unacceptable to the person who set the constraints in the first place."
They cite the example of a weapon-systems study, where a constraint on acceptable
casualties led to solutions in which 100 million dollars was being spent, at the margin,
to save a single life. Many more lives could have been saved with the same resources.
Had the policymakers realized the opportunity cost of their safety requirements, they
would probably have set them at a lower level. Or, like good utilitarians, they may have
chosen to treat the risk factor as a subgoal, to be optimized compatibly with other
systems' requirements and the available resources.
MEASURING ACmEVEMENT BY PROXY
Worthy and apposite objectives are necessary, but for the purposes of analysis
it is desirable that they also be clear and measurable, or that good surrogates or
proxies exist. A good proxy is one that tells us with acceptable accuracy how
well the real objective is being attained. To measure the health status of a pop-
ulation, mortality rates are often used (Grosse, 1971, p. 19). This, of course, is
in the right direction; the pitfall is that a mortality rate ignores many factors
that are important to good health.
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The mark of a good measure of effectiveness is that it closely reflects the
objectives. Unfortunately, there are a number of pitfalls that lie in the path of
the analyst who tries to find such a measure.
One crude scheme is to use input to measure output, as, for example, in
comparing the quality of primary-school education in various districts in terms
of the expenditure per pupil. A second is to use workload or efficiency
measures to compare quality of output. Consider a single unambiguous goal,
say to improve garbage collection. To compare alternatives, we need a scale on
which to measure their effectiveness. But, as there is no obvious scale to
measure better garbage collection, we have to use a proxy-a measure such as
the percentage of city blocks remaining without health hazards, or the reduc-
tion in the number of fires involving uncollected solid waste, or in rodent bites,
or in valid citizen complaints. Unfortunately, all of these treat just one or a few
aspects, not the full value of better garbage collection. In practice, people often
use even less satisfactory scales, for instance, an efficiency measure-number
of tons collected per man-hour-or a workload measure-tons of waste
collected-that indicate nothing about the quality of the work.
A third approach, where there are a number of attributes that should be con-
sidered, is to devise a composite index of worth, sayan ordinal or cardinal utili-
ty function. The possible danger here is that the function is to a large extent the
product of the analyst's judgment of the decision makers' values and their
weights and not that of the decision makers themselves. The decision makers, if
they were willing to spend the time, could work out their own set of weights
(with guidance from the analyst) but even here the analyst's influence is power-
ful. Hatry (1970) comments:
There is no doubt that the job of decisionmaker would be easier if a single effectiveness
measure could appropriately be used. However, I contend that such procedures place
the analyst in the position of making a considerable number of value judgments that
rightfully should be made in the political decisionmaking process, and not by the
analyst. Such value judgments are buried in the procedures used by the analysts and
are seldom revealed to, or understood by, the decisionmakers.
Such hocus pocus in the long run tends to discredit analysis and distract significantly
from what would be its principal role.
One would like measures of effectiveness to reflect in a measurable way the
ultimate good effect intended. For example, in a school health program aimed
at detecting and correcting medical conditions that handicap a child's social
adjustment or academic achievement, the ideal measure is the increase in the
number of such children who, as a result of the program, engage in less socially
aberrant behavior and make better grades. Unfortunately, improvement in
behavior or even in grades due to a health program may be so difficult or
expensive to measure that measurement of some intermediate goal may be
operationally more significant Thus, the number of health examinations given,
or the number of children with handicapping conditions who are detected, or
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the number of those detected with handicapping conditions who receive ap-
propriate medical treatment, or the number of those who receive appropriate
treatment who have their handicap corrected, or even measurement of the
number of handicapped children who are missed or not treated may have to
serve as a proxy to indicate the success of the program. Actually, even our
ideal measure is defective, for we should be talking about learning, not grades,
if we remember what's important rather than what's measurable.
MISJUDGING TIlE DIFFICULTIES
Another pitfall lies in the misjudgment by the analyst of the difficulties of
problem solving in the practical world of affairs as contrasted with the
laboratory or classroom. In the latter the analyst or scientist can decide for
himself where to bound his problem. (The formulation of scientific problems is
no less important; as has often been said, scientific reputations are made in
choosing the problem.) The systems analyst, on the other hand, must tackle
what is there, and problems in the real world tend to proliferate. An analyst can
set out to tackle far more than he can handle with the time and resources
available. He can trap himself if he does not realize that he is not going to give
a complete solution to the decision maker's problem. At best, he will produce
evidence that other analysts will find hard to refute. As Holling (1978, p. 170)
puts it:
Any useful analysis is based on an abstraction of reality. Such analyses therefore will
always be incomplete. Attempts to "include everything" result in ambiguity, confusion,
and intractability. The irony is that the more rigorous and organized the attempt to
abstract a useful portion of reality for analysis, the more tempting it is to presume that
those features left out of the analysis are unimportant. The more effectively the known
is analyzed, the more likely it is that decisions will be based upon the analysis. But the
unknown cannot be ignored, and any attempt to do so is bound to end in unpleasant
surprises and policy failures....
An analyst, of course, must be just as careful to tell his client what he has
not done and not included as he is to describe his results, for otherwise he may
trap his client into the belief his results mean more than they do.
Analyses, except those directly requested by the decision maker or his im-
mediate staff, require considerable time to penetrate to the decision maker; un-
less there is vigorous lobbying, it may take several years. If analysts want their
work to affect policy, they must allow time for it to reach the policy maker
before the moment for decision is past, as well as time to do the study.
BIAS
Finally, the analyst must guard against the biases introduced during formula-
tion, a pitfall found elsewhere in the process, but to a lesser degree. Some biases
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are well known, such as deliberately giving preference to aspects that are easy
to quantify and neglecting the intangible, unquantifiable ones. Others are more
subtle, introduced, say, because the analyst unconsciously acquires the goals
and preferences of the organization for which he works. As a naval analyst, for
example, he may consider only "scenarios" that are ideally suited for employ-
ment of the weapons he advocates. Wilson (1973) finds these latter biases to be
almost universal, observing that "[al1l policy interventions in social problems
produce the intended effect-if the research is carried out by those implemen-
ting the policy or their friends." If, however, the research is carried out by those
skeptical of the policy, the opposite holds.
Wilson goes on to say:
Rarely does anyone deliberately fudge the results of a study to conform to pre-existing
opinions. What is frequently done is to apply very different standards of evidence and
method. [Agency studies] accept an agency's own data about what it is doing and with
what effect, adopt a time frame (long or short) that maximizes the probability of obser-
ving the desired effect, and minimize the search for other variables that might account
for the effect observed. [Independent studies] will gather data independently of the
agency, adopt a short time frame that either minimizes the chance for the desired effect
to appear or, if it does appear, permits one to argue that the results are "temporary"
and probably due to the operation of the "Hawthorne Effect" (i.e., the reaction of the
subjects to the fact that they are part of an experiment), and maximize the search for
other variables that might explain the effects observed.
Parochialism, the "cherished belief," or adherence to a "party line" has been
called by Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann (1957) "... the single, most impor-
tant reason for the tremendous miscalculations made in foreseeing and
preparing advances or changes in the strategic situation." Today, the introduc-
tion of bias by the analyst is well recognized, as Lesourne (1977, p. 75) notes:
... Ten years ago, there was a tendency to consider that a model produced by a team
did depend on the decision studied and on the policymaker's objectives, but was not
affected by the team itself, except by the team's intellectual abilities. Now we are begin-
ning to realize, under the influence of new ideologies, that, as with the reconstruction of
history, what OR professionals produce is partly conditioned by their goals. their
values, the culture to which they belong.
Lesourne goes on to say that the presence of such bias does not mean
systems analysis must be abandoned, "... but it introduces relativity into a
field in which some of us have been trained in over-positivist attitudes." Even
though most analysts strive to be objective, the knowledge that bias is often
there underlines the need for competing studies of the same issue, with their
different sets of biases.
The decision maker, as client or problem giver, can also trap the analyst by
forcing assumptions on him or merely by expressing such strong prejudices
against certain alternatives that the analyst feels their investigation is not
worthwhile. The natural tendency of the decision maker is to keep the range of
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alternatives narrow, but he may pay a high price, as some of the excluded alter-
natives may be far superior to those remaining.
PITFALLS IN MODELING
Let us turn now to models and modeling. Models, in my definition, include any
procedure that is meant to help the policy or decision maker and his staff
predict the consequences of proposed courses of action. Models may be im-'
plicit or conceptual, existing only within the mind of the decision maker (and
possibly rife with pitfalls), but we will confine our attention to explicit models
designed by others. These latter may take many forms-physical, natural
language, mathematical equations, or a computer program, for instance--and
the method of prediction may be judgment, physical manipulation, numerical
approximation, or simulation, among others. The role of the policy model is to
tell or predict what would happen were the decision maker to adopt a par-
ticular course of action, and in some cases it is also to indicate the one he
should (on some explicit basis) prefer-processes obviously full of difficulties if
not pitfalls.
EQUATING MODEUNG WITH ANALYSIS
Analysis without the use of some sort of model, explicit or otherwise, is im-
possible. Many analysts, unfortunately, tend to view modeling as identical with
analysis and even with policy making itself. But models are only one ingredient
and modeling only one step in policy analysis; searching out the right problem,
designing better alternatives for consideration, and skillfully interpreting the
computations from the model and relating them to the decision maker's
problem are equally significant. In Bruce Goeller's (1977) analogy, models are
major tools in the analysis of policy, just as brushes and palette are major tools
in painting. A model is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Forgetting that
precept can trap policy analysts into acting as if the model they set out to build
were more important than the question they set out to help answer. That is,
they begin to tailor their model to simulate, to greater and greater perfection,
larger and larger segments of the situation of interest, knowing full well that
much must be left out Often this is done without the specific problem in mind,
with no thought to the decision the model is to guide, or even to who the real
decision maker, with his preferences and constraints, will be. For this last
reason alone, it is no wonder that decision makers so frequently find model
results irrelevant and unusable.
Analysts, in addition, become wedded to a particular modeling ap-
proach--say, optimization, systems dynamics, or input-output-and then
tend to adapt the problem to fit the model type they know best rather than the
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other way around. But it is the problem that is important; adapting it to the
demands of a particular model form can change it. Moreover, even if that were
not pitfall enough, each method has its characteristic traps that modelers must
constantly guard against. 3
For example, computer simulation may be selected as the modeling
technique because it is well understood, very easy to set up, and seems to be the
least costly. But it is only inexpensive in the model-building stage (Bowen,
1978). In fact, a simulation is likely to be the least desirable of models. It offers
low insight, since it does not provide an explanation of the observed results,
and it may involve a long and expensive analysis phase. Nevertheless, it may be
the correct choice as the model, if only because no other choice is available.
For certain purposes, a model may indeed be an end in itself, and merely to
demonstrate that some process can be modeled on a computer may be a
worthy accomplishment It is a pitfall for policy analysis, however, for the
analyst to become more interested in the model than in the problem he set out
to help solve. This trap is easy to fall into, for modeling can be a fascinating
business. Technical people with training, knowledge, and capabilities like to use
their talents to the utmost. It is not hard for them to focus their attention on
data analysis, or the relationships between various factors, or how to ap-
proximate a difficult relationship, attempting to find a more representative fit to
the situation. In doing so, they may neglect facets of the study that cannot be
easily incorporated into the model, a frequent accusation of critics of policy
analysis. They also like to operate with the model and to explore its
capabilities. Thus they may find out a great deal about the inferences that can
be drawn from the model, but not necessarily very much about the question
they should be trying to answer.
IMPROPER TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES
No aspect of systems analysis is more difficult to handle properly than uncer-
tainty. Uncertainties (the unpredictabilities in factors that affect the outcome of
a course of action) are the sine qua non of the analytic process; actions can be
taken to counter their presence, but they cannot be eliminated. Uncertainties
about parameters whose distributions are known or can be inferred with some
confidence and with which calculations can be performed tend to absorb the
attention of analysts out of all proportion to their importance as compared with
the more serious uncertainties about which little is known. To take the
calculable uncertainties into account properly can be an attractive challenge to
the analyst's ingenuity. The danger lies in a corresponding neglect of the uncer-
tainties that are not stochastic in nature. There is a huge critical literature on
the treatment of uncertainty in decision making; for example, see Raifi'a (1968),
Schlaifer (1969), or Madansky (1968).
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Sensitivity analysis is a major technique for compensating for uncertainty.
There are, however, several misconceptions about its use. Holling (1978,
p. 103), for example, points out that sensitivity testing in which sensitivity to a
series of parameters is tested by changing them one by one and determining the
result will not produce correct results. Simultaneous variation of the
parameters is necessary to give reliable sensitivity testing. He cites a study of
the Meadows world model by Scolnik ( 1973). One-by-one variation had shown
the model's prediction of boom and collapse to be stable to small variations in
many parameters. But when several parameters were varied simultaneously
over ranges of less than 10 percent, the results changed dramatically. Bowen
(1978) cites a second misconception, the belief that sensitivity analysis can
overcome the omission of the stochastic nature of the real world system when
"expected value" models are used.
Along these same lines, there is a precept, also pointed out by Bowen (1978),
often followed that. in a situation in which two alternatives are being com-
pared, assumptions, aggregation, and simplifications in modeling that apply
"equally" to both sides produce usable relative solutions. This is far from true
even if the situation is fairly symmetrical.
ATTEMPTING TO REALLY SIMULATE REALrry
There are two common ways to go about constructing a model. One is to
design the model with relevance uppermost, Le., with the issue or problem as a
guide. The other is to keep realism uppermost, attempting to capture the real
world by simulating the situation to perfection and thus, if all goes well, to be in
a position to answer not just a single question, but other questions about the
situation or subject as well. Using this latter approach, there have been, for
example, attempts to model the behavior of a city, its population, and its
government so realistically that the model would predict faithfully what will
happen to growth, population movement, industrial development. and so on.
What can happen in the attempt to simulate reality is that the analyst finds
himself criticized because the model he is building has left out various aspects
of the situation or issue under investigation that the critic feels are important.
The analyst is vulnerable to these criticisms unless he heeds the principle that
the problem-the question being asked-as well as the process being modeled,
determines what should be in the model. Without reference to the question, he
has no real guide to what to accept or reject, because he has no way to decide
what is important or relevant. He can answer such criticism only by making
the model more inclusive and more detailed. Doing so may not stop the
criticism, for a great many factors must still be left out, but the result may be to
make the model complex and difficult to handle, increasing the number of
operations to a point where the total number is determined not by what is rele-
vant but by the capacity of the available computer. Indeed, as Kenneth Bowen
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(1978) remarks, "some simulations are not appreciably less complicated than
the real world. We need models to understand such models."
Analysts will deny that they believe that their model is equivalent to reality,
yet they may still convey this impression to the unwitting decision makers. For
instance, Kenneth Kraemer (1973, p. 74) in his description of the San Fran-
cisco Housing Market Simulation Model remarks: "For example, Wolfe and
Ernst speak of the San Francisco model as reproducing in an abstracted form
the octual [italics Kraemer's] interrelationships that occur, or might occur, in
the market for land and building space in the city!"
BEUEF THAT A MODEL CAN BE PROVED CORRECT
A particularly dangerous myth is the belief that a policy model can be fully
validated-that is, proved correct. Such models can, at best, be invalidated.
Holling and his colleagues in their perceptive work on adaptive environmental
assessment (1978, p. 95) say
In fact, it is the central tenet of modern scientific method that hypotheses, including
models, can never be proved right; they can only be proved wrong (Popper, 1959).
This is why the frequent claim of-and demands for-"valid" models ... are so un-
sound. Provisional acceptance of any model implies not certainty, but rather a
sufficient degree of belief to justify further action. In practice, the problem is one of
model invalidation--of setting the model at risk so as to suggest the limits of its
credibility....
Thus the aim of the validation (or rather, as Holling suggests, invalidation)
attempts is to increase the degree of confidence that the events inferred from
the model will, in fact, occur under the conditions assumed. When you have
tried all the reasonable invalidation procedures you can think of, you will not,
of course, have a valid model (and you may not have a model at all). You will,
however, have a good understanding of the strength and weaknesses of the
model, and you will be able to meet criticisms of omissions by being able to say
why something was left out and what difference including it would have made.
Knowing the limits of the model's predictive capabilities will enable you to
express proper confidence in the results obtained from it.
Models of the same situation built by different analysts will not be the same
and will usually produce different results. If they are not the same, then which
is the right one? "Our answer ... is that there is no right one. A model is only
one piece of evidence ..." (Holling, 1978, p. 79).
One must also check the data. Holling (1978, p. 97) cites an example from a
study to find ways to lessen damage to North American forests from the
spruce budworm, a defoliating insect, where the model predicted that forest
volume would decline independently of insect damage, while it was "common
knowledge" that volume would remain high if insects were controlled.
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We spent 2 months checking the model for errors when we should have been spending
2 days looking at available raw data on forest volume. When we belatedly took this ob-
vious step, the model was vindicated and common knowledge was shown to be at
variance with the data on which it should have been based. We suspect that this is not a
rare occurrence.
NEGLECTING TIlE BY-PRODUCTS OF MODELING
It is a pitfall to believe that the only valuable output of the modeling process is
the results of the computation and that, as a consequence, quantitative or
mathematical models are really the only useful kind. In fact, for problems
where behavioral, political, and social factors dominate, although we may be
unable to construct any model that can produce useful computations, building
a model may still be valuable because of what one learns about the problem
during the process and because of the guidance even a crude model can provide
to the judgment and intuition of analyst and policy maker.
Judgment and intuition permeate every aspect of policy making and of
analysis to support it. Policy analysis, like science, is a craft activity, as Majone
argues in Chapter 1. Judgment must be used by the analyst to limit the extent
of his inquiry, to decide what approach to take, to select what factors to in-
clude, and at a host of other stages before he applies it to interpreting his
results. A great virtue of the modeling process is that it provides a systematic
way to focus the required judgment and intuition.
An explicit model, quantitative or not, introduces structure into a problem,
providing a means of breaking a complex multidisciplinary question into con-
stituent parts that can be handled one at a time, often by experts within a single
discipline. In using and building models, analysts and the experts on whom
they must call for practical knowledge and experience are compelled to use a
precise terminology and to develop their ideas and to exercise their judgment
and intuition in a well-defined context, one that puts their opinions in proper
relation to those of the other participants. Moreover, if they disagree initially,
they must reach an acceptable compromise. The model thus provides an effec-
tive means of communication. It is a pitfall, however, to accept uncritically the
contributions of the experts (Ackerman et al., 1974).
Because features other than the calculations can be so important, it is a pit-
fall to make such an effort to keep a model quantitative that factors important
to the question have to be left out. One cannot, as Helmer (1978) shows, ad-
vance in an uncertain context of any complexity solely by formal theoretical or
mathematical means. Overemphasis on quantification can result in a dangerous
underemphasis on or even total neglect of considerations that resist quan-
tification; this is a source of much criticism of systems analysis for neglecting
ecological and other "fragile" elements (Tribe, 1972).
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OVERAMBITION
While the usefulness of simple policy-relevant models is unquestioned, there
has been, almost since large-scale multipurpose computer modeling began,
sometime in the mid-fifties, controversy about the value of such modeling
-particularly for use in public, or societal, decision making-to gi ve advice
about what to do about such issues as unemployment, the environment, or law
enforcement. Greenberger and his colleagues (1976) and Brewer (1973) offer
considerable evidence that analysis dependent on computer-based policy
models has been a disappointment. In fact, with respect to urban problems,
Brewer (p. 233) is rather pessimistic: "... results from real contexts to date
have been so checkered that even the eventual realization of the mythical
policy-assisting model is in doubt."
Large-scale models designed for many purposes are likely to serve none in
the end. Lee (1973), in cataloging the sins of their designers, found that the
limitations or unintended constraints resulting from the structure of most such
models are almost impossible to perceive. He gives an example (p. 165):
Trip distribution functions (the heart of any gravity model, which includes most of the
land-use models) are fitted to observed trip frequencies for different classes of workers
and (sometimes) different classes of households. While valid at the scale of a
metropolitan area, the gravity model has no statistical explanatory power at the
neighborhood level. This is a near-classic case of imputing individual (or census tract
or neighborhood) behavior from aggregate relationships-the ecological fallacy. In ad-
dition, the purely descriptive nature of the gravity model implicitly assumes that the
existing land-use patterns served by existing transportation, with existing prices,
qualities, and service levels, will be maintained in the future. To then ask the model
what will be the impact of a change in the type of transportation service provided is
pointless; the model lacks the structural information to be able to trace out the
consequences.
For economic~emographicmodels, Arthur and McNicoli (1975, p. 262)
find that the aspiration to be multipurpose"... makes them large, structurally
inflexible, overdressed in side issues, and beyond proper validation...." They
find (p. 257) that this can introduce false complexity:
Take, for example, the question of fertility reduction. A recent TEMPO study of 19
different countries finds in every case that "slower population growth, produced by
declining fertility, translates directly into a more rapid growth of GNP per capita. This
conclusion is extremely robust in the sense that it is relatively invariant under the
diverse socioeconomic conditions encountered in the different countries studied and un-
der widely differing parameter values for the key equations in the models." (Brown,
1974). This appears to be astonishing testimony to the universal need for swift fertility
reduction. The TEMPO models, however, make one key, central assumption. Economic
output takes place according to a Cobb-Douglas production function, a function that
enjoys the property that, no matter what the parameters, the derivative of per capita
output with respect to labor is always negative. An increase in population can therefore
never pay its way. One assumption, questionable in theory, therefore governs the out-
come; the result has been settled in advance and built in....
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A pitfall for those making use of the results from large computer models,
noted by Majone (1977), is that modelers, to make their models produce
answers that agree with what they or their clients think those answers should
be, sometimes arbitrarily "fudge" the parameters. Holling (1978, p. 78) makes
a similar point:
Users often adjust values in the input interaction matrix in order to give "reasonable"
output: i.e., data are adjusted to fit preconceived notions of what should happen-ob-
viously not useful in the context of environmental impact assessment.
Many professional modelers argue that if large-scale multipurpose modeling
has failed, it is because policy makers have misunderstood or misused the
results of their models. While this may be a contributing factor, much of the
negative reaction is due to the modelers themselves and the way they practice
their craft, particularly in allowing themselves to fall into the next two pitfalls
discussed.
SEEKING ACADEMIC RATHER THAN POLICY GOALS
Modelers ordinarily come from the academic world, and so do their rewards.
This leads many analysts, as pointed out by Ansoff and Hayes (1973), par-
ticularly those still holding academic positions, into the pitfall of building their
models to satisfy academic criteria. Professors of operations research are likely
to evaluate models devised by their students to solve a textbook problem by a
set of criteria based on quality. That is, they would like the models or
methodologies to be nontrivial (permitting inferences not perceivable by direct
observation), powerful (offering a large number of nontrivial inferences),
elegant (using a minimum of carefully selected analytic tools to produce a
model of great power), cost-effective (producing the answer with a minimal
number of machine operations), valid (capable of reproducing results based on
historical data), and so on. Unfortunately, their students, and often they
themselves, on becoming practicing analysts, may unconsciously over-
emphasize the same "quality" in the policy models they build.
Decision makers, on the other hand, are interested in a largely different set of
criteria based on the applicability of the model to the segment of the world for
which they have responsibility. They want a model to be relevant (to treat a
problem of importance to their domain), valid (to give a high degree of con-
fidence that the inferences obtained from it will, in fact, occur in the real world),
usable (for there to be a good chance that the model can be accepted as a basis
for action), cost-effective (for the benefits to them and to their organization that
result from its use to exceed the expense of developing and applying the model),
and so on. They are interested in the costs of modeling-not only the cost of
the resources required but other costs as well, particularly the cost of delaying
38
action because of the time needed for the modeling processes. They have little
direct interest in power and elegance. They would, of course, like the model to
be nontrivial-to give them or others new insight into, or ideas about, issues of
interest. It is unreasonable, however, for them to expect the model and the ac-
companying analyses to determine a completely acceptable and unquestionable
solution to the problem; a model produces evidence at most, not proof. The most
one can ask is that the analysis be relevant and have some validity, for then it
may provide the perspective that may lead, through judgment, to a satisfactory
resolution of the problem.
Unlike the policy maker, the analyst is not ordinarily held responsible if a
particularly pressing public problem does not receive the attention it deserves.
The policy maker, on the other hand, may be penalized for failing to focus
attention on a critical problem or for failing to take action that improves the
situation.
This difference in responsibility between analyst and decision maker can lead
the analyst, in choosing what sort of model to construct to help with the deci-
sion maker's problem, to select a type that will offer the greatest latitude for the
application of modeling skills and knowledge and that will produce, as a con-
sequence, the greatest recognition and reward. This appears to be found in
highly nontrivial, powerful, and elegant models-mostly large computer
simulations. The analyst may, in fact, seek to work only on problems that offer
opportunities for models of high quality. In any given problem, these con-
siderations can become the criteria for choosing how to tackle the problem and
what kind of model to build.
The hold of the professional community on the modeler, the source of the
pitfalls in this section, is strong. As House and McLeod (1977, p. 4) explain it,
because "... one's professional career is predicated on peer group status, the
modeling community usually tends to be more loyal to the demands of the
professional community than to the needs of the policymaker."
INTERNAUZING THE POLlCY MAKER
Many modelers subscribe to what, in my view, is almost a complete myth,
namely, that a policy model can be made so comprehensive that it satisfactor-
ily internalizes the policy-making process itself. They believe that the model can
capture the preferences of and constraints, both real and imagined, on the
policy makers, so that it can weigh and trade off the numerous factors involved
in making a policy decision and designate the best alternative in a way that will
be both credible and acceptable to the policy makers. In brief, they fall into the
pitfall of thinking that one can substitute a model for the decision maker,
something possible in only a very narrowly prescribed situation. We do not
have, and do not expect to have, models that will simply allow the public
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official to "plug in the numbers" and get back the correct decision with regard
to housing, transportation, public welfare, or education.
In most policy studies-for instance, a study to assist in a choice of
transportation a1ternatives--the many impacts or consequences predicted by
the model or models-the environmental, economic, financial, service, social
(i.e., distributional) and other outcomes--must in some way be presented for
consideration to the policy makers. The usual presentation method (e.g., using
multiattribute utility theory or cost-benefit analysis) combines the many
different impacts into a single measure.
Any aggregated approach to evaluation has two serious defects. First, a
great deal of information is suppressed by the aggregation; the fact that alter-
native A has environmental problems that can cause serious political reper-
cussions whereas alternative B requires developmental work that may not pan
out may escape attention. Second, as pointed out earlier in the discussion of
proxies, any single measure of value depends on the relative weights assigned
by the analyst to the various factors that enter and on the assumptions he used
to get them into commensurate units. To assign these weights req uires a great
deal of arbitrary quantification, often using means and arguments that are, to
say the least, questionable. To do so requires judgments by the analyst, or by
experts on whom he depends, about probabilities and values that may have no
solid basis in fact or theory. More important, where value estimates are
required (which is almost everywhere), the results are often based on judgments
by the wrong people-by the analysts, not by the responsible decision makers.
The most promising approach of the aggregative type, that of decision
theory, attempts to model the value system or preference structure of the policy
maker (or policy makers) so as to be able to predict what the decision would be
were he (or they) to be presented with the alternatives and information about
their consequences under various assumptions about the future. Somewhat
similar schemes have sometimes worked satisfactorily when the decisions were
of a repetitive type and for preliminary design and screening of alternatives
(where the value judgments need not be as accurate).
In contrast, the natural disaggregative approach in which the alternatives
and their full spectrum of consequences are presented in a tabular array to
allow the decision makers to impose their own value judgments retains all the
information and avoids interposing the analyst's judgment. There are, however,
problems with the proliferation of information. The refinement of this approach
by Goeller (1977, p. 217), the "scorecard" with shading or color coding to
provide an effective "gestalt," manages to overcome many of them.
NOT KEEPING THE MODEL RELEV ANT
An important factor in the success of analysis and modeling is the interest and
attention of the policy maker in the work being done (Walker, 1978;
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Greenberger et aI., 1976, p. 326; Holling, 1978, p. 51). A sure way to lose his
interest is to allow the model to become irrelevant to his problem.
To keep the model relevant, Goeller (1976) suggests that it be considered in-
itially as a "black box," with first attention being given to what knobs,
representing policy variables under the control of the policy makers, and what
dials, representing consequences of interest to them, should be put on the front
of the box. Only then should attention be given to the design of the contents of
the box.
It is important, however that the model not remain a 'black box.' To quote
Lee (1973, p. 175) once more:
Probably the most important attribute any model should have is transparency. It
should be readily understandable to any potential user with a reasonable investment of
effort. "Black box" models wiU never have an impact on policy other than possibly
through mystique, and this wiU be short lived and self-defeating. A transparent model is
still about as likely to be wrong, but at least concerned persons can investigate the
points at which they disagree. By achieving a consensus on assumptions, opposing par-
ties may find they actuaUy agree on conclusions. A good deal of effort will be required
to get people to think this way, because it is a trait of modelers and nonmodelers alike
to throw in everything at once when they do not understand a problem; odds are that
somewhere in the jumble are the parts to the explanation. The trouble is, nothing is
learned from such an exercise, and future problems receive the same treatment.
Patience and good will are necessary in this communication and education process; big
"black box" mOdels are not.
The practice common to many policymakers of assigning one of his staff to monitor
the study once a contract is approved can also lead to irrelevance and thus present a
pitfall to the analyst. The staff monitor may be competent technically but he cannot
pass on what the policymaker really has to have to satisfy the needs, interests, and
goals of his constituency and what motivates his personal and political life. The
policymaker loses interest if his needs are slighted, while the analyst, without the
motivation the policymaker would provide, may turn to modeling for modeling's sake.
NOT KEEPING THE MODEL SIMPLE
A pitfall in allowing the model to become more complicated than it need be is
that eventually it has to be explained to and understood by somebody else. For
Greenberger et al., (1976), the most important reason why so many policy
analyses fail as "instruments for the clarification of policy issues and the
enlightenment of policymakers" is that "the inner workings of a policy model
are seldom understood by anyone but the builders of the model (and not
always by them). This is a weak foundation for gaining the reliance and trust of
policymakers."
One should not expect the model to be so simple and transparent that the
client himself can understand its inner workings, but his analyst should be able
to do so. It would be a rare client who would want to or could use this kind of
detailed analytic knowledge. The analyst, however, should be able to exhibit in
somewhat simplified form the key structural elements of the model and their
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most important relationships so that the client can not only understand how the
results came about, but also incorporate the logic of the analysis into his con-
tinuing thinking about the problem.
For a policy maker to convince himself that a model is conceptually and
theoretically sound is not easy. He can ask that mathematical statements (a
few) be translated into verbal statements to see if they make sense and seem
plausible. He can inspect the list of variables that are selected as representative
of reality. He can ask if various symbols have empirical referents and if
degradation or fudge factors are present in the model. He may be able to check
in simple cases whether the model output agrees with his intuition. The mere
fact that a model can produce a close approximation to a historical time series
is no guarantee that it has much value as a predictor. As is well known, almost
any model that reasonably approximates the situation with a few free
parameters can be made to produce results that closely fit any given curve
(Bush and Mosteller, 1966). But the simpler the model, the easier it is to
understand.
CAPTURE OF THE USER BY THE MODELER
A pitfall for the user (Brewer, 1975, p. 6) is to allow himself to be captured by
the modeler. This can sometimes happen with models that are built for repeated
use (e.g., a model to assign police patrol cars to beats). It is in the interests of
the model builder to keep its details from competitors and to see that the ideas
embodied in it enhance his own academic credit. For this and other reasons,
documentation may not be done well. Thus, when the user, because of changed
circumstances, wants to ask a slightly different question, he has to go back to
the original builder-who, for a follow-on contract, will undertake to make the
change. This may present difficulties, for often the computer specialist who ac-
tually put the model on the computer and made it work has moved elsewhere.
To protect himself, the user should insist on full enough documentation to
allow a second modeler to reproduce the model.
CONCLUSION
The pitfalls discussed in this chapter are only a small sample of those that
await analysts and decision makers. Many other pitfalls associated with for-
mulation and modeling have been pointed out in the literature, although not
always under the heading of pitfalls. Collections are found in papers by Kahn
and Mann (1957), Lee (1973), Koopman (1956), Quade and Boucher (1968),
Quade (1975), and Brewer (1975), with Strauch (1974) and Webber and Rittel
(1973) giving particular attention to formulation.
The primary purpose of systems analysis is to improve decision making
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rather than to advance knowledge or to improve forecasting per se. Therefore,
one way to avoid pitfalls is to remember that, from start to finish, problem for-
mulation and modeling must be oriented toward the decision-making problem.
NOTES
I. To Webber and Rittell (1973) the situation may also be "wicked"; to Strauch (1974),
"squishy." "Mess" is used here in the sense of Ackoff (1974).
2. For a discussion, see "Putting Out Fires in the Fire Department," Chapter 8 in Greenberger
et al., 1976.
3. For a discussion of problems associated with various model types, see The Electronic Oracle:
Computer Models and Social Decisions, by D. H. Meadows and J. M. Robinson, John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd. Chichester, England. Forthcoming.
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4 Pitfalls of Data Analysis
Stanley M. Altman
We live in an age of continuous confrontation with decision-making situations.
Rarely, if ever, are decisions made where all possible choices and their resultant
consequences are known. Decision making takes place under conditions of un-
certainty-uncertainty about options available, sometimes uncertainty about
the goals used to judge alternative options, and uncertainty about the eventual
consequence of each option. Uncertainty can be reduced only by obtaining in-
formation, although it has been shown that there are limits to the degree to
which uncertainty can be eliminated. Generally, more information can be
acquired only by incurring increased costs. Therefore, the utility of acquiring
additional information must be measured against the costs so incurred.
Within existing boundaries for reducing uncertainty, there is generally room
for improving the information available to a decision maker. When a decision-
forcing situation arises, an analysis of the phenomena involved is performed to
obtain information. The phenomena may involve the operation of a govern-
ment agency's service delivery system; they may involve the operation of a
national government's social service program; or they may involve the design
and evaluation of a public policy. Whatever the phenomena are, the process of
information gathering involves collecting and analyzing data. The pitfalls that
confront both those who analyze data and the decision makers who are con-
sumers of the resultant information are the subject of this chapter.
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AN OVERVIEW OF DATA ANALYSIS
A working definition of analysis is
... the resolution or separation of the reference system (object, system, process being
described) into parts to illuminate their nature and the interrelations and to determine
general principles of behavior.!
In data analysis, the reference system (object, system, process) is described
by data. Underlying the description is the data analyst's hypothesis regarding
which particular characteristics of the reference system are important and must
be accounted for, and which characteristics can be ignored. Data analysts use
methods of analysis on data to discover relationships between the different
variables for which data have been collected. These relationships are tentatively
established by descriptive models that relate output (or dependent) variables to
input (or independent) variables. The model developed represents the data
analyst's hypothesis about the phenomena. Inferential statistical tests are used
to obtain evidence to support the hypothesis. Statistical testing is one of the
many points at which inferential statistics and data analysis overlap.2
There are numerous techniques used by data analysts to build models from
data Data analysts use techniques from descriptive statistics for reducing data
into summary forms that are more illuminating and easier to work with than
the original data.3 Modeling techniques based on probabilistic and optimization
arguments, such as regression,4 are used, as are other modeling techniques that
do not involve probabilistic arguments, such as two-way tables. The develop-
ment and codification of this latter group of techniques has been pioneered by
Tukey under the name "Exploratory Data Analysis."~
The process of fitting a model to data is the first step in a larger process of
model building and model verification. Model verification involves using data
that are independent from the data used to construct the model in order to test
the model's predictive powers. The process of verification helps to determine
whether the model is only a good fit to the original data or if it is more general-
ly applicable as a predictive tool for dealing with the phenomena being studied.
The use of models in the larger quest to reduce the uncertainty that sur-
rounds decision making and decision-forcing situations is a subject broader
than the defined objective of this chapter. This chapter is concerned with the
pitfalls that confront analysts working with data as part of the larger process of
using models to reduce uncertainty. In particular, the chapter is divided into
five sections, each presenting pitfalls common to the practice of data analysis.
Each of the pitfalls discussed represents a potential danger to the effective im-
plementation of any data analysis effort. Therefore, rather than arrange this
discussion by assigning different degrees of importance to different pitfalls, the
discussion is organized around the data analysis process. This order of presen-
tation emphasizes the major steps in problem solving, generally described by
the scientific method.
46
TRANSLATING A PROBLEM STATEMENT INTO
QUANTITATIVE TERMS
The starting point for any analysis is a definition of the problem to be explored
in terms of the list of variables (both dependent and independent) to be included
in the analysis. One should not expect this list to be complete, but developing a
list at the beginning of the analysis serves two purposes. First, it forms the
framework for deciding what data are required. Second, it is an implicit state-
ment of the analyst's belief in the applicability of underlying theory for
describing the phenomena in a given problem.
An incomplete specification of the list of variables to be included in the
analysis can lead to an incomplete analysis, or to incorrect conclusions being
drawn. Allocating too little time to problem definition, focusing on the symp-
toms rather than the causes of the problem, being unwilling to exert the effort
necessary to understand the underlying theory applicable to the problem at
hand are all pitfalls of incomplete specification. The very nature of problem
definition almost guarantees that the problem specification will be incomplete.
But the pitfall consists of not knowing what was left out and its possible
significance for the final results of the analysis. The pitfall of incomplete
specification starts the entire analysis off on the wrong foot. Relationships that
may exist between the specified list of variables and those excluded will not be
accounted for in the analysis.
COLLECTING DATA AND USING COLLECTED DATA
Even if the list of variables pertinent to the problem being studied is completely
defined, there are additional pitfalls that the data analyst must watch out for
during the process of acquiring. data. For a variety of reasons, these pitfalls can
occur throughout the process of acquiring data.
One pitfall that can appear during the data acquisition process is the pitfall
of inappropriate proxy variables. This pitfall can occur when a variable cannot
be measured directly. It is common practice in such situations to measure a
different variable that is assumed to be related to the original variable. This
may be the only thing a data analyst can do when information on the desired
variable cannot be measured directly. In such situations, the data analyst must
recognize the potential limitation this places on the entire analysis and attempt,
when possible, to determine the magnitude of the errors that can occur. The
data analyst must be cautious in taking this step, because doing so implies an
underlying belief about the relationship between these variables that may not
hold. In addition, it is difficult to prove that this relationship does hold because
the original variable cannot be measured. This pitfall can result from an in-
correct conclusion drawn from commonsense arguments or a misapplication of
experience.
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G. D. N. Worswick cites the following example of this type of pitfall:
Many quantities which appear in economic literature, such as numbers employed, or
tons of steel, look very like familiar physical facts, but there is a subtle and all-
important difference. The physical quantities of steel, or labour, are only proxies for
economic "values" or "utilities." This distinction is vital: failure to make it can have
detrimental consequences, both for policy, as for example in the discussion of the rela-
tion between wages and productivity, and for theory, as in the measurement of capital.6
Hatry further illustrates this pitfall:
Appropriate criteria for evaluation of manpower training programs would not be the
number of persons entering training-analysts do want this information, but not for
evaluation of overall effectiveness-but rather the additional number of persons who
obtain employment and the number of families who thereby get their standard of living
raised above, say, poverty levels.'
Another pitfall of data acquisition is the pitfall oj biased measurement
errors. This pitfall can occur when the assumption is made that errors of
measurement are randomly distributed about the variable's true value, when, in
fact, this is not true. As a result, the data analyst has fallen into the pitfall of
biased measurement error and has also set the stage for the systems analyst,
who makes use of the data, to fall into the same pitfall.
The various causes of bias in measurement error can be summarized as
follows: lack of designed experiments; hiding or lying about information; use of
untrained observers; reliance on questionnaires; lack of universally agreed-
upon definitions and classifications; errors of instruments; and the fact that
observations may have to span a long period of time. This means that data
analysts often have to deal with data gathered by a widely separated group of
untrained "observers" who have vague if not conflicting notions of basic policy
classifications and who have to elicit information from people who may be less
than candid. Hanson points out:
Errors are thus inevitable; all the available evidence indicates that there is no
benevolent god who makes these errors cancel out. Given this situation, the best we
can do is to be sensitive to the many sources of error, and, whenever possible express
numerically the magnitude of probable error.8
Data acquisition in public policy fields has been modeled on the approaches
used in the natural sciences. But the nature of the data is much different.
Nowhere is this difference more obvious than in the problem of hiding informa-
tion or just plain lying. The natural sciences may have a problem in getting
good answers to questions, but at least it can be safely assumed that nature will
not deliberately lie. This is not the case with the subjects of policy research. For
example, in the United States, much of the CIA'S budget is hidden in other agen-
cies' budgets; this falsifies not only information on the CIA, but also on the
other agencies. However, it is not difficult to understand the origins of such a
situation. Game theory suggests that bluffing is a sound move in strategic
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behavior. In other words, giving the wrong impression to an opponent, real or
potential, is an essential feature of rational strategies.
Data are also suppressed, or statements of needs, resources, or impacts are
exaggerated or understated. In the early 1970s, it came to light that the New
York City Transit Police was falsifying crime statistics to make the deployment
of transit police on subway trains appear more effective than it was. Crimes
that occurred shortly after the shift of increased transit police beg an were being
reported as though they occurred before the shift began. Similarly, crimes com-
mitted just before the shift ended were reported as though they occurred just
after the shift ended. These statistics were being used to argue for more
resources to increase the number of transit police deployed on subway trains.9
Other data may be unreliable, even though there was no intention to lie.
Crime statistics provide such an example. It is difficult to even know if the
crime statistics reported are reliable because they only refer to reported crimes
and not to total crimes committed.
As an example, if more policemen are assigned to patrol duty, their augmented force
may cause them to observe a larger fraction of all crimes than they did before the in-
creased manning, thus showing an apparent increase in crime. 1O
Morgensternll discusses other types of data acquisition errors that the data
analyst should be aware of. His discussion of errors associated with question-
naires, untrained observers, and misclassification of data are paraphrased in
the following discussion.
Questionnaires are widely used in policy research and, of course, they may
introduce certain kinds of errors. It is difficult to ask good questions. One must
be careful because the answers may vary according to the type of approach:
oral, written, or mail. Care also has to be taken because certain words have
political connotations that could interfere with objectivity. Other threats to
objectivity are evasions, lies, forgetfulness, and the inability to interpret one's
own actions. The only way to judge the merits of data gathered through
questionnaires is to read the questionnaire. If the questionnaire is not published
with the results, the results should be rejected. One should also beware of sur-
veys that break their results into many small groups. The number of subjects
falling into some of these categories will be small and results will be inaccurate.
"Tnese 'outliers' are rare events (in terms of the sample) and probably belong
to a different statistical distribution than the one encountered."u (See the dis-
cussion ofpif{alls ofmistreating outliers in the folJowing section.)
Errors also occur in policy research because observers are generally not
trained. This can sometimes lead to mass error. Thousands of observers may
be employed for mass observations; there may result, for example, "a summa-
tion of errors by the successive processing of the data (observers at various
stages not being able or trained to correct the errors of the lower stages). These
errors frequently are cumulative. There is no guarantee that they will cancel."12
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In population statistics, millions of people are sometimes omitted or counted
twice. The error associated with mass observations also arises in the frequent
cases where different agencies record the same activity and come up with
different measurements.
Part of the reason that agencies have different approaches is that there is a
lack of definition of classification of phenomena to be measured or recorded.
Error is inevitable when there is uncertainty about whether a phenomenon is to
be classified as an "X" or a "Y." Here again, the natural sciences are in a much
better position. The theoretical characteristics of a wavelength are well un-
derstood, while the theoretical characteristics of, for example, health services
and their relationship to quality of health care have yet to be established.
Employment categories are particularly hard to define. Therefore, when
looking at unemployment figures, remember that at least two sources of error
may be at work: doubtful classifications and untrained observers. Another
problem is classifying large organizations, like General Motors. Is "auto in-
dustry" an appropriate classification for a corporation that produces
automobiles as well as airplane engines, electrical appliances, and heating
equipment?
THE DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS
The data that form the input to the data analysis process provide snapshots of
the phenomena being studied. The information obtained from a datum will
usually be of limited value. It is the general pattern that emerges from all the
data that provides the first level of information required by decision makers.
A second level of information may emerge if the data contain extreme cases
that appear to contradict the general pattern. Such extreme cases, called out-
liers, can arise for a variety of reasons. One reason may simply be that
someone made a mistake or error in acquiring or processing the data. Another
explanation may be that under the condition that gave rise to the outlier, a
pattern different from the one originally identified describes the phenomena.
The pitfall ofmistreating outliers can confront the data analyst in a number
of different situations. If the outlier arises from an error, it can be discarded
because it would not contradict the theory embodied by the model to be built.
If it is included, it would distort the model and the corresponding theory. If the
outlier is not due to an error, but reflects a true situation, then discarding it
limits the model and may lead to an incorrect theory. The data themselves may
not answer the question of what has given rise to the outlier. However, atten-
tion must be paid to answering this question before the data analyst falls into
this pitfall.
In fitting models to data, we make a statement about the effect of different
variables on a phenomenon. By explicitly including a variable in the model, we
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are stating that the phenomenon behaves differently for at least some values of
the variable. Variations in the data may suggest that a variable has an effect on
the phenomenon. However, it is necessary to determine whether the differences
observed between the different subgroups of the data defined by different values
of the variables are (a) systematic differences due to the effect of the variable on
the phenomena; or (b) random differences unrelated to the different values of
the variable before a conclusion can be drawn. Therefore, it makes sense to in-
clude only those variables that describe patterns of "true" differences in the
phenomenon.
Hypothesis testing provides the data analyst with information concerning
which of the above two cases explain the observed differences between the sub-
groups of data. If the appropriate hypothesis test provides evidence to support
the conclusion that the effects are systematic, then the differences are referred
to as statistically significant differences. 'The process of hypothesis formulation
and testing has a number of pitfalls associated with it. In general, the
hypothesis to be tested is designed to answer the question: "Is the evidence
strong enough to contradict a hypothesis of no difference?" or perhaps the
more meaningful question: "Is the evidence strong enough to support a belief
that the observed difference has the correct sign?"!3
If a variable does not reflect statistically significant differences in the
phenomena, then, in general, it will not be included in the model. The fact that a
variable may differentiate statistically significant differences in the phenomena
may not be r.eason enough to include the variable in the model. There are two
reasons to avoid including every term that tests reveal as statistically significant
in the model. The first reason is related to the pitfall of unnecessary complica-
tion. The second reason is related to the pitfall of operational inSignificance.
The pitfall of unnecessary complication is described by Alonsol4 as "The
more, the better." As Alonso points out, the more, the better is often not true in
modeling, especially if greater detail entails additional calculations that com-
pound or aggravate the errors in the data. Crissey observes that "a simple
model may have better performance characteristics over the long run than a
complicted model, even though it provides less information. As more detail is
added, a model can become more opaque to the user, harder to understand,
and more expensive to operate."I' Tukey points out:
In general, parsimony and simplicity will be achieved in the summary description either
at the price of inadequacy of description or at the price of complexity in the model or in
the analysis. Typically, those who insist on doing only primitive analysis must often be
satisfied with complex-not parsimonious-summaries which often miss important
points. 16
The pitfall of operational insignificance is related to the notion of usefulness
to the user. The data analyst falls into this pitfall if the assumption is made that
every statistically significant difference must be operationally significant. A
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variable may identify differences that are statistically significant but that in real
terms cannot be acted upon or that in their interpretation provide no useful in-
formation to the user. Such differences are said to be operationally insignifi-
cant. Only the user can decide what is operationally significant and what is
operationally insignificant. In some cases the analyst and user may disagree,
but in such cases the burden of proof is on the analyst, not the user.
The process of the step-by-step fitting of a model to the data (as shown in
Figure I) ends when there are no longer any relationships to be found between
the residuals and the independent variables and predicted dependent variables
(values predicted by the current model). However, the analysis does not end at
this point. To end here is to fall into the pitfall af the premature stap.
This pitfall occurs when the analyst forgets or neglects to analyze the dis-
tribution of the final residuals. If the distribution appears to be descriptive of a
single random distribution, such as a normal distribution, the analyst can ter-
minate the process of model building. If the distribution appears to be bimodal
or multimodal, this may be a clue to the analyst that other effects exist and are
yet to be accounted for. Continuing the analysis may reveal that other effects
that exist were not accounted for in the initial definition of the problem. If they
had been, then at least one relationship would still be indicated between the
residuals and the independent and predicted dependent variables. Overlooking
this clue (revealed through the distribution of the residuals), the analyst may
have missed a critical factor that explains the phenomena being studied.
CONFUSING THE PAST WITH THE FUTURE
Data provide historical information about different aspects of a phenomenon.
As such, they provide insights into what happened. The assumption is often
made that the future will be similar to the past, and patterns are developed by
extrapolating from historical data. 11 This can lead one into the pitfall affalse
continuity. This pitfall occurs when the data analyst explores historical patterns
under the incorrect assumption that the future is simply a continuation of the
past. In this case, deviations between predicted values and actual values
provide clues that changes are occurring. But this does not help us if data are
analyzed to develop models upon which future prediction and plans are based.
A data analyst must always be sure to ask the question: "Is the future really
going to act like the past?" or "Is the phenomenon changing slowly enough
that predictions based on past data are useful in the near future?" The farther
the prediction is projected into the future, the shakier will be the ground upon
which the analyst walks.
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and
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Figure 1 Flow diagram summarizing process of data analysis.
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INTERPRETAnON
The interpretation of data depends in part on the skill of the analyst. An impor-
tant pitfall to watch out for in the process of constructing models from data is
taking spurious relationships and treating them as direct, causal relationships.
This pitfall is particularly tricky because it is always possible that models built
from data describe relationships of "related variables" but not relationships
that are causal.
... [Ilmports of gold and the annual number of marriages are positively correlated over
years (because both reflect economic health), but suddenly increasing gold imports by
government action could scarcely be expected to change the number of marriages. 17
Zeisel presents other examples of this pitfall. 18
After the question has been translated into quantitative terms, data analysis
techniques are a bridge to the answers. Quantitative answers obtained from
data analysis may require translation into qualitative terms, to ensure effective
communication. The various translations that occur before and after the actual
analysis offer numerous opportunities for falling into the pitfall of mis-
understanding. When analysts describe the findings of a study of the daily
demands of clients requesting services in terms of daily averages, a decision
maker may reschedule personnel to meet these average daily demands without
understanding the dynamics of actual variations in demand from day to day
and from week to week. The pitfall of misunderstanding continually confronts
analysts and decision makers when these two roles are not filled by the same
individual. Modelers should always work closely with the model's user19 to en-
sure that important factors are accounted for. The same reminder is required in
analyzing data. Context and technique must be coordinated and integrated, if
meaningful interpretations are to be made at the conclusion of the analytical
process.
The separation between user and data analyst can produce effective work
only if the communication between them is direct and clear. But communica-
tion between those who are technically trained and those who are not has
always been a problem because of the specialized languages developed by
different professions. Moreover, in extending communication beyond the inner
circle occupied by professionals, one encounters the problem of differences in
meaning for key words and phrases. The possibility of falling into the pitfall of
misunderstanding increases as messages pass back and forth between two
groups.
In the early 1970s there was strong disagreement in the United States over
what policy to pursue to stimulate the economy. The executive branch of the
federal government had decided to increase the money supply to achieve this
end. When this policy did not produce the desired results, the Congress held
hearings to study the matter. One of the analyses cited at the hearings as
providing evidence that the original policy choice was justified was a statistical
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analysis developed by two staff economists at the U.S. office of Budget and
Management. However, while testifying at the congressional hearings, the
economists stated
that in their original paper they denied the ability or intent of their model to identify
causal relations. They declared that the results can only show statistical correlations
(not) cause and effect. Yet that is not how their results were received.20
DATA ANALYSIS: EVIDENCE, NOT CONCLUSIONS
The data analyst supplies the user with evidence from which conclusions can
be drawn. The conclusion itself is not the product of analysis. Conclusions in-
volve subjective judgments about the relative importance of different pieces of
the evidence uncovered. They also involve subjective judgments about the im-
portance of relationships uncovered. But, most important, drawing conclusions
involves a willingness to take a leap of faith and make a statement about what
is believed to be true even though uncertainty may surround the truth of the
statement.
When all is said and done, data analysis is concerned with providing answers
to questions. Every answer has many possible interpretations. The challenge of
analysis is to narrow the choice down to what is most likely to occur under a
given set of circumstances. But remember, most likely is not the same as ab-
solutely certain, unless, of course, you walk across the hall afterwards and
look. This is called evaluation.
FINAL NOTE
This discussion is by no means exhaustive. The list of pitfalls and dualities of
interpretation is endless. The interested reader is directed to a number of papers
for further readings,21
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5 Pitfalls in the Analysis of Costs
Robert E. Bickner
IGNORING COSTS
We intend only a passing comment about the folly of ignoring costs altogether,
for it is too gross a blunder to require astute exposition. Yet the pitfall is there,
with its deceiving logic and enduring temptation. And the blunder is common
enough.
The specious logic has two popular variants. First is the theme of the
overriding objective, the transcendent goal that must be attained "regardless of
costs." Second is the theme of noble concerns-concerns about lives, or
human dignity, or aesthetics, or art-matters too precious to be sullied by the
crass calculus of costs.
The cost analysts, however, unless they fall into some of the pitfalls men-
tioned here, are every bit as dedicated to ultimate goals and noble concerns as
those critics who are in haste to ignore costs. The critics' undue haste reflects
only an ignorance of the essential meaning of costs, for costs are nothing less
than goals unfulfilled and concerns compromised. Costs are benefits lost. Costs
lie in the same realm as benefits; costs have the same dimensions as benefits.
Costs are in no wise less important.
The specious logic rationalizing the neglect of costs is accompanied by un-
derstandable temptation. Not only is the identification and appraisal of costs
hard work, but the attention to costs often generates evidence contrary to one's
pet schemes or personal interests.
The blunder of ignoring costs altogether is easily recognized, and it is a
blunder more characteristic of decision makers than analysts. Less easily
recognized, and more characteristic of analysts, is the pitfall of ignoring
various components of costs: the pitfall of mistaking some conventional or
convenient part of costs for the whole.
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MISTAKING A PART OF COSTS FOR THE WHOLE
The painstaking care with which cost data are collected, the sophisticated for-
mulae with which cost estimates are extrapolated, the expressions of caution
that accompany aggregate cost projections, all distract our attention from the
most critical characteristic of a cost analysis: its completeness. The challenge
of cost analysis is not the development of impressively supported fine esti-
mates of some very uncertain fraction of total costs. Such cost estimates are
not simply useless; they misguide decisions, or else they reinforce the unfor-
tunate but understandable skepticism with which many decision makers view
the merits of cost analysis. l
Yet the temptation to produce such cost estimates is well-nigh irresistible.
Like the proverbial drunk who searches for his missing wallet under the street
lamp rather than in the dark, where he lost it, we search for costs where we
have data. The pitfall is camouflaged by a specious reasonableness and a false
modesty: the cost analysts may argue that they should restrict their efforts to
within the bounds of their competence. But there is little true modesty in
restricting one's attention to the easily measurable aspects of costs while
presenting the results as an estimate of total cost.
Limited conceptualization of the meaning of costs adds further inducement,
and further rationalization, to succumb to this common tendency to mistake a
part of costs for the whole. To some people, for example, the meaning of costs
is restricted to monetary expenditures. Once the probable monetary outlays
associated with a proposed plan of action are identified and summed, then total
cost has been estimated. The limitation of this view of cost is perhaps too ob-
vious to warrant exposure here, but somewhat more comprehensive, yet still in-
complete, concepts of cost are often accepted. Only slightly more sophisticated
and adequate is the concept of cost that would include, in addition to outright
expenditures, estimates of the monetary rent that might be imputed for the use
of marketable durable resources: land, buildings, equipment.2
The experienced cost analyst will be aware that: (a) there will often be
monetary expenditures relating to a decision or plan; (b) there will usually be
other costs that might be readily measurable in monetary units; (c) there will
often be still other costs that might be quantifiable in some way, though not in
monetary units; and (d) there may yet remain costs that resist quantification in
any trustworthy way. All of these costs need attention. Neither the allure of an
inadequate concept of cost, nor the convenience of searching only where data
are readily available and where units of measurement are at hand, nor the false
modesty that rationalizes neglect of difficult challenges, should divert the
analysts from their primary responsibility: comprehensive identification of
costs. And cost means all of the sacrifices, every benefit lost, as a result of a
decision.
A common, and especially enticing, variant of this pitfall is the neglect of
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long-run costs. Both the analysts and their clients may be inclined toward this
neglect: the analysts because long-run costs are difficult to identify and difficult
to assess; the clients because decision horizons, especially where short-term
political appointments or terms of office are concerned, are apt to be short.
CONFUSING DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF COSTS
CONFUSING RELEVANT AND IRRELEVANT COSTS
Having warned against the pitfall of ignoring various costs, it is now necessary
to acknowledge the equally common pitfall of including, in cost estimates,
irrelevant costs.
Costs are consequences of decisions. Relevant costs are those costs, only
those costs, that result from the specific decision or choice being analyzed. Any
expenditure, for example, or resource commitment or sacrifice, that will occur
regardless of the decision being analyzed must not be reckoned as a cost of that
decision.
The principle is simple enough, and every primary course in economics
dwells on this principle. The distinctions between fixed costs and variable costs,
between sunk costs and incremental costs, between nonrecurring and recurring
costs, are all intended to fix attention on the careful separation of relevant and
irrelevant costs-the distinctions in each case, or the definitions, being precise-
ly governed by the scope of the decision under review. Whether a certain type
of expenditure is considered a "variable cost" or a "fixed cost," for example,
depends simply upon whether the expenditure is influenced by, or independent
of, the decision being analyzed.
Yet the pitfall of including irrelevant costs in an analysis is so deceptively
reasonable and inviting that only continuous care will avoid it. Here the
meritorious concern for comprehensive coverage of costs can easily turn into
an exaggeration of costs, and here the common habit of focusing attention on
average costs can turn easily into a snare. In deciding whether or not to expand
a program, for instance-in estimating the costs of the proposed expan-
sion-fixed costs do not belong in the cost estimate. In deciding whether to
complete a program or to continue a program, sunk costs do not belong in the
cost estimate. And any average cost estimate is more than likely, unless we
exercise great caution, to include cost elements that are simply irrelevant to the
decision under examination.
This does not mean, incidentally, that resources on hand are cost-free. It
means that the relevant cost estimate for resources must always be found in
currently available alternative uses for them, not in past history.3 And it means
that only those sacrifices incurred as a result of the specific decision under con-
sideration belong in an estimate of the cost of that decision.
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CONFUSING THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCE WITH THE QUESTION OF CONCERN
If you decide to paint your house a brilliant purple, your decision may not only
reduce the value of your house but also the value of your neighbor's house. Of
course, you may decide that this doesn't concern you. Or perhaps it concerns
you-but not very much. The question of concern is different from the ques-
tion of relevance, and it is often a much harder question to resolve. Relevance
is more of a factual matter, while concern is more a matter of volition.
It is very tempting to assume that cost analysts should restrict their attention
to factual matters. Perhaps they should, but among the facts that they must
confront are the concerns or lack of concern of their clients. The question of
concern cannot be evaded.
Again, it may seem contrary to our earlier admonition to be comprehensive
in identifying costs, but costs to other people will inevitably concern us less
than costs to ourselves, and costs to some people may not concern us at all.
And if cost analysts believe that they are going to avoid the arbitrary or
moralistic judgments involved in this problem, they are mistaken. If the)' believe
that they are going to concern themselves with costs to everyone, and to
everyone equally, they are deceiving themselves and their clients.
Perhaps the tendency of one government agency or one community to ig-
nore the cost impacts of its decisions on other governmental agencies or other
communities is a regrettable deficiency that the cost analyst should attempt to
transcend. But will the analyst's broader scope of concern have no bounds?
Even if their philanthropy embraces the whole world, even if their cost calculus
weighs, somehow, the interests of all living people equally, will their calculus
give equal weight to future generations? All future generations?4
So perplexing is the problem of assigning relative weights to cost impacts on
different people that cost analysts are apt to jump willingly into some pitfall as
a way of hiding from the problem. They can choose from many pitfalls, some
of which we have already noted, others that we will come upon shortly. They
can find shelter, for example, in some very restricted concept of costs, such as
monetary expenditures. But note that this concept is no more sufficient than a
concept of benefits that is restricted to monetary receipts. Note also that
treating all monetary expenditures or receipts as equivalent, unit for unit,
regardless of who pays or receives the money, is itself a weighting system that
is arbitrary and lacking in any profound justification whatever. It would be
better if cost analysts, rather than hiding from the problem, confronted it
directly, being careful, or at the very least conscious, of what they are doing.
CONFUSING LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
The analysis of costs may proceed on different levels. The analyst may attempt
to identify the resources required to carry out a plan or decision. The analyst
may also attempt to identify the most attractive alternative uses of the required
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resources, or the most promising alternatives to the decision. He or she may
even attempt to assess the benefits of these alternatives. None of these tasks is
likely to be easy, and competent effort at any of these successive levels of
analysis will illuminate the choice to be made. In the final analysis, however,
the decision maker, if not the cost analyst, must attempt to assess the benefits
of alternatives and weigh them against the benefits of the proposed decision.
Obviously, if different components of the cost analysis have been carried to
different levels of analysis, summing up the analysis for the decision-maker
requires special care. The analyst has abundant opportunity when piecing
together the disparate elements of such analyses either to double count or to
omit costs, or both.
The analyst also faces, not a pitfall, but a Scylla and Charybdis as he
chooses among levels ofanalysis. On one hand, an analyst who restricts his efforts
simply to identifying required resources may reasonably be faulted for evading
the essential challenge of cost analysis: the evaluation of alternative benefits.
Furthermore, since there will typically be a wide range of alternative resources
usable in carrying out any plan or decision, the analyst must then either iden-
tify a host of options available to the decision maker or else identify the
preferred, or the "least-cost," option. But this latter process itself inevitably in-
volves an evaluation of alternative benefits. On the other hand, if the analyst
boldly accepts the challenge of evaluating alternative benefits, he or she may
easily be forced into making assumptions that fail to convince the decision
maker fully, leaving him unsure about how much reliance to place in the
analysis presented. There is no easy escape from this dilemma; only hard work,
judgment, and communication with the decision maker can guide the analyst
between these opposing hazards.
EXAGGERATING POSSIBILITIES OF REDUCING
COSTS TO A SINGLE MONETARY DIMENSION
PRESUMING THAT A SCHILLING IS A SCHILUNG IS A SCHILLING
Schillings are not all alike. Neither are marks or francs or liras. No pitfall is
more tempting than the presumption that money, or monetary measures, sim-
ply because they might all be expressed in terms of some common monetary
unit, can sensibly be added. Under certain conditions that procedure is
reasonable, but just as often it is a dubious process, not unlike adding
tomatoes, currants, and grapes after labeling them all berries. A schilling taken
from your pocket is certainly not, to you, equivalent to a schilling taken from
someone else's pocket, no matter how much they may look alike.
Costs, or benefits, to two different individuals cannot easily be compared,
even when the costs, or benefits, can be measured in monetary units. This
regrettable predicament is so easily forgotten that it wants emphasis, and the
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distinction between appropriate and inappropriate additions or comparisons of
monetary units may sometimes be subtle.'
Consider a government agency choosing between two prospective sites for a
new, and unwelcome, power generating plant or trash disposal dump or vehicle
parking lot. All other considerations are judged equal, but the agency, wishing
to be fair, seeks to compare the costs that would be imposed on the residents
neighboring one site with the costs that would be imposed if the alternative site
were chosen. After a skillful survey is undertaken, it is estimated that 50,000
schillings annually would be required to compensate the residents at one site
for the unwelcome intrusion, and 60,000 schillings annually would compensate
the residents at the other site. Can we compare the 50,000 schillings with the
60,000, and presume the former is less?
The answer is yes or no, depending on whether or not the residents will ac-
tually be compensated. If compensation is intended, then we are comparing a
prospective 50,OOO-schi11ing expenditure from the funds of the agency with a
60,OOO-schilling expenditure from the same funds. A direct comparison of the
two amounts is reasonable. If, on the other hand, no compensation is actually
intended, we are comparing costs imposed on one group of people with costs
imposed on another. This is a very different matter indeed, and if, for example,
the monetary income of one group is much higher than the monetary income of
the other, the comparison of costs in terms of monetary units will be of dubious
legitimacy.6
RELYING ON SIMPLISTIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF COMPARING CURRENT
SCIflLUNGS WITH FUTURE SCHILUNGS
Everyone knows that a schilling on hand today is worth more than a schilling
deliverable next year. This is another way in which one schilling can differ from
a second, even though each of them is a schilling. Future schillings are dis-
counted. The appropriate rate of discount is debated, but recommendations for
governmental cost analyses typically suggest some uniform rate related to
prime interest rates or government bond rates or estimates of the marginal
efficiency of capital, or to something similar. There is a plausibility and a
reasonableness in such suggestions that distract us from their frequent
limitations.
An agency, with a limited annual budget, will have numerous options for
postponing or advancing expenditures. Typically, but not always, post-
ponements will increase undiscounted total costs while advancements will
reduce them. If budgets are stringent relative to immediate needs, the agency
may be incurring considerable costs to postpone expenditures--eosts con-
siderably greater than commonly proposed discount rates. Alternatively, if the
agency has surplus current funds that it will lose if they are not spent, it may be
advancing expenditures at little or no savings, or even at extra cost. In short,
63
the effective discount rate in specific situations can vary over a very wide
range.
Failure to analyze the actual costs, in the specific situations, of postponing
or advancing expenditures, relying instead on some conventional normative
discount rate, is a pitfall camouflaged by admirable intentions. Economic
efficiency would be served by having actual discount rates uniform, rather than
widely variant, and the use of uniform discount rates in cost analysis is
recommended in the hope of promoting this optimal harmony. But actual,
effective rates can be brought into balance only by shifting budgets, not by
legislating uniform rates for cost analysis. Seeking optimality is a virtue.
Presuming optimality is a blunder.'
Crucial to the question of the appropriate discount rate to use in a particular
situation is the question of who the decision maker is. The meaning of costs
must always be found in alternatives, and decision makers at different
hierarchical levels will have a different range of alternatives available. The
effective discount rate must be found within the options available to the rele-
vant decision maker.
Perhaps an example will clarify these points. If an agency is postponing
needed repairs to the roof of a building, because of a temporary stringency of
funds, it may find that the cost of repairs next year, along with the cost of
damage due to the faulty roof, will exceed by 50 percent the cost of repairing
the roof immediately. In this circumstance, it would be inappropriate for the
agency to expend a comparable sum of money on some other maintenance
project that could be postponed a year at a cost of only 25 percent,
notwithstanding the possibility that some economist might estimate the social
discount rate, or the opportunity cost of capital, to be only 10 percent. On the
other hand, if we focus critical attention on some higher level of
authority-some authority capable of shifting funds to this agency from some
other agencies-then it is certainly possible that the project saving 25 percent
should be funded (as well as, but not instead of, the project saving 50 percent).
The discount rate issue is often intertwined with two other matters, risk and
uncertainty, and also with the issue of inflation, requiring their careful disen-
tanglement by the analyst lest he become entangled himself. If the discount
rate issue takes the extreme form of comparing costs, or benefits, accruing to
future generations with those accruing to the current generation, then all of the
intractable difficulties involved in interpersonal comparisons, mentioned in the
preceding section, come into prominence. Discount rates can obscure this
problem more easily than they can resolve it.8
OVERRELIANCE ON MONEY AS THE MEASURE OF COSTS
It may be true, as frequently reported, that money can buy anything-but it is
also true that there is often legitimate dispute over the proper price. It is, of
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course, part of the analyst's challenge to measure costs wherever possible, and,
whenever possible, to reduce these measures to some common denominator.
Money is, by all odds, the most frequently applicable measure and the most
common of common denominators. It should not be disdained. But the
measure, like the medium, can corrupt us.
This is not the place for a disquisition into the complexities of money and
monetary measures, but the analyst must have a keen awareness of these com-
plexities. Money has a familiar face and a deceptive simplicity that invites naive
use and overreliance. The ingenuous analyst can easily be lured into faulty
applications of monetary measures, or into neglect of alternative or supplemen-
tary measures where they might be advisable, or into neglect of cost elements
not readily included in monetary measures.
For example, the use of market prices as estimates of costs, while often ap-
propriate, is frequently inappropriate without careful review and adjustment.
As a case in point, market prices, if competitive, will reflect marginal costs.
However, if we are reviewing any plan or program large enough to have signifi-
cant market impact, large enough to affect economies of production or to alter
supplies and prices, then actual costs may be higher or lower than current
market prices would suggest. Noncompetitive prices are even more likely to be
misleading. Market prices will often be influenced by market imperfections, in-
cluding government-introduced constraints. Depending upon the concerns of
the decision maker in those circumstances, it is very likely that such market
prices will either understate or exaggerate costs.
Exclusive reliance on monetary measures can be a fault as much as mis-
application of monetary measures. Translation of other measures into
monetary measures is a worthy ambition, but if the procedures employed to
make the translation are insubstantial or highly disputable, then the usefulness
of the entire cost analysis can be diminished. Other measures can usefully
supplement, and sometimes displace, monetary measures of costs. For many
smaller optimization problems, for instance, cost impacts in other terms such
as failure rates, or kilograms, or hours, or liters, or units of output, or frequen-
cies, or indices ofone kind or another, may be more convenient and meaningful
than monetary cost measures, provided that sight is not lost of relevant
possibilities of substitution. 9 And for many major decisions or large-scale
projects, the only meaningful procedure for comprehending and assessing costs
may lie in a direct exploration of alternatives rather than in an effort to
calculate monetary expenditures or losses. Certainly the marginal prices
generated by the marketplace are not going to tell us the cost of a program that
diverts half of a nation's scientific research capability into some limited area of
effort, or the cost of a policy that redirects a large fraction of college students
from the pursuit of medical education into other pursuits, and so on. Similar
examples could be adduced without end.
Yet the most common pitfall created by our fascination with money is the
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simple neglect of costs--costs that are not automatically, or at least not easily,
grasped in our monetary calculations. Money is a most useful measure of
costs, but if the focus of our attention shifts from the ultimate target, costs, to
the means for measurement, money, the risk of omission of important costs
becomes large.1o
Before leaving this section, we must attempt to avoid a misinterpretation.
Nothing said herein is intended to support the supposition that it is immoral to
attach monetary assessments to sacred virtues or noble values--lives, for in-
stance. We save money daily at the risk of life. Innumerable governmental
decisions trade off monetary expenditures, on one hand, versus risk to life on
the other. Refusing to look at the monetary evaluations implicit in our
decisions does not exalt life: it only increases the likelihood of our making in-
consistent trade-offs and, hence, making nonoptimal decisions.
FAILING TO COMPREHEND AND CONFRONT THE
ESSENTIAL CHALLENGE OF COST ANALYSIS:
THE IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF
ALTERNATIVES
The purpose of analysis is to guide decisions. The purpose of analysis is to
illuminate the choice among alternative courses of action. The purpose of
analysis is to help identify and evaluate the differences that will result from
choosing one course of action rather than another. Perhaps so obvious and
fundamental an observation doesn't need such reiteration, but an analyst who
has lost sight of his ultimate destination is in a very deep pitfall indeed.
It should not be presumed that analysts who have stumbled into this pitfall
will experience either loneliness or vexation. They may, instead, find both com-
pany and comfort there, for the pitfall is a haven from challenge.
Costs, like benefits, must always be found in a comparison of alternatives:
i.e., in a comparison of two or more different chains of events, or different
states of the world, that would result from different choices. Failure to
recognize that cost analysis is an analysis of alternatives, a comparison of op-
tions, leaves the analysis without its essential guidance and direction. Variant
facets of this common failure, variant forms of this pitfall, include those briefly
noted below.
GIVING INADEQUATE ATTENTION TO ALTERNATIVES
The alternatives relevant to a particular plan of action may not be explicit or
obvious. This characteristic of alternatives in no way diminishes their
paramount importance; it only invites their neglect. And if the cost analyst is
unaware or unconvinced of their importance, their neglect is virtually assured.
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Yet the alternatives are there, explicit or implicit, recognized or denied,
attended or neglected, clarified or confused, and the quality of the cost analysis
rests upon the meaningfulness of the alternatives presumed.
The implicit character of most alternatives is only one of the inducements to
their neglect. The difficulty of discerning the relevant alternatives is another.
The remarkable, but mesmerizing, performance of money as an indicator and
evaluator of alternatives is yet another.
Money is so frequently and marvelously effective in identifying and assessing
alternatives that, in cost analysis as in life, money often becomes the end rather
than the means. Money is a useful measure of costs because, but only because,
and only to the extent that, it indicates and evaluates the relevant alternatives.
The importance of sophisticated understanding, rather than naive faith, in
judging the capacity of money to perform this feat has already been stressed.
For those who insist that the essence of costs is to be found in money rather
than in alternatives, we might add some incidental observations. Note, first,
that the only reason you hesitate to spend money is because of its many alter-
native uses. Note, second, that even if cost analysis were simply the addition of
a long list of monetary expenditures, the analyst would still need some key to
determine which specific expenditures were, and which were not, appropriately
attributable as costs of the plan being analyzed. The method, if rational, will be
to determine which expenditures would change if the plan were not im-
plemented. But that determination depends upon the alternative presumed. The
fact is that we only know how to estimate costs of choosing one course of ac-
tion rather than some alternative. We know how to evaluate decisions only by
assessing the alternatives available.
PRESUMING TIlAT TIlERE IS ONLY ONE ANSWER TO TIlE QUESTION OF COSTS
If there is more than one pertinent alternative to a plan of action, then there is
more than one pertinent answer to the question: What will it cost? If you and I
have divergent perceptions of the pertinent alternatives, then we will have
divergent perceptions of the costs of the plan. If there is some irreconcilable
dispute over the pertinent alternative, then there is an irreconcilable dispute
over the costs of the plan. And if we don't know the relevant alternatives, then
we don't know the costs of the plan.
It may be that some nominal, neutral, inert alternative can be used as a com-
mon baseline against which to measure costs of several competing plans of ac-
tion. This procedure will, of course, generate a unique estimate of the cost of a
plan, but it should be recognized that (a) costs measured against a nominal
alternative are only nominal costs; (b) the nominal alternative is as likely as the
other alternatives to need careful delineation; and (c) nominal alternatives such
as "do nothing," or "leave matters to the marketplace," are rarely as simple as
they seem. In any event, the specification of a nominal alternative will not tell
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us the real costs of a plan, and the specification will inevitably be arbitrary and
variable. 11
Other considerations should further discourage the presumption that there is
only one valid answer to the question of costs. Since costs must be found in
alternatives, and since the range of available alternatives depends upon the
authority, power, perception, influence, and persuasiveness of the decision
maker, it also follows that there will be different answers concerning the cost of
a plan depending upon the locus of the decision. Higher levels of authority, for
instance, may have different alternative uses for resources utilized in a plan or
different means for implementing the plan. The meaning of the costs of the
plan, and meaningful estimates of these costs, will differ accordingly.
Yet another reason for expecting multiple cost estimates is, of course, the un-
certainty of the future. This uncertainty leads not only to different cost es-
timates in a simple sense but also to related issues of risk acceptance or
avoidance, and issues related to the assessment of strategies for enhancing the
flexibility of plans.
So far we have simply noted that there may well be more than one relevant
meaning to the cost of any decision. We must now also note that any singular
meaning can have more than one meaningful measure. We are referring now to
the problem of concern, discussed earlier. Different clients of cost analyses will
inevitably be concerned with different costs. Even if there is only one relevant
alternative to a decision, and even if that alternative is clearly and precisely
defined, the question of how much weight or concern to attach to different
kinds of costs, or to costs falling on different people, remains. Different, but
valid, cost estimates will result. 12
BEUEVING THAT COSTS ARE OBJECTIVE AND SIMPLE
Costs, like benefits, are inevitably matters of conjecture. We do not mean simp-
ly that costs must be anticipated or projected. Even in retrospect, even after a
decision has been made and implemented and after history has run its course,
costs are a matter of conjecture. An estimate of the consequence of any deci-
sion is inevitably a comparison between two contrasting courses of events: one
course that follows upon the decision if it is, or was, made, and the contrasting
course that will follow, or would have followed, upon an alternative decision. At
least one, if not both, of these courses of events will be conjectural. Costs, like
history, require skillful interpretation.
The popular illusion that cost estimation is objective and simple, or that it is
relatively simple compared with the estimation of benefits, is easily maintained.
The cost analyst can, if he wishes, confine his efforts to those assignments in
which the meaning and the measurement of costs are relatively easy. Or he
can, if he wishes, define costs as those considerations relating to a decision that
are easily identified and measured. These procedures are common enough to
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have obtained the status of orthodoxy. But to those who are willing to con-
front, rather than to diminish or evade, the challenge of cost analysis, costs are
not simple, nor is cost analysis routine. Analysts who understand the essential
nature of costs will also appreciate the complexity of the analytic challenge.
They will conduct their analyses with both imagination and caution-and in-
terpret their results with great care.
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6 Pitfalls in Optimization Methods
E. M. L. Beale
This chapter is devoted to pitfalls in the use of optimization methods. An
applied systems analyst spends more time using known optimization methods
than in developing new ones, and a discussion of pitfalls in algorithm develop-
ment would require more mathematics than is appropriate to this volume.
Throughout the chapter, it is assumed that the optimization methods discussed
will be implemented on a computer. Given any optimization model, one should
certainly think about whether it can be solved analytically. If it can, though, the
model probably does not capture the essence of the problem being studied. For
example, analysis may show that the optimum solution to the problem as posed
is to set all the decision variables to zero or, alternatively, to set them all to
their upper bounds. It is a pitfall (into which I sometimes fall) to assume that all
real problems must be more difficult than this. But if a problem is subjected to
systems analysis, it is nearly always because there are partially conflicting
objectives that cannot be resolved so easily. In the preliminary stages of a
study, rough calculations made without a computer can help to fix the range of
data and parameter values of interest in the main study, and some such
calculations can be regarded as applications of optimization methods. But the
real benefits from optimization come when its systematic methodology is
applied to problems that involve the interaction of so many factors that in-
tuitive methods are ineffective. And these benefits require automatic data
handling and computation.
THE PURPOSE OF OPTIMIZATION
The immediate purpose of optimization is to find the optimum solution to some
explicit model of a real situation. Thus, a discussion of the practical value of
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optimization must be concerned as much with the development of such op-
timization models as with optimization techniques or methods.
Optimization models may be classified as either established or new. An es-
tablished model is run from time to time with updated input data as part of
some operational decision-making routine. The purpose is then to suggest a
specific course of action to management, and the suggestion will usually be
accepted. A new model may also be used in this way, but it is more often used
to gain greater understanding of the situation. The model may be run under a
variety of assumptions that lead to different conclusions, and the model itself
will not suggest which set of assumptions is most appropriate.
The use of established optimization models is relatively free from pitfalls. It
should not be too hard to find out whether the optimization process leads to
decisions that are about as good as, or better than, the decisions that would
otherwise be taken, and then to assess whether the optimization process is cost-
effective. This assessment should take account of the savings realized from not
having to carry out alternative procedures, and of the relative speeds of the
different decision-making procedures. The use of formal optimization may also
improve management's ability to react to new circumstances, since these may
require only a small change in the optimization model, or perhaps just a change
in the data, while other methods of decision making may lead to decisions that
are no longer appropriate.
An optimization model can be used to explore the appropriate reaction to a
large number of hypothetical situations, and the understanding provided by
this exercise may well justify the initial investment in the development of the
model. But this is not a reason for using the model on a day-to-day basis.
Systems analysts are more often concerned with new situations, and the use
of optimization may then be more controversial. Koopman (1956) drew atten-
tion to the pitfalls of "linearitis" and "maximitis," and yet linear programming
is now widely accepted as a very successful tool in applied systems analysis.
Why is this? It is partly because linear programming provides a true optimal
solution to a wide class of problems that could previously be solved only ap-
proximately. But much more important, it is because the concepts of
mathematical programming provide a convenient framework for thinking
about the types of data that are relevant to the problem at hand, and a focus
for collecting these data. The mathematical programming model is then used
by the project manager to coordinate the outputs from other studies. The
model will produce an optimal policy according to some explicitly stated
criterion, given some first approximation to the data. This policy will often be
unacceptable. But the calculations will show where the data are unrealistic,
which additional features need to be considered, and perhaps where additional
data need to be collected. Because optimization tends to produce extreme
solutions, and because it requires a precise specification of the policy options, it
is a much more powerful tool for model development than, say, simulation.
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There is therefore nothing wrong with making exact calculations on inexact
data. On the other hand, very elaborate calculations on inexact data may be
unwise for the following reasons.
One must try to avoid a situation where everyone working on a project is so
busy with the mechanics of obtaining numerical solutions that no one has the
time or energy to think about whether these solutions are reasonable, or
whether some assumptions or some numerical data need to be changed. These
mechanics may involve the development of a computer program to carry out
the optimization process itself. More often, they involve the development of
computer programs to read the data in a convenient format, to express them in
the formats required to carry out the optimization using some standard
software such as a mathematical programming system, and to print out both
the data and a report on the solution in convenient formats. These programs
are usually called matrix generators and report writers. In addition to this
programming effort, the sheer process of feeding a large number of alternative
sets of data into a complex computer package and assessing the solutions can
take a remarkable amount of time and energy, particularly if the matrix
generator and report writer have been designed or implemented casually. This
serious pitfall can often be avoided only if the whole project team works very
hard while the project deadline is still some time in the future. And this is
perhaps contrary to human nature.
A related pitfall is to underestimate the number of times that an optimization
model needs to be run, with alternative sets of data and probably with some
changes in the model structure. Perhaps the most common cause of failure of
optimization models is that analysts, and their clients, are so frightened of over-
simplification that they produce a model that is too expensive to be used for
more than a few runs. They then fail to obtain any real understanding of the
problem.
One can try to avoid expensive runs by truncating the iterative process
used to solve the problem and accepting an intermediate result as an "ap-
proximate" solution. This is rarely sensible. The amount of computer time
saved is usually small unless one is willing to accept a possibly very poor ap-
proximate solution. And the pattern of the solution may be obscured in an ap-
proximate solution even if the objective function is not severely degraded. This
can greatly reduce the value of the work. In integer programming applications
one must often accept a "good" solution that is not guaranteed to be optimum
because it would take too long to complete the tree search. This is unfortunate,
but at least the solution is conditionally optimum, given possibly arbitrary
assignments of values to some of the integer variables.
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OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES
The cost of developing and running a model may depend crucially on whether
it can be solved using some standard optimization technique, and more
specifically on whether the analyst has access to effective computer software
implementing the technique and to people who know how to use it.
Optimization techniques can be classified into five groups:
• Linear programming
• Integer programming
• Nonlinear unconstrained optimization
• Nonlinear constrained optimization
• Dynamic programming
LINEAR PROGRAMMING
Linear programming minimizes an objective function of continuous variables
subject to equality and inequality constraints. In principle, the objective func-
tion and constraints must be linear. In practice, a nonlinear objective function
and nonlinear inequality constraints can be handled by piecewise linearization
provided that both of two conditions hold:
• The objective and constraint functions are defined globally as explicit
functions of the decision variables.
• The objective function and the constraints are convex, or, in other words,
the model does not represent any economies of scale.
Linear programming on large computers is a relatively reliable technique if
the number of constraints is less than, say, 5,000 and the number of decision
variables is less than, say, 50,000. But remember that many constraints and
decision variables may be needed to represent "obvious" aspects of the model
in an explicitly linear form. Software is available for solving much larger linear
programming problems with particular special structures, such as network flow
problems, which include the classical transportation problem.
INTEGER PROGRAMMING
Integer programming is a direct generalization of linear programming in which
one can include variables required to take integer values, and particularly
zero-Qne variables, representing the omission or inclusion of some activity.
Special ordered sets can best be considered as part of integer programming.
These allow nonconvex nonlinear constraints, and therefore economies of
scale, again with the proviso that all functions are defined explicitly.
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Integer programming is a less reliable technique than linear programming, in
that some types of model cannot be solved in a reasonable amount of computer
time if they contain more than, say, 100 integer variables. However, many
models containing several hundred integer variables are solved routinely. And
if good results can be obtained on a realistic set of test data, then they can
usually be obtained with new sets of data for the same class of problem,
provided that the dimensions of the problem are not significantly increased.
NONLINEAR UNCONSTRAINED PROGRAMMING
Nonlinear unconstrained optimization techniques find local minima of func-
tions defined only by subroutines that give the function value, and perhaps the
vector of first derivatives, and again perhaps the matrix of second derivatives,
for any set of trial values of the decision variables. Reasonably reliable
methods for twice-differentiable functions (whether or not the derivatives are
computed explicitly) exist for up to about 100 variables, and many real
problems are solved with a few thousand variables. Methods for nondifferen-
tiable convex functions have been developed and have been found to work well
on some problems but not on others.
NONLINEAR CONSTRAINED PROGRAMMING
Nonlinear constrained optimization, or nonlinear programming, is a simple
extension of unconstrained optimization if all the constraints are simple lower
and upper bounds on individual decision variables. The problem becomes
somewhat more difficult with general linear constraints, and somewhat more
difficult again with general nonlinear constraints. But even in this case,
software for handling hundreds of constraints and variables has been
developed, and some much larger models have been solved accurately enough
for practical purposes.
DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
Dynamic programming is more a modeling technique than an optimization
technique: apart from one extension discussed in the section on dynamic
programming below, it solves problems expressed in terms of finding the
shortest path through a network. Once the problem is in this form, the task of
finding a global optimum solution is quite easy if the numbers of nodes and
arcs in the network are not too gigantic. The classical dynamic programming
formulation is one in which the nodes are grouped into "stages" in such a way
that all arcs lead from a node in one stage to a node in the next stage. The
nodes at any stage then represent the possible states of the system at this stage,
and the lengths of the arcs represent the cost of moving from one state in one
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stage to the appropriate state in the next stage. The shortest-route formulation
implies that the states are defined so that this cost does not depend on how the
previous state was reached.
Dynamic programming is sometimes described in terms that make it seem
much more general than other branches of mathematical programming. But for
computational purposes this is misleading. Instead, dynamic programming
should be regarded as applicable to a narrow range of important problems,
some of which cannot easily be solved any other way. The technique works
well if the number of states at each stage is less than about 10,000. Unfor-
tunately, this is not a large number if several independent variables are needed
to define the state: for example it allows for up to ten possible values of each
of four variables. Sometimes the difficulties can be overcome by using
approximate methods.
Special software is not usually needed for dynamic programming.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FORMULATION
AND THE SOLUTION METHOD
Having outlined the reasons for optimizing, and the available techniques, we
now turn to the formulation of optimization models. It is a pitfall to confuse the
activities of finding out what the real problem is and those of deciding how to
solve it. This is in a sense a generalization of Koopman's linearitis. But, having
decided what the problem is, one should choose a mathematical structure to
represent it that makes computing as simple as possible while capturing the es-
sence of the problem. This generally means representing the partially conflict-
ing objectives.
To illustrate this point, consider two different problems concerning the
production and storage of a number of products. The analyst may be asked to
help make an annual plan when demands for the products are seasonal. The
problem here is to compromise between a policy that produces to meet the de-
mand as it arises, which may minimize storage cost at the expense of high
production costs, and a policy of steady production rates of all products, which
may minimize production costs at the expense of high storage costs. A multi-
time-period linear programming model using deterministic estimates of all
demands, capacities, and costs may well be adequate for this problem,
although the actual stock levels used will include an allowance for uncertainties
in the supply and demand for materials and for operational flexibility. But if the
analyst is asked to help choose the best compromise between holding expensive
stocks and the risk of failing to meet unexpectedly high demand, then some
explicit representation of the stochastic nature of demand is essential.
Sometimes the simplest model with the required logical structure needs data
that seem so abstract to the client that he cannot supply them. A more dis-
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aggregated model may then be necessary. But we must resist unnecessary dis-
aggregation. Inexperienced clients sometimes feel that features of their opera-
tion that are important to them must be included in any model "to make it
more realistic." But realism in a mathematical model is not a primary require-
ment, and the test must be whether the features are really important to the deci-
sion that the model is being used to study. The dangers of being misled by an
oversimplified model may be the most obvious ones at an early stage of the
project. But, if realistic data for the simple model can be collected, then the
dangers of having a model that is too cumbersome to be used effectively, dis-
cussed above, are probably greater. A model built by a committee is particular-
ly prone to excessive detail. The model will need to incorporate information
from many sources, so this pitfall can be avoided only if there is someone in
charge of the project who understands the danger and has the authority to do
what is needed.
Even in the initial discussions before detailed model-building starts, the
analyst probably has some solution technique in mind to help him to structure
his thoughts. Nevertheless, he must not shut his eyes to relevant information
that cannot be processed by this technique, so he should be in no hurry to
make a final choice.
Even the general concepts of mathematical programming, namely, decision
variables and explicitly defined constraint and objective functions, can blind the
analyst to stochastic aspects of the problem. This may be inevitable. There are
no general modeling approaches that allow effective optimization when the
stochastic information evolves as successive decisions are made. Multistage
stochastic programming can be applied only to very simple models.
Although dynamic programming allows for some random variables, these
must be statistically independent of all previous random variables, given the
values of the current state variables. Representing uncertainty in such a naive
way may be even more misleading than omitting it from the formal part of
the analysis. Informal guidance can often be obtained from sensitivity analyses
of the effects of changes in the data.
Even if a mathematical programming approach is accepted, there is no
reason to think specifically oflinear programming if there are relevant data that
can be expressed more conveniently in nonlinear or integer terms. Once the
structure and approximate values of the data have been established, the analyst
should think seriously about whether a purely linear programming model, or
even a network flow model, might be adequate. If so, the tasks of developing
and running the model are simplified, and the model becomes less dependent on
specialized computer software and therefore more portable.
Two more specific pitfalls in optimization modeling are worth noting. One is
that the ratio of two variable quantities is rarely, if ever, a good way to express
an objective function. For example, one may be interested in the rate of return
on some portfolio of investments, but to choose the portfolio to maximize the
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ratio of net revenue to capital employed can lead to the omission of useful in-
vestments because this omission reduces the denominator by a more significant
amount than the numerator. It is nearly always better to ask the client to
specify the value of capital, or whatever is measured by the denominator,
possibly as a function of the amount of capital used. One can then maximize
the difference between the value of the net revenue, or whatever is measured by
the numerator of the original ratio, and the cost of the resource measured by
the denominator.
The other pitfall is to forget that there may be many solutions with the same,
or almost the same, value of the objective function. There is usually no reason
to prefer one such solution to another, but, if there is a reason, it should be in-
corporated in the model. So, for example, if a linear programming model is
used monthly to allocate the production of materials at different sources to
different destinations, it may be important to include the information that, other
things being equal, it is more convenient to supply a destination from the same
source as last month. Otherwise, the model is quite likely to recommend
changes for trivial reasons.
This is a convenient place to point out two contrasting pitfalls in the com-
puter implementation of models. It seems inevitable that while a model for a
practical problem is being developed, and while the initial data are being
collected, the detailed requirements will change. One serious pitfall is for the
analyst to allow changes in the specification during the initial computer im-
plementation of the model. Even apparently trivial changes can have un-
expected ramifications, delaying the production of working programs and in-
creasing the risk that the developed programs will contain errors. But an
almost equally serious pitfall is for the analyst or his client to become so im-
pressed with the difficulty and danger of program changes that he continues to
use an unsatisfactory implementation of the model. Once the initial develop-
ment is complete, changes may be very worthwhile. The input can often be
simplified. It may be found that some quantities that were originally conceived
as individual items of data are in fact computed from other more basic data.
Provided these basic data are not much more voluminous, they should be read
instead., and the computations consolidated into the model. Experience may
suggest the desirability of introducing more data checks, or, on the other hand,
of making some data formats more flexible, even if this means removing some
checks.
The output can often be improved in the light of experience. And changes in
the mathematical structure of an optimization model are often easy as long as
they do not require a change of solution technique. Indeed such changes often
cause far less trouble than in a simulation model. This is probably because
optimization requires that the model structure be set out in a more disciplined
way than does simulation.
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DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
It seems appropriate to say something about the task of formulating an op-
timization model, although this cannot be reduced to simple rules. Beale (1968)
suggests that the constraints can be classified as availabilities, capacities,
qualities, demands, and material balances and that the activities, or decision
variables, can be classified as buying, making, and moving. This classification
is still valid and helpful, although there is a good case for treating demand con-
straints merely as special types of material balance constraints and for treating
"making" as another type of activity whose characteristic feature is that it has
a negative coefficient in one or more capacity constraints.
Confusion over signs is an obvious pitfall in any mathematical work. So it is
wise to have a rigorous convention about signs in material balance constraints.
The usual convention is to use a positive coefficient for activities that bring
material in and a negative coefficient for activities that take material away.
Thus the general form of the constraint is
Stock on hand
from the
previous time
period (or
initial stock)
Stock bought, Stock sold,
+ transferred in, - transferred out
or made or used
Stock on hand
at the end
of the
time period
=0
This is very natural. The only aspect that is at all counterintuitive is the signs
attached to the storage activities, but these follow inevitably from the rest of the
equation. It is worth noting, however, that there is a superficial contradiction
between this sign convention and the convention that says that a capacity con-
straint takes the general fonn:
Capacity used is less than or equal to capacity available.
Thus the use of capacity is represented by a positive coefficient while the use
of a material is represented by a negative coefficient. An availability constraint
can be regarded as a material balance constraint except that it is written with
the sign conventions of a capacity constraint to remove the negative
coefficients.
Signs in the objective function can also cause trouble. Unless instructed
otherwise, mathematical programming systems maximize the dummy variable
Xo if the objective function row is written
Xo + 1: ao· x = boj 1)
So a positive coefficient ao in the objecDve function row represents a cost, andJ
a negative coefficient a revenue. But a positive constant term bo represents a
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fixed revenue. This operation of maximizing Xo is, of course, equivalent to
minimizing the expression
It is recommended that storage activities indexed by time period t should refer
to the end of this time period and not the start. Initial stocks then have a sub-
script of zero, which is natural, and one can normally avoid any activities in-
dexed by a time period after the last one.
One rather technical point about linear programming formulations so often
causes trouble that it seems worth mentioning. Typical production activities
give only a single output, and these are naturally represented by single decision
variables, even though these variables may have negative coefficients in several
material balance rows if they consume several raw materials in fixed propor-
tions. If the activity produces one or more by-products together with the main
product, however, many people feel the need to represent the by-products by
additional decision variables. This feeling must be suppressed. By-product
production is represented by positive coefficients in the appropriate material
balance row in the same way that raw material use is represented by negative
coefficients. Of course, if there are alternative modes of production giving
different products, or even the same products in different proportions, this is a
very different matter, and one must introduce separate decision variables
representing the different modes.
One pitfall with optimization models, and particularly with large-scale
mathematical programming models, is that the detailed formulation and im-
plementation can easily become unintelligible to anyone except their authors,
who may overlook something vital, particularly if the model needs amendment.
A first step away from this pitfall is the adoption of a systematic way of
documenting models. The approach recommended by Beale et al. (1974) works
well. This is based on the fact that an intelligible detailed formulation of a large-
scale model depends on the compactness of an algebraic formulation using
subscripts and summation signs. By including summation over one or more
subscripts, one can write a single line of algebra to define an equation connec-
ting many variables. Furthermore, if other subscripts not covered by summa-
tion signs are included, the same single line of algebra can define several similar
equations.
It is therefore natural to base the computer implementation of a
mathematical programming model on an algebraic formulation. But this for-
mulation itself can easily become unintelligible ifit is not set out systematically.
The following order of presentation is recommended.
1. Subscripts. Use lowercase letters, with the corresponding capital letter
representing the maximum possible value of the subscript.
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2. Sets. These may be needed to give precise definitions of ranges of sum-
mation, or conditions under which a constraint, variable, or constant is defined.
Use capital letters.
3. Constants. Specify the physical dimensions. Use capital letters.
4. Variables. Specify the physical dimensions. Use lowercase letters.
5. Constraints.
Avoid using any letter to mean more than one thing. If there are too few
different letters to use mnemonic single letters for all quantities, then use capital
letters as literal subscripts to define composite letters. Such literal subscripts
never take numerical values, while lowercase subscripts always take numerical
values. So, for example, CUJp may denote the manufacturing cost for product p
at factory f (in £/tonne), and C DdJp the distribution cost to destination d (in
£/tonne).
This may seem a perverse approach, since with a very simple model one can
go straight to the constraints and then explain them by defining the constants
and variables. The subscripts are then defined implicitly in the course of the
other definitions. Some of the reasons for the recommendations are therefore
spelled out.
A definition of all the subscripts immediately indicates the overall scope of
the model. If the symbols are then used consistently, the subscripted constants
and variables can be understood more easily and defined more compactly since
the subscripts need not be reinterpreted.
Although sets may not be needed in simple models and will generally be
developed at a late stage in the formulation, they often provide the only com-
pact way of giving a precise definition of domains of summation, or conditions
for the existence of other entities. It seems natural to define them immediately
after the subscripts to which they refer.
The constants, variables, and constraints are normally developed in parallel.
The constants are listed first because they are part of the conditions of the
problem and logically precede the decision variables, which represent the ap-
proach to its solution.
The structure of the constraints is clarified if the notation distinguishes
between the constants, or assumed quantities, and the decision variables to be
determined by the model. This may not be clear from the context. For example,
the model may take the amounts of each product to be made either as data or
as quantities to be determined. Confusion is avoided by always using lowercase
letters for decision variables and capital letters for constants. This notation
conflicts with that used in more theoretical work, where one is concerned with
comparatively few types of subscripts and variables, and where one can reserve
letters near the beginning of the alphabet for constants. But this approach is
not convenient for applied work. On the other hand, in applied work there is no
merit in using capital letters to denote matrices, since constants and variables
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often have three or more subscripts and in any case their physical significance
is clarified if the subscripts are written explicitly.
In applied work, quantities are sometimes given names consisting of two or
more letters, as they are in computer programming languages. But it seems best
to maintain the mathematical convention that multiplication is implied when
two letters are written side by side and not as subscripts. These ideas can be
reconciled by writing the name with all letters after the first as literal subscripts.
These letters are written in capitals to distinguish them from subscripts that
take numerical values, which are always written as lowercase letters.
These literal subscripts can be appended to constants, variables, and sets.
They can, if necessary, also be appended to subscripts. Subscripts may also
take numerical subscripts if several quantities of the same type are needed in
the same constraint So the amount of material transported from location i 1 to
location i2 may be written as Yi,i, ,and if the demand at location i is Di, we
may have a constraint
Similarly, if c, denotes the capacity introduced in time period t and X, the
capacity used in time period t, we may write the capacity constraint as
I
X - 1: C ~ Co
I (1=1 'I
where Co denotes the initial capacity. But this form of constraint, relating the
current situation back to the initial situation, may represent a formulation pit-
fall, since the constraints often contain significantly fewer nonzero coefficients
if one time period is related to the previous time period. The constraint can be
written as
/
X - 1: C + e = Co
t 11=1 ,'I I
where e t is an "explicit slack," and if the constraint for time period t - 1 is sub-
tracted from it, we have the constraints
Xl - cl + el = CO
X-X -c+e-e =O(t~l)
t I-I ( t I-I
This constraint has fewer nonzero coefficients than the original one when t > 3.
Given the algebraic formulation of the model set out in this way, the assuming
that the values of the constants can be read into the computer, it is a straight-
forward task to write a matrix generator computer program to write the data in
the format required by a mathematical programming system such as MPSX.
Indeed, the task is so straightforward that it can be automated. Scicon, for
example, has written a matrix generator generator program, which produces a
matrix generator program, given the algebraic formulation and instructions for
computing the coefficients in the form of FORTRAN arithmetic statements or
function-type subroutines.
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Whether the matrix generator program is produced automatically or
manually, Beale et al. (1974) recommend that one should try to keep the
documentation of the algebraic formulation up to date when the model is
changed. They were wary of proposing rigid standards, since they knew the
pressures under which practical program developers work. But subsequent
experience has shown that it is quite easy and very desirable to accept this
requirement unconditionally: whenever the algebraic structure of the model is
changed, however smal1 or however urgent the change, the master copy of the
documentation of the algebraic formulation must be updated before the com-
puter program is altered.
LINEAR PROGRAMMING
For many good reasons, linear programming is the most widely used optimiza-
tion technique in systems analysis. Reliable software for solving quite large
linear programming models exists for many computers, and there are
remarkably few pitfal1s in its application.
The advantages of linear programming can be summarized under three
headings:
• Ease of modeling and data collection
• The fact that one can easily find a global optimal solution
• The fact that sensitivity analysis is easy, and in particular that an immediate
by-product of the solution is a set of shadow prices, or Lagrange multipliers,
representing the effects on the objective function of small changes in the
constraints
It is sometimes suggested that the reason people use linear models is simply
that they cannot solve nonlinear models. This would not be a bad reason
except that it ignores recent progress in numerical methods for nonlinear
programming. The real reason, however, has much more to do with the
feasibility of data collection and a judgment of what is relevant. It may be in-
exact to use a linear material balance constraint as spelled out in the preceding
section. This ignores the possibility that breakages, or theft by employees, may
depend in a nonlinear way on the level of activity in the store. But even though
it may sometimes be desirable to allow for these "losses," it is rarely sensible to
consider them in such detail. Capacity constraints on multipurpose machinery
are another example of a linear constraint simplifying reality by allowing for
the time lost changing over from one product to another in an inexact way. But
we try to avoid representing these changeovers in detail, not only because it
would make the optimization much more difficult but because it would make
data collection much more difficult.
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This situation can be summarized by saying that any fool can think of a
reason why a linear model may not represent the real world exactly. But this is
rarely useful unless he can offer some quantitative correction to the linear
model. The only real exception occurs when the nonlinearity is the essence of
the problem even though it is hard to quantify. In a model for farm planning,
one decision to be considered may be the amount of fertilizer to be applied to
the farmer's grass. A linear model is likely to conclude that if fertilizer is useful
at all, one should apply as much as possible. It seems necessary to allow for the
nonlinearity of the yield as a function offertilizer level, even though the data on
this nonlinearity may not be very reliable. Fortunately, such effects can be ac-
commodated within a linear programming model by using piecewise
linearization.
It is important to be aware that quite large linear programming problems can
be generated (using a matrix generator program) and solved easily. From a
logical viewpoint, it is also important that all linear programming problems are
convex and that any local optimum is therefore also a global optimum. Prac-
tical linear programming models usually have between about 500 and 1,200
constraints and a rather larger number of variables. It is interesting that these
model sizes are much the same as those used 15 years ago, even though com-
puter capabilities for solving linear programming problems have increased
vastly. These increased computer capabilities owe at least as much to im-
provements in mathematical methods for handling sparse matrices as they do
to improvements in computer hardware. So, although it is conventional to
measure the size of a linear programming model by the number of rows (essen-
tially the number of constraints), because the solution time increases as the
cube of the number of rows (other things being equal), the number of nonzero
coefficients in the matrix is much more significant. This means that one may be
very disappointed by the computer's performance on a model with many more
than six nonzero coefficients in an average column. The problem will require
more computer storage than a typical problem with the same number of rows
and columns. The time per iteration of the simplex method will be increased,
the number of iterations may be greatly increased, and there may even be
problems of numerical accuracy. Sometimes these difficulties can be
overcome by introducing extra variables defining intermediate quantities
that occur in many constraints. Adding to the numbers of rows and columns
in this way is well worthwhile if it drastically reduces the number of nonzero
coefficients.
It is a pitfall to think that no one could ever reasonably want to generate a
linear programming model with several thousand constraints. Such models
arise all too easily in studying operations that extend over several locations and
several time periods. So the art of model building in linear programming con-
sists of reducing the "natural" problem size to something manageable by
aggregation or by using other simplifications in the formulation.
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Careless scaling of the numbers can cause difficulties with any optimization
method, but it seems best to consider this problem with each method in-
dividually. Modern linear programming codes are fairly robust against bad
scaling. In particular, they have some automatic rescaling option, and they also
provide some variant of the dynamic scaling algorithm introduced by Harris
(1973). The codes still retain a number of fixed tolerances, so it is still desirable
that the magnitudes of the nonzero coefficients in the original matrix should lie
between 0.0 I and 100 as far as possible. This can usually be achieved by
scaling the units in which constraints and activities are measured by suitable
powers of 103•
INTEGER PROGRAMMING
Integer programming is a useful approach to optimization problems involving
economies of scale. Many large integer programming problems are now solved
routinely. Thus the task of developing an integer programming model for a new
application should be approached optimistically. This optimism must be
cautious, however, since the amount of work required to solve the problem in
principle increases exponentially with the number of integer variables, and
many models in which the solution of the linear programming relaxation of the
problem does not give good guidance toward the corresponding integer solu-
tion have proved useless.
Difficulties with integer programming models can sometimes be overcome
by reformulation. Williams (1974) provides some illuminating examples.
Integer programming is not as robust a technique as linear programming, and
although we can use it to find the best combination of subsystems, we must try
to avoid using it to find the best options within subsystems when these can easi-
ly be found by other means. As an extreme example, in a model used to study
the economic viability of a system of offshore gas-gathering pipelines, it is
natural to introduce integer variables representing alternative possible starting
times for a shore terminal, and integer variables representing alternative possi-
ble starting times for the different links in the pipeline system. If there is only
one possible link to some shore terminal in the system being considered, then it
stands to reason that this link and the terminal should start operating together.
But an integer programming model that treats these as separate decisions can
waste a great deal of time before it recognizes the fact.
A more general pitfall in integer programming formulations concerns con-
straints of the form
1: x-MB~Oj J
where Cl is a zero-one variable. This is a very powerful modeling device for im-
posing the constraint that each x j must be zero unless /) = 1. Problems with
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many such constraints tend to be very hard to solve, however, particularly if
the numbers M are larger than they need to be. Williams notes that these
difficulties can often be alleviated by disaggregating the constraint. Specifically,
if the upper bound Mj on an individual x j is lower than the upper bound on
their sum, then it is probably better to write
even though this may greatly increase the number of constraints.
Once the formulation is settled, the user can sometimes still have a signifi-
cant effect on the progress of the algorithm by varying the solution strategy. In
particular, if the standard strategy does not work too well, he should consider
assigning a priority ordering to the integer variables and special ordered sets.
Integer programming methods tend to work less well on purely com-
binatorial optimization problems, so it is important to remember the basic
arithmetic of combinatorial optimization. A problem with n independent yes-
or-no decisions has 2n possible solutions. It can therefore be solved by
enumerating them. If n = 10, this means enumerating just over 103 possibilities,
which may well be feasible. If n = 20 there are just over 1()6 possibilities, and
enumeration is probably infeasible. The idea of branch-and-bound methods is
to avoid the need to examine all possibilities. But if this approach saves 99.9
percent of the work required for a complete enumeration, there are still over
1,000 problems to be solved if n = 20, and the amount of work doubles when n
is increased by one. Fortunately, there are many applications where branch-
and-bound is much more effective than this, and problems with hundreds of in-
teger variables can be and are solved.
The task of finding the optimal permutation of a set of elements increases
even faster with the number of elements. Since 6! is only 720, one can often
handle up to six elements without considering anything more sophisticated
than complete enumeration. Even 1O! is only just over 3 x 1()6, and this might
be a manageable number. But every single extra element then increases the
amount of work by a factor of more than 10, so the approach cannot then be
considered practical using even the fastest computer. This is the starkest exam-
ple of the pitfall of thinking that the computer can do arithmetic at effectively
infinite speed.
UNCONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION
Unconstrained optimization is more rarely used in systems analysis than the
techniques discussed so far. The most important applications are in fitting
models to data by choosing parameter values that minimize some function of
the residuals, which are defined as the deviations of the observed values from
86
the fitted values. Special methods can be used for such problems, based on
local linear approximations to the individual residuals. The function is often
taken as the sum of the squares of the residuals, and the problem is then usual-
ly solved using the Gauss-Newton method as modified by Levenberg (I 944)
and Marquardt (1963). These methods usually work wen, but if they fail to
converge in a number of iterations of the same order as the number of un-
known parameters, then the problem can often be solved more effectively as a
general unconstrained optimization model.
The main pitfall in this type of unconstrained optimization is to rely on the
computational technique to cope with an unnecessarily awkward formulation.
While there is no reason to abandon a model in favor of another model that
makes less physical sense just because it is easier to compute, there is every
reason to express the model in terms of different parameters if the effects on the
fitted values of changing one parameter could be largely counteracted by com-
pensating changes in other parameters. This pitfan is discussed constructively
by Ross (1970).
NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING
There are so many types of nonlinear programming problem, and correspon-
dingly so many methods for nonlinear programming, that it is hard to identify
general pitfalls.
One pitfall is to use a primitive general method, particularly one that does
not require derivatives, and to rely on the power of the computer to overcome
any lack of sophistication in the algorithm. In practice, round-off errors can
easily cause the algorithm to stop some way from any local optimum.
Penalty function methods are convenient for small problems if one has a
good unconstrained optimization code, but they are intrinsically weaker than
other methods. And one must beware of the inherent ill-conditioning of the
problems as the penalty parameter tends to zero. Various ideas have been
proposed for avoiding this difficulty, but it is doubtful if they will ever be com-
petitive with the best methods that use explicit linear approximations to the
constraints. These methods are mostly based on the reduced gradient method
introduced by Wolfe (1963) and generalized to nonlinear constraints by Abadie
and Carpentier (1969).
DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
The major pitfall of dynamic programming is that, even if the problem can be
accommodated within the computer, the amount of computing required may
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be excessive. Careful thought must thus be given to whether some of the
calculations are being repeated unnecessarily. In other words, there may be
common elements in the calculation of the effective lengths of different arcs in
the network.
As noted in the section on optimization techniques above, it is a pitfall to
think that dynamic programming deals only with shortest-route problems. A
minor extension of the standard algorithm solves optimization problems on a
tree in a sense that can perhaps be best explained by considering a specific
example.
Suppose that one has the design for a network of pipes in which material
enters the network at a number of sources and proceeds by a unique route to a
single sink. A number of nodes can be identified in this network. There must be
a node at each junction point, and we may introduce additional nodes. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that only two pipes join at ajunction, since
multiple junctions can be represented as neighboring simple junctions. The
problem is to choose some property of the network that depends on the "state"
at each node. For example, we may need to choose the diameters of each
pipeline link, and the state at the node may represent its depth. The cost and
feasibility of any link may then depend on the diameter chosen and on the
depths at the upstream and downstream ends of the link. Such problems can be
solved by dynamic programming, by defining a value function Vn (xn ) for each
node n, depending on the state x
n
at this node, as the minimum achievable cost
for all links upstream of node n, given that the state at this node is xn •
CONCLUSION
In spite of the pitfalls noted in this chapter, numerical optimization techniques
are becoming increasingly useful to applied systems analysts. This is partly the
result of the development of understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of
the techniques and of appropriate modeling strategies. It is the result of the
development of reliable and convenient computer hardware and software, so
that models can be developed and implemented quickly. If the first numerical
results are unexpected or unsatisfactory, there is then plenty of time to correct
the data, or even restructure the model if necessary.
One final pitfall is to dismiss numerical optimization as an old-fashioned and
unchanging aspect of systems analysis. To use it effectively, the analyst may
well need to take advantage of current developments in mathematical modeling
techniques, in numerical algorithms, and in computer software design.
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7 The User's Perspective
Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
Whether based in government or in private organizations, systems analysts are
recognized as playing an important role in the making of public policy.
Because most policy choices are complex, public officials often need help in
sorting out the issues and alternatives and in marshaling evidence concerning
their likely consequences. I Systems analysts provide that help by bringing the
knowledge, methods, and ideas of the scientific community to bear on the tasks
of designing and choosing public policies.
Yet decision makers are often dissatisfied with the usefulness of systems
analysis. In part, their criticisms are aimed at incompetently done studies or at
analysts who lack skill and experience. However much of their dissatisfaction
is more fundamental. It is directed at studies and advice that, though
professionally competent, they view as misguided and irrelevant. It is the latter
type of dissatisfaction with which this chapter is concerned.
Some see dissatisfaction of this sort as rooted in the sharply different ways
that policy makers and policy analysts think. Laurence H. Tribe, for example,
argues that
in part because of their particular form of commitment to a posture of detached and
impersonal objectivity, the policy sciences tend to partition and warp reality in certain
patterned ways, generating a fairly understandable, and sometimes quite unfortunate,
system of blind spots and distortions. 2
The reality to which he refers, and in which policy makers are enmeshed, is
characterized by the inseparability of facts and values, of private values and
the public interest, of political process and policy outcomes, and of decision
making and moral judgment. Analysts, Tribe is saying, fail to come to grips
with that reality.
This is an important issue. To prepare the ground for identifying pitfalls
from the perspective of a user of analysis, the next section of this chapter
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explores different models and images of decision making in the public sector.
With this as background, the discussion moves to an identification of pitfalls in
systems analysis from the perspective of a government official facing a com-
plex policy decision. Conclusions follow.
DECISION MAKING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
RATIONAL ACTORS AND CLASSICAL ANALYSIS
Many ideas about the application of systems analysis have been derived from a
particular paradigm of the decision-making process and of the role of analysis
in shaping decisions. Christened the "rational actor model" by Allison3 and
"the problem solving image" by Rein and White,4 this idealization charac-
terizes the decision maker as a goal-oriented seeker after the knowledge that
will enable him or her to make "good policy." Through a rational process of
identifying specific objectives and evaluating alternative ways of achieving
them, the decision maker chooses policies and allocates resources toward their
achievement. Rational decision makers, furthermore, are participants in a
policy process that is purposeful.
Implicit in [thel basic characterization of problems and solutions [by traditional policy
analystsl is the image of someone or some collective mechanism that is actively in-
volved in steering, making the policy decisions that guide the ship of state. The image
involves both a steersman and a steering wheel well connected to the rudder.'
The task of the systems analyst in supporting the rational decision maker is
to do good analysis in the classic sense. E. S. Quade characterizes such
analysis as follows:
The idea of an analysis to provide advice is .. " in concept, ... simple and rather ob-
vious. One strives to look at the entire problem. as a whole, in context, and to compare
alternative choices in the light of their possible outcomes. Three sorts of inquiry are
required, any of which can modify the others as the work proceeds. There is a need,
first of all, for a systematic investigation of the decisionmaker's objectives and of the
relevant criteria for deciding among the alternatives that promise to achieve these
objectives. Next, the alternatives need to be identified, examined for feasibility, and
then compared in terms of their effectiveness and cost, taking time and risk into ac-
count. Finally, an attempt must be made to design better alternatives and select other
goals if those previously examined are found wanting.6
More precisely, the elements of analysis, "present in every analysis of choice,"7
are the objective (or objectives), the alternatives, the costs, a model (or models),
and a criterion.
This paradigm of decision making is popular with systems analysts partly
because it is compatible with the methods of rational inquiry that they use and
partly because of its normative implications. Belief in the problem-solving
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image rests, according to Rein and White,8 on "the conviction that policy
expresses a theory of action that includes: (1) a definition of the problem; (2) a
set of possible courses of action; and (3) a goal or goals one seeks to achieve."9
Thus, in this view, decision makers and systems analysts are engaged in iden-
tical cognitive activities. Moreover, the argument goes, policy making should
be conducted this way if the public interest is to be served. The making of
public policy depends to a large and increasing extent on the clarification of
objectives and on the efficient use of resources, the achievement of which is
beyond the reach of judgment unaided by systematic analysis of ends and
means. 10
In the classical formulation of systems analysis, pitfalls are defined as
sources of errors in logic or reasoning that stem from weaknesses in the
theoretical foundations of systems analysis and from lack of training and
experience on the part of the analystY Quade further categorizes pitfalls as in-
ternal-those inherent in the analysis-and external-those concerned with
getting analysis used,12
Internal pitfalls are those that decision makers and their advisers typically
have in mind when they say, "This is a poor study." Pitfalls of this type include
inadequate treatment of uncertainty-the inability of the analyst to answer
questions of the form, "How would your results be affected if ... ?"; failure to
treat all considerations relevant to the decision at hand; failure to formulate the
problem in a way that is responsive to the decision maker's concerns; bias or
parochialism exhibited at any stage of the analysis; and excessive attention to
technique or to detail to the neglect of the policy issue or problem.
External pitfalls include failure to get the message across to the client Such
failure may stem from arrogance on the part of the analyst and from the
analyst's having to bear a message the client does not want to hear; failure to
anticipate organizational resistance to change; and "substituting a model for
the decision maker," i.e., discounting or neglecting factors outside the analyst's
model that may have an important bearing on the decision.
The origin of the idea of a dichotomy between internal and external pitfalls is
perhaps to be found in the distinction drawn in the early systems analysis
literature between analysis and judgment. This distinction has often been inter-
preted as justifying a hierarchical separation of analytic considerations and
policy-making considerations. Systems analysis should be done in accordance
with the highest standards of scientific excellence and the results submitted to,
or injected into, the processes of political decision making. That is, analysts
make their judgments, then policy makers make theirs, sacrificing "objective"
values in the interest of achieving political ends or "second best" solutions.
This interpretation often leads to the view that non-use of competent
analysis can be attributed to flaws, often termed "irrationalities," in the policy-
making process or to mistakes by decision makers. Politics are seen as
obstacles to rational decision making and to the uncompromised use of good
analysis.
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THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS
Although some policy decisions in some systems of government are the
province of a single decision maker, in which case "rational actor" or "problem-
solving" models might be appropriate, most are not. That the rational actor
model is not an adequate characterization of most public sector decision
making is widely recognized. A number of alternative conceptualizations of
decision making have been developed that represent the nature of the policy-
making process with greater realism. Each has important implications for the
practice of systems analysis and for the identification of pitfalls.
Some conceptualizations are concerned with explaining policy outcomes in
terms of interactions among social institutions, groups, and individual actors
sharing the power to influence decisions. One type of model, associated with
Charles E. Lindblom, identifies the interdependence of ends and means, the
prevalence of value conflicts, the dispersion of power, and the processes of in-
cremental adjustment and compromise as essential characteristics of policy-
making systems.13 Rein and White describe a variant of this model according
to which "policy formation involves (1) problem setting as a step toward issue
setting; (2) mobilization of the fine structure of governmental action; (3)
achievement of settlements in the face of dilemmas and trade-offs among
values."14
Other conceptual frameworks are concerned with the actions of decision
makers within organizational settings. According to Alexander L. George, for
example, a "policy making system is comprised of individuals who often come
together in small groups within the framework of an organization that is
characterized by hierarchy, division of labor, and specialization."B He goes on
to note that impediments to the use of analysis and other information are to be
found in
(1) the dynamics of individual behavior; (2) the ways in which small, policy-making
groups are structured, their internal processes managed, and their communication with
outsiders regulated; (3) the patterns of behaviour that emerge in complex
organizations.16
Allison has developed two alternatives to the rational actor model, each of
which incorporates important elements of reality. According to his
"organizational process model," governmental behavior can be understood less
as a product of deliberate choices and more as the outputs of large
organizations functioning according to standard or routinized patterns of
behavior. In contrast, his "bureaucratic politics model" explains government
behavior in terms of political bargaining along regularized circuits among
players positioned hierarchically within the government. I 7
Combining the ideas of complex policy-making systems and complex
organizations leads to a view of policy making considerably different from the
problem-solving image. The objectives and values of participants are not given
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and immutable, nor is the establishment of goals the first stage in policy
making. Often values are created and objectives are selected in the course of
choosing among alternatives. Conflict and compromise are the methods of
decision making, and rational calculation-to the extent that it occurs-is a
diffuse, difficult, and largely unobservable activity.18
For the most part, the implications of these alternative models of decision
making for the practice of systems analysis-and for the identification of pit-
falls-have not been systematically spelled out. Some observers have offered
general advice. Tribe, for example, advocates that analysis move
in the general direction of a subtler, more holistic, and more complex style of problem-
solving, undoubtedly involving several iterations between problem formulation and
problem-solving and relying at each stage on the careful articulation of a wide range of
interrelated values and constraints through the development of several distinct
"perspectives" on a given problem, and couched in an idiom true to its internal struc-
ture rather than translated into some "common denominator."19
Lindblom argues that "analytical methods cannot be restricted to tidy scholar-
ly procedures."2o The analyst must recognize, and incorporate into his or her
work, strategies and dodges reflecting the actual behavior of decision makers:
"satisficing" instead of maximizing; proceeding incrementally; focusing on
specific bottlenecks and the elimination of specific disadvantages. Especially
useful in this context are the views of those who have at different times been
both producers and users of analysis. This largely anecdotal body of lore is a
rich source of insights into the practice of analysis based on insiders' perspec-
tives on the decision-making environment.
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE
Alain Enthoven, for example, formerly the Assistant Secretary for Systems
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Defense and a distinguished practitioner of
systems analysis, has distilled from his experience in government ten practical
principles for systems analysis.21 For example: "A good analysis will search
out and highlight the key questions of values, the uncertainties and the in-
tangibles, and not bury them."22 A good analyst will "keep it simple"z3 and
recognize that "It is better to be roughly right than exactly wrong."z. A good
analyst will "consider the basis on which decisions are actually being made,
and ask whether [he or she] can improve on it,"23 and will "think critically and
realistically about the prospects for implementation."z6
Following service as the Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget,
economist Charles Schultze echoed the general theme of Enthoven's principles:
"Systematic" in the term systematic analysis has more than decorative meaning. It im-
plies that problems should be analyzed in the context of the relevant environment.
Successful analysis of the federal government's domestic programs does not isolate
facts or relationships from the system in which they exist. It does not ignore the feed-
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backs between the results and initial conditions or major spillovers of costs or benefits.
It avoids solutions that have' a high risk of failure because they run directly across the
grain of the system on which they are imposedY
A number of officials and systems analysts who worked in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) during the 1960s and 1970s
have furnished advice to analysts. Economist Alice M. Rivlin, formerly Assis-
tant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at HEW and the first Director of the
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, has written:
Analysts would be wasting time and effort if they gave high priority to making dollar
estimates of the benefits of social action programs, for politicians and decision makers
are unlikely to pay attention to them. They and their constituents have strong, intuitive
ideas about the relative importance of health, education and social well-being that are
not likely to be shaken by benefit-cost estimates.28
Rufus E. Miles, Jr., for 12 years HEW'S Director of Administration, says:
The ... role of the assistant secretary for Planning and Evaluation requires sophistica-
tion in understanding the competing political forces that act on and through the
Congress, as well as in economic analysis. Enormous amounts of energy may be
wasted if it is devoted to enterprises that have no realistic chance of acceptance by the
Congress.29
After assessing a group of studies done in the early days of the use of
systems analysis by HEW, reporter Elizabeth Drew called attention to recurrent
problems:
Some of the studies are more conscientious than are others about pointing out assump-
tions which are only guesses.... Others at times reach levels of near unintelligibility.
. . . Some belabor the obvious, are super-repetitive (we shall discuss ... we are dis-
cussing ... we have just discussed), are littered with references to arcane studies. leave
the reader to find the page which explains the chart, and serve up these vague
euphemisms at which bureaucrats specialize.... Finally, and most disconcertingly,
some of the figures in the charts on benefit-cost ratios have been afflicted with
typographical errors.30
Constantine Menges, a former HEW analyst, writes in a similar vein of his
experiences with evaluation studies:
Reports are often esoteric, highly detailed, and not easily digested by high or lower
level practitioners.... Decision-makers expecting clear and broad answers have been
disappointed when they encountered poor products or poor reports that were too
narrow in SCOpe.31
The common theme running through these observations and admonitions is
that systems analysts must base their work on a deeper understanding of how
policy is made and on clearer insights into how government works. Doing
useful analysis is not only a matter of technical proficiency but also of good
judgment and good instincts in identifying issues and designing policies. But
how can such advice-which sounds like a vague counsel of perfection-be
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made operational to the practicing systems analyst? What are the specific pit-
falls they should avoid?
A useful place to begin answering these questions is with Giandomenico
Majone's view that "[ ulncritical acceptance of the metaphysical distinction
between ideas and action is probably the most serious pitfall of applied
analysis."32 He suggests that analysts who implicitly accept distinctions
between logic and action, or between analysis and politics, are apt to place
"excessive reliance ... on normative decision models and the pure logic of
choice, on analysis rather than synthesis and design,")) thus ignoring or mis-
handling important aspects of the reality with which decision makers must con-
tend. In this context, Majone defines a pitfal1 as "a conceptual error into which,
because of its specious plausibility, people frequently and easily fall."34 He
argues that
The real significance of the category "pitfall" for systems analysis is best appreciated in
relation to the craft aspects of the field.... Good analytic work cannot be produced
mechanically.... "Style" plays as big a role in determining the value and acceptability
of the analytic product as it does in the results of the craftsman's work.)l
From the perspective of decision makers, then, Majone's view is that
systems analysts can be viewed as craftsmen employing their skills to create
useful analysis. In addition to mechanical or technical mistakes, decision
makers are apt to be disturbed, and alienated, by failures of
craftsmanship-the exhibition of an irrelevant style.
In fundamental respects, this formulation goes to the heart of the matter.
Decision maker dissatisfaction with analysis is often based on the feeling that
the analysts have failed to relate the practice of their craft to the decision
maker's needs and situation, to what Schultze termed "the relevant en-
vironment" and what Enthoven termed "the basis on which decisions are ac-
tually being made." In this context, Majone's definition of pitfall might usefully
be extended to include errors o/perception into which, because of their analytic
convenience, systems analysts frequently and easily fall.
In what fol1ows, I shall organize the identification of pitfal1s in terms of
Majone's four components of the analyst qua craftsman's task: (I) problem
setting, data, and information; (2) tools and methods; (3) evidence and
argument; and (4) conclusions, communication, and implementation. In il-
lustrating pitfalls, I shall try wherever possible to give examples that conform
to the following criteria: There is an identifiable analytic product-a particular
study or group of related studies; an explicit purpose of the analysis was to be
useful to decision makers; the analysis was competently done except for the
pitfall(s); there is evidence of reaction by decision makers or their represen-
tatives; and these reactions are to the study's success in producing relevant in-
formation and do not constitute acceptance or rejection on essential1y arbitrary
grounds. Where all criteria are met except that decision maker reactions are
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unknown, I wil\ supply plausible grounds for criticism from a user's
perspective.
DEFINING THE PROBLEM
This initial phase of the analytic task involves "translation of a policy situation
into a policy problem," the development of the questions to be addressed in the
analysis, and identification of the data and other information to be sought and
used.J6
Without doubt, this phase is the greatest source of pitfalls for the analyst.
During this phase, training is least relevant, and instinctive feel for the decision-
making process most important. "Because of the unstructured character of a
problem situation," Majone points out, "imagination, judgement, and
analogical and associative thinking playa bigger role than rigor and technical
skills."J7 Faced with the inherent difficulty of structuring a complex problem,
analysts are tempted to trim the questions to the available data, to make both
questions and data collection conform to methods they know or prefer, or to
frame the problem in accordance with preconceptions about the issue. Among
the most common types of pitfalls under this heading are addressing the wrong
question, failing to consider the institutional and political context, and failing to
identify an adequate range of alternatives. A typical illustration is the
following.
• The Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior faced a decision on
whether to continue construction on the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah
Project (cup), a large, multipurpose irrigation, municipal, and industrial water
development project. The Bureau of Reclamation, the agency responsible for
the CUP, needed the Secretary's authorization to award contracts for construc-
tion of Currant Creek Dam, the next part of the Bonneville Unit to be built.
The Secretary asked for an analysis of the controversial project before
proceeding.
His analysts studied the issues and alternatives and presented their findings.
Completion of the Bonneville Unit would, they argued, create problems that
could easily be avoided. Much less expensive and less environmentally
damaging alternatives were available to meet the most important water needs
in central Utah. Moreover, implementing these alternatives would avoid
troublesome questions concerning the water rights of the Ute Indian tribe.
Therefore, all construction should be stopped and the cUP reformulated.
But, the Secretary responded, you are describing the consequences of com-
pleting the entire Bonneville Unit. Suppose we built only Currant Creek Dam.
Would it be useful by itself, Le., without constructing any other tunnels,
aqueducts, or pumping plants? If so, and if building it would not pose serious
cost, environmental, or Indian water rights problems, wouldn't I be better off to
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go ahead with it while taking more time to study the bigger issues? Enamored
of the task of evaluating the entire Bonneville Unit, the analysts had not con-
sidered a narrower possibility that was attractive to the Secretary. Under
political pressure to go ahead with construction and facing other issues that
were more important to the Department, he had wanted to know whether he
could simply duck the bigger issues for the time being. In the end, the answer
was yes.
The point is not that the analysts erred in evaluating the Bonneville Unit as a
whole. Their mistake was in getting carried away with it and neglecting to con-
sider less exciting but more practical alternatives. Their neglect cost them an
important measure of credibility.
• An analyst completed a careful study of the role of foreign medical school
graduates in the U.S. health manpower picture. While discussing his
recommendation that the U.S. Department of Labor terminate the "critical
skill" designation that permitted large numbers of foreign medical graduates to
enter the U.S., he was asked how approval of this recommendation would
affect overall U.S. immigration policy, and how foreign governments facing a
drain of other types of skilled manpower to the U.S. would react to such a
precedent Preoccupied with studying U.S. health manpower issues, the analyst
had failed to consider questions about which the responsible official would in-
evitably be concerned. Indeed, the dilemma neglected by the analyst was that
health manpower officials with the greatest concern for the problem were
located in another agency and had little power to do anything about it, whereas
the officials with the necessary power to act saw the problem in a very different
light.
• Even when addressing the right questions, systems analysts may fail to
appreciate the institutional and political context in which the decision will be
reached. For example, analysts of welfare reform in the United States have
seen their efforts go for naught in the Congress time and time again because the
logic C'f their analysis has failed to fit the perspectives of elected officials. Of
President Richard M. Nixon's proposal to reform U.S. welfare programs, Vin-
cent and Van Burke wrote:
Its unorthodox origin, the drawing board of economists, plagued the Family Assistance
Plan [the name of Nixon's proposal] for it denoted a national plan aimed at directly
reducing poverty, not a plan to attract other constituencies for their own self interests.
And when it reached Congress, the politicans and special interest groups fell upon it.J8
William A. Morrill, following service as Assistant Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation at HEW, during which he supervised an analysis of welfare
reform, summarized his impressions of the Family Assistance Plan (PAP)
experience.
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... I think [my] staff felt strongly that the FAP designers really hadn't understood what
it was they were up to well enough, not because they were stupid but because the state
of the art was such that they took some important compromises far too early in the
game. And in some ways they destroyed the chance for the plan very early on. The
original FAP design hadn't really dealt much with the work problem. It sort of came on
them subsequently, and then they began to say and do things that they hadn't thought
through very well and they got themselves into all kinds of problems.
Another dimension which they hadn't thought through seriously enough was the ad-
ministrative one: where they were assigning responsibilities for what. For instance, as
soon as they decided they had to do something federal about the work test and its ad-
ministration, that brought with it all the problems of saying, "Well, what are you going
to do about the training, and what are you going to do about the day care." And then
that got pulled up into the federal level; yet, if we knew anything, we knew that federal-
ly administered manpower programs were hardly a thriving success. And the system
began to get clogged up with bad roles and missions that inevitably dumped a whole
bundle of cost on the federal structure that wasn't there before. And the FAP designers
just lost control of the problem at that point. 39
• A similar but more complex example is that of a study of the San Fran-
cisco, California, housing market conducted as part of the city's Community
Renewal Program. The overall objective of the program was the development
of a comprehensive, integrated program of public and private actions aimed at
improving the living environment of the city, with special concentration on the
housing market. The task of the analysts, then, was to develop a framework
that adequately replicated the operation of the private housing market.
Among the problems facing the analysts was the choice of a geographical
boundary for the study. They chose the legal-jurisdictional territory of the City
of San Francisco, since their charter applied to the city only. However, they
realized they were on the horns of a dilemma. The relevant housing market was
larger than the city. Plans developed for the city alone would be greatly
weakened by what they necessarily left out of the picture. On the other hand,
plans developed for the natural social unit (the region) would be irrelevant,
because there was no decision-making entity with the necessary power to act or
to induce the cities or the region to act. The model builders were apparently in
a no -win situation.
In evaluating this experience, Kenneth L. Kraemer points out that:
In practical terms, ... the types of analysts selected to work on a problem should often
include not only model builders and experts in the issue involved, but also
organizational and behavioral scientists who understand the social and institutional
context in which decision is arrived at and action eventually carried out. 40
In a broader vein, Kraemer notes that:
Generally, analysts (model builders, planners, and other professionals. etc.) do not face
problems as other decision makers must face them. They tend to ignore two things.
First, they ignore many decision options which other decision makers would regard as
important. Second, in considering this limited set of options, they fail to consider many
pros and cons that these other decision makers cannot ignore.41
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TOOLS AND METHODS
During the next phase of analysis, judgments must be made concerning the
tools and methods to be used in data production, manipulation, or interpreta-
tion. Pitfalls are typically associated with using tools whose limitations are not
understood, using tools for their own sake, and using techniques and models of
unknown reliability. Such inappropriate uses are most likely to occur when
tools are employed because of their supposedly intrinsic merits rather than
because they fit the problem. Pitfalls in the choice of tools and methods are
often encountered in social experimentation, econometric analysis,
benefit-cost analysis, and simulations.
• Social experiments have been particularly vulnerable to problems that
vitiate their use.42 In their report on the experiments in educational perfor-
mance contracting, for example, Edward M. Gramlich and Patricia P. Koshel
conclude that
... the experimental strategy is no panacea.... The experiment encountered difficulties
at almost every stage-there were problems in determining exactly what was to be
tested; in design; in selecting firms, school districts, and schools; in writing and
negotiating contracts; in developing the institutional programs; in enlisting the
cooperation of local personnel; and in measuring the success of the contractors. Any
one of the problems, if even slightly aggravated, could have completely frustrated the
enterprise. Thus the first important lesson from the experience is that social scientists
should be modest about their ability to perform experiments, at least in the area of
education. Experiments can be done, but they are much more difficult than the early
rhetoric implied.43
With regard to the planned variation experiments in education, James
Coleman has noted:
The experimental paradigm adopted at the federal level appears to be wrong, or at least
incomplete, for it assumes the existence of a single decision maker who requires some
kind of information feedback. In schools, above all, there are a number of decision
makers.
He goes on to point out that:
These decision makers are not all concerned solely about cognitive achievement. A
number of outcomes are often more important to local school systems than grade-
equivalent scores in reading achievement, and a number of outcomes are often more
important to parents and children. 44
In assessing the same experiments, Carol VanDeusen Lukas noted that
successful experimental treatments might not be replicated in other locations,
the presumed goal of the experiment, because the models are not specified in
behavioral terms.
Even if all models were complete in the sense of being firmly based on clear and in-
tegrated theories on how to teach children, some of the sponsors [i.e., the designers of
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the models] still would not be able to provide detailed operational description of day-to-
day classroom activity because their philosophy runs counter to close prescription.
Instead they set out general principles and encourage teachers to carry them out in the
manner that best fits their style and the needs of their students.... [W]here lack of
specification is inherent in the nature of the model, variation in implementation will
continue to occur.4 '
Alice M. Rivlin and P. Michael Timpane summarize the experience with
planned variation experiments in education by noting that
The model developers held diverse views about the aims of early education. Hence the
objective of testing models individually would have implied the development of many
sets of outcome measures, each appropriate to the goals of a particular model or group
of models. A comparison of models would have required that some common measures
h.; :!I'plied, at moments in time when the full program effects would be captured. The
most useful strategy might have been to do both, developing measures appropriate to
specific groups of models, but finding out how each model stacked up on the various
criteria. It would then have been feasible not only to rate models on their own objec-
tives, but to say how they rated in terms of the objectives of other models. It might then
have been possible to give potential users and other interested parties the information
that one model rated higher on a particular set of outcomes and low on another set
while the reverse was true of another model, and let them apply their own values in
weighing the various measures.46
• A definitive analysis of pitfalls in choosing statistical techniques was
generated by a symposium on the "Integration of Sociology and Other Social
Sciences through Policy Analysis."47 The principal paper was written by
sociologist James S. Coleman, and discussion centered on the statistical
techniques used in Coleman's classic study, Equality of Educational Oppor-
tunity. The study examined the question, "What factors in schools as they are
currently organized in the United States contribute most to a child's
educational experience?" As Coleman points out:
It was the answer to this analytical question ... which could provide the most extensive
avenues for policy, for this would indicate what kinds of policy changes in schools
might be most effective in increasing educational opportunity.
In his paper, Coleman outlines three "general styles of strategies" in the use
of regression analysis. These strategies are
• Use of regression analysis as a technique for estimating parameters of a
well-specified model, with a known or hypothesized structure, but with un-
known values or parameters
• Use of regression analysis as a technique for uncovering the causal struc-
ture in a set of variables when something is known about, or some prior
assumption can be made about, the causal priority in a system of variables
• The use of regression analysis as a method for obtaining as much infor-
mation as possible about the structure of relations among variables when
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nothing is known or assumed about the independent variables other than that
any relation between them and the dependent variable is not produced by an
effect from the dependent variable to the independent variables
"It is clear," Coleman points out, "that belief in the use of one or another
measure has been dictated by the general strategy in the use of regression
analysis by the different disciplines." Coleman further points out that the fact
that his report was shaped by sociologists had a major effect on the report's
policy impact. The sociologists chose a two-level regression technique with in-
dividual student performance as the dependent variable and with the
background characteristics of individual students as one set of independent
variables and other school level variables as another set of independent
variables. Coleman's results, which identified the importance of school level
variables to education outcomes and gave support to efforts toward racial in-
tegration, attracted the greatest policy interest. Investigation of the effects of
such variables, he says, is peculiar to sociology, since it stems from a concern
for the influence of other persons or influences in the environment. Economists
would ignore such influences, because they cannot easily be incorporated into a
production function. Educational psychologists and statisticians would tend
not to look for them because educators did not view them as educational inputs
and, besides, they are beyond their control.
Though an academic historian, Andrew Hacker provided what could well be
a decision maker's response to Coleman's paper and his report:
While the report purports to provide illumination for policy makers on how they may
more effectively deploy their resources, the very manner in which that research was
conducted induces the suspicion that it was also made to serve as an exercise in
sociological scholarship and a testing ground for certain disciplinary techniques.
Indeed, the criticisms of that report ... dwell less on public questions of effective
education and more on the private dialectics of social science.
• Problems in the use of benefit-cost analysis have been widely discussed.
They have been well summarized by the economist Robert H. Haveman, who
was drawing in part on his experience as a member of the staff of the 10int
Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress:
... while policy analysis focuses on the costs and benefits of policy measures to society
as a whole, few individual policymakers find the net social benefit criterion relevant to
their more limited objectives. If the legislator takes the costs of a decision and spreads
them widely over citizens or in some other way camouflages them, while he concen-
trates the benefits on a vested group whose support he seeks, the fact that aggregate
costs are greatly in excess of benefits is of little interest to him. In effect, policy analysis
answers questions that few legislative policymakers are interested in either asking or
having asked.48
More generally, Burton A. Weisbrod has argued that the typical aversion of
economists to questions of distribution in program analysis is one important
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reason why decision makers so often seem to ignore the analysis. He traces this
aversion to the logical distinction economists like to draw between efficiency
and equity. Choices concerning the latter are essentially political, in this view,
and can be implemented with appropriate tax-transfer policies. Weisbrod holds
that this orthodoxy assumes that tax-transfer programs are costless to effect,
which of course they are not.49
Another example of problems arising in the economic analysis of benefits
and cost is contained in a 1963 exchange between economist Jerome
Rothenberg and Frederick O'R. Hayes, then an official at the U.S. Office of
Economic Opportunity. With respect to Rothenberg's study of the benefits and
costs of urban renewal programs, Hayes says:
... public investment can seldom be justified solely on the basis of market considera-
tion. Some part of the support must be found in other benefits. In renewal, a major part
of support rests on an assumption of net social benefits, some measureable and others
not, some clearly identifiable and others representing the satisfaction of a kind of itch
on our collective superegos.... The most careful effort to analyze the costs and benefit
of renewal is, therefore, unlikely to produce a definite answer.!O
Hayes goes on to criticize the Rothenberg study for more specific reasons:
concentration on too narrow a range of renewal projects, failure to consider
benefits from income redistribution associated with projects, the assumption
that resources are fully employed, neglect of the effects of projects on com-
munity functioning, and failure to produce data on benefits and costs
meaningful to central city decision makers.
• An example of a pitfall in the choice of simulation modeling techniques is
provided by the effort to model the San Francisco housing market mentioned
earlier. Members of the model-building team soon came into conflict over
The different levels of detail desired by the different participants to support their normal
pattern of work and interest. The city planners, for example, maintained insistence on a
level of detail which bordered on impracticality, in terms of input data requirements
and output analysis.... The operations research personnel wished to retain simplicity
in the initial model, even at the cost of possible loss of validity and utility of results.
Experience with the use of simulation in other fields had indicated a consistent pattern.
Initial models were found to be over-detailed, and successive versions were almost in-
variably made more aggregated. However, this process would presumably result in a
model which could not answer all questions of interest to the planners.... The com-
promise finally reached probably satisfied neither party.!1
Following their extensive review of the use of models in policy making, Mar-
tin Greenberger and coworkers concluded, first, that the political setting in
which a model is presented may be decisive in how the model is received by
policy makers, and, second, that the organizational framework in which a
model is developed can also be a crucial determinant in its usefulness.
We find that there is often a considerable gulf between the policymaker and the policy
modeler, a reflection, we believe, of the different constraints under which the respective
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parties work and the dissimilar value systems to which they respond. We find that
modelers, especially those who are at a distance from the actual workings of the policy
process, tend to overestimate the real relevance and usefulness of models for practical
decision making.!2
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT
Arguments linking data and information with conclusions will typically be a
complex blend of factual statements and subjective evaluations. " ... [A] wrong
assessment of the strength and fit of evidence before it is included in the argu-
ment can lead to pitfalls in the drawing of conclusions."!3 Pitfalls include over-
ly formalized styles of presentation, the use of data in contexts other than ones
for which they were obtained, and setting inappropriate standards for accep-
tance of information or opinion. "No amount of technical skill can compensate
for a lack of sophistication in the structuring of arguments or for carelessness
in drawing the necessary distinctions between data, information, supporting
evidence, and conclusions."~4 A variety of examples illustrate pitfalls of this
type.
• Wallace K. Swan reports on efforts by the Minnesota Department of
Public Welfare to undertake a series of studies leading to the preparation of a
comprehensive master plan for shifting from reliance on larger multipurpose
state hospitals to smaller community-based facilities for the mentally ill, the
mentally retarded, and those dependent on drugs. Based on an analysis of this
experience, Swan calls attention to a common pitfall:
Care must be taken in a research analysis to indicate the value judgments which un-
derlie ... analyses. The assumption that community-based care is better than hospital-
based care is closer to a value judgment than an established fact.!!
In part because value judgments were presented as facts, the results of the
study effort encountered a swarm of difficulties with the state legislature.
• An important pitfall was encountered during analyses of whether catalytic
converters on automobiles produced sulfuric acid emissions that would create a
hazard to human health and whether a delay by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in implementing the statutory standards for HC, CO,
and NO, specified in the Clean Air Act would be justified.~6
Human exposure to sulfuric acid concentrations in the air cannot be
measured directly. One group of EPA analysts used a CO dispersion/physical-
activity model to approximate peak hourly exposure of pedestrians near major
arterial roads for both normal and adverse meteorological conditions. Based on
calculations using this model, the analysts concluded that the "health risks lof
using catalytic converters] exceed the benefits after four model years are
equipped with catalysts." Based in part on such conclusions, the EPA
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Administrator made a controversial decision to reduce the pressure on the
automobile companies to install catalytic converters.
Subsequent analyses showed that the conclusion rested on a series of "worst
case" assumptions, the improbability of which called into question the earlier
conclusions. Had the uncertainties in the data, the assumptions, and the
calculations used in the model been made explicit and appropriate sensitivity
analyses conducted, a very different picture of the problem would have
emerged. Later developments in estimating sulfuric acid exposures were to
show that the problem had, in fact, been greatly exaggerated.
• Additional examples are found in the relationships between analysts and
the U.S. Congress on issues of higher education. Thomas R. Wolanin points
out that the criteria used in Congress to determine what is relevant information
and the criteria applied by those who supply information are different.
[L]egislative policy makers and policy analysts in the executive branch and outside of
government reach decisions on desirable courses of action in basically different ways.
Analysts quite properly begin with questions and finally produce the answers. The
legislators, as politicians, are concerned above all with the answers, the results, the im-
pact, who will get what-"the bottom line." To them, analysis is often perceived as an
analytic trap. Implicit in most questions are values and preferences. These are often un-
intended and unknown even to the analyst. This is particularly true as the questions
and analytic techniques become more abstract and are cast in terms of statistical
procedures, models and simulations. A legislator who buys into the apparently inno-
cent and objective questions runs the risk of being locked into conclusions that are
politically unacceptable. For example, the 1973 report of the National Commission on
the Financing of Postsecondary Education has had little apparent impact on the
1974-76 review of the basic higher education legislation. An important reason for this
is that the Commission was charged with developing "alternative models for the long
range solution to the problems of financing postsecondary education" and it carried
out its task in large part by producing "an analytic framework."17
• Thomas R. Dye compares the way the now-defunct U.S. Office of
Economic Opportunity hurried to report "preliminary findings" of the New
Jersey income maintenance experiment, which supported the agency's views
that guaranteed levels under a negative income tax did not produce massive
reductions in work effort, with the same agency's reluctance to release
preliminary results of the Westinghouse Learning Corporation/Ohio Univer-
sity evaluation of the Head Start early child education program, which did not
support the agency's views. Dye asks:
Are government sponsored research projects predisposed to produce results supportive
of popular reform proposals? Are social scientists, whose personal political values are
generally liberal and reformist, inclined to produce findings in support of liberal reform
measures?"
• A detailed assessment of the New York City RAND Corporation's
experiences in providing analytical advice to the city's agencies illustrates the
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pitfalls of using models as evidence. A RAND analyst had created a
sophisticated queueing model to study the problem of empty beds in New York
City's hospitals. Analysts in the City's Health Services Administration were
notably cool to the development and proposed use of this model. In their eyes,
the model "did not add much to what could be gained by simply ordering
hospital officials to close down empty beds 'to the point where occupancy rates
reached 90 percent.'" "I don't have much faith in computer simulation,"
explained the official who was director of program analysis at the time.
I think that you can use a lot less sophisticated quantitative techniques a lot more
successfully. Frankly, I don't think it's worth the effort-the time, and especially the
expense-to do a computer simulation when you can do it a lot less sophisticatedly.
. . . There was a problem of taking a study that sophisticated and turning it into a
policy.... I felt, for our purposes at least, that things were happening so quickly ...
that we just couldn't rely on that kind of sophisticated method.'9
CONCLUSIONS, COMMUNICATION, IMPLEMENTATION
The way conclusions are drawn and the persuasiveness with which they are
communicated to decision makers can determine the fate of an entire systems
analysis study. Meltsner puts the proposition cogently:
Analysis is a social process, and this fact is nowhere more apparent as when we try to
communicate the results of our work.... Communication and analysis are interdepen-
dent activities. Not to recognize this interdependence and its social implications are
primary errors.60
The test of an analysis is whether it is convincing "even to a hostile and dis-
believing but intelligent audience."61 A related pitfall is failure to consider the
problems of implementation adequately, which Majone attributes to the
excessive reliance of many analysts on normative decision models and the pure
logic of choice, on analysis rather than on synthesis and design.62
• An example is furnished by the higher education situation discussed
above.
From their respective institutions, legislators, executive branch officials and postsecon-
dary educators often fail to communicate effectively with each other because each
speaks the language of their specialized environment. Congressmen work and com-
municate in legislative language and explain their efforts in everyday language ... the
executive branch officials speak in the convoluted style born of bureaucratic caution
and complexity.... The educators tend to speak in the eloquent rhetoric of the
academy. They leave the legislators with a warm glow of high ideals, but frequently
without the words of legislative art that could transform noble sentiments into
legislative realities. Alternatively, academics and bureaucrats speak in the tongues of
education and social science research, lacing their remarks with "multiple regressions,"
"cognitive constructs," "learning modules," and "synergy at the interfaces." ... Unfor-
tunately, there are too few effective translators when they come together, so legislators
fail to use the information they receive because they often cannot understand it.63
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• In discussing a set of papers analyzing results of the New Jersey income
maintenance experiment, Henry Aaron said:
... the various reports on the experiment thus far available may be scientifically useful
... but they are of limited short-run political value. [They] are not fully comprehensible
to any but well trained economists. Even for this latter group, the various reports suffer
from uneven style, employ diverse models that cannot be compared, and in general
reflect a kind of scholarly laissez faire that makes integration and evaluation of the fin-
dings quite difficult. ...64
• A brilliant example of failure to consider implementation problems is
provided by Davis and Salasin.6' Research at the National Institute of Mental
Health showed that the rehospitalization of mental patients following discharge
could be reduced if a social worker from a patient's county of residence visited
the hospital, established a working relationship with the patient, and par-
ticipated in planning for discharge. They proposed to a state Commissioner of
Public Welfare that he implement the practice statewide.
Instead of leaping for joy at their proposal, Davis and Salasin relate, he said
he wanted to ask a few questions:
"How will people in our hospital social service departments feel about county workers
coming in and taking over a major portion of what they have seen as their roles? And
how will the counties feel about extending the duties of their employees beyond the
responsibilities which they normally carry?"
"In your project, you used experienced psychiatric social workers and public health
nurses with masters degrees. How do I know that our county welfare workers will be
able to match the skills of your project workers? How will we pay for the training
programs necessary to prepare the county workers to carry out the same aftercare ser-
vices? Where do I find funds to pay for their travel expenses to the state hospitals?
Who will carry out the work that they will be unabl~ to accomplish while they are spen-
ding the required time at the hospital helping the patients prepare for discharges?"
"Your findings sound almost too simple and pat. How do you know the results you
obtained did not stem from the skills of the workers on the project? And how do you
know that their small caseload of only about six patients at any time wasn't the deter-
mining factor?"
"In your project, your workers had their offices in the city very close to the hospital
and the locations of the patients after discharge were also fairly close. There aren't
many parts of the state where things are that convenient. Will the plan still be
feasible?"
"The counties aren't going to volunteer to use their scarce resources for added ser-
vice unless legisl ative and budget adj ustments are made. The state legislature just met.
How will I bridge things throughout the rest of the biennium?"
"Readmission rates are already respectably low. Who is so critically concerned
about the problem that the increased expenditures would be warranted? Of course, I'd
like to see readmission made unnecessary even for one patient, but it would help if the
legislature, the governor, or at least some groups were concerned enough to back this
policy."
"The need for social workers in our hospital would be considerably less. Some may
lose their jobs. How will I handle their unhappiness? And the county workers are going
to be raising Cain because of the hardships they'll face, even if compensation is
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arranged; they will have to stay away from their families during trips to the hospital,
for instance."
"Though your results are statistically significant, would the improvement in the
readmission rate be sufficient even to be noticed? Will anyone feel better for having
gone along with this policy if it should be adopted?"
• A vivid example of planners and analysts stumbling into an implementa-
tion pitfall is provided by Lehman's study of the Canadian experience with
welfare reform. Lehman reports as follows:
The strategy charted by federal officials in the Social Security Review was a deductive
one. T. R. Robinson, an Assistant Deputy Minister who mapped federal strategy in the
Review, described the method in this way:
"The idea was to rethink the basic concepts, examine the evolving nature of social
security issues, and work from basic principles-i.e., 'from the top down'-in pursuit
of viable reform proposals. Constraints resulting from potential costs, administrative
exigencies, existing programme patterns, and finally any difficulties with respect to
financial arrangements or jurisdictional issues, were to emerge as the issues (and
choices) became more and more specific. They were not to encumber the first stages of
the review. The evolution was to be from the 'desirable' to the 'practical,' with as little
departure from the former as possible" (Robinson, 1975, p. 20).
Of course, the Review did not proceed smoothly along these lines. The issues of cost·
sharing and jurisdiction derailed attempts to reach a consensus. The deductive ap-
proach had ignored crucial questions of practicality that desperately needed resolution.
Because no effort had been made to resolve these difficult questions in the early stages
of the Social Security Review, no room for compromise existed when they finally
reached the agenda. Thus just when conflicts over jurisdiction and financing had
become most intense in the April, 1975 meeting of welfare ministers, the federal com-
munique emerging from this meeting dreamily declared: "A consensus has been
reached on the broad features of a new guaranteed income system," and officials have
been "instructed to work out the details of an operational design for an income support
and supplementation (guaranteed income) system of the kind Ministers [have] agreed
on" (quoted in Johnson, 1975, p. 42).
In view of the disappointing results of the Social Security Review, some federal
officials closely involved with it later themselves regretted not having taken an in-
cremental or inductive approach that tried to accommodate these practical problems
piecemeal. The disappointing outcome is testimony enough to the deficiencies of the
deductive approach.66
IS ANALYSIS EVER DONE RIGHT?
The preceding catalogue might make the prospect of pitfall-free analysis seem
depressingly remote.
Unfortunately, successes are even harder to document than pitfalls. This is
not to say that analysis and analysts have not been influential in policy making.
Enthoven and Smith have written, "Good systems analysts were willing to
work for [U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S.l McNamara and [McNamara's
successor, ClarkI Clifford because they knew that when they did good work it
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would be acted upon and would influence decisions."67 Many of the growing
number of current and former members of policy analysis offices in govern-
ment and of policy-related research and analysis institutions outside of govern-
ment have testified in various forums that their work was used. Many former
policy makers have lauded their analytic staffs. What is hard to come by are
examples showing how attention to the four aspects of craftsmanship discussed
above contributes directly to the acceptance and use of an analytic product.
lllustrations of analytic craftsmanship that come close to filling the need are
described in two teaching cases developed at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University.
The first case, The 1972 Education Finance Initiative,68 describes how
analysts in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Planning
and Evaluation Office participated in departmental and presidential decision
making concerning an initiative, proposed by the President's staff, to reform
the financing of elementary and secondary education. The issue had become
prominent because of state court decisions declaring the property tax to be an
inherently unfair basis for financing education. At the direction of HEW
Secretary Elliot L. Richardson, and in association with officials from the U.S.
Office of Education and the White House Domestic Council, analysts over the
course of a year assessed the nature of the school finance problem, possible
goals of a federal government initiative, and the costs and likely consequences
of alternative ways of meeting different goals. Drawing on their work, Richard-
son recommended to the President a program to replace the property tax as a
source of school funds by federal revenues, with the primary educational goal
of equalizing interstate differences in spending per pupil. (At the time, Alabama
was spending an average of $438 per pupil; New York's per pupil spending
averaged $1,237.)
The second case, Caspar Weinberger and Welfare Reform,69 describes how
a different group of HEW analysts assisted HEW Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger in reviewing U.S. welfare programs and deciding what policies to
recommend to the President. The analysts conducted a comprehensive review
of the possible objectives of an income maintenance system, the costs and con-
sequences of existing welfare programs, and alternatives for reform. Lengthy
discussions of the analysis with Weinberger led to his recommending to the
President in November 1973 that he propose to Congress a comprehensive
overhaul of U.S. welfare programs and the enactment of a negative income tax.
Both cases illustrate the importance of craftsmanship to the success of
analysis.
I. The program and the issues were defined both with analytic rigor and
with awareness of the political and institutional context. Moreover, the analysts
became involved in a sustained dialogue with the decision makers concerning
the nature of the problem, the issues, and the interrelationship between policy
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goals and the means to achieve them. In the end, fundamental agreement had
been reached on how to think about the subject, and the issues and alternatives
had been sharply drawn.
The lengthy discussions of the problem appeared to clarify and focus both
Secretaries' thinking.
• School finance analysts, for example, posed questions such as "What is
the nature of [the property tax reliefl goal? Is it to reduce property tax burdens
or to provide net tax relief? Or is it to make the property tax or the general tax
structure more equitable and progressive? For whom is the relief primarily in-
tended: homeowners, renters, agriculture, commercial property? The answers
to these questions can dramatically affect the form of our program."68 Richard-
son came to emphasize the goal of interstate equalization of per pupil spending
for the new initiative after detailed analysis of this sort. Only the federal
government could achieve this goal, he concluded, whereas other goals-in-
trastate equalization, general fiscal relief for the states, encouraging educational
reform-were less appropriate or could be pursued in other, perhaps more
efficient ways.
• Weinberger began with an apparent preference for tougher welfare
management and skepticism concerning welfare reform schemes. The analysts
surveyed possible objectives of welfare programs and the effectiveness of the
existing system in achieving them. In recommending comprehensive welfare
reform, following extensive review of the analysis, Weinberger concluded: "The
interrelationships [among] the domestic assistance programs have become as
important as the content of each one. To ignore these interrelationships is to
pile one program on top of another with undesirable, unintended and costly
results."69
2. A rather complex array of data had to be assembled and analyzed. (In
both instances, computer simulations were needed to analyze the consequences
of different policy designs.) By maintaining their focus on the problem and the
policy issues, the analysts were able to create a coherent, appropriate, and
credible body of evidence without being trapped or mesmerized by technique.
• The school finance analysis, for example, encompassed both straight-
foward examinations of school spending trends (comparisons of education
spending increases with changes in other local expenditures and with changes
in pupil-teacher ratios) and computer models simulating the effects of different
federal spending formulas on patterns of per pupil spending by individual
school districts. Conclusions were drawn in terms of the issues to be resolved:
[Power equalizing grants, i.e., federal grants that are larger for less wealthy states,
provide] a strong interstate equalizing thrust and a strong upward push on educational
spending. As such [they] ... conflict particularly with an objective of net tax relief,
since they impel the States toward higher levels of effort.68
• William A. Morrill, who supervised Weinberger's welfare reform analysis,
describes the process of structuring the analysis:
I
I~
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We just worked it through mutually as to what the problem was and what we could
bring to Cap [Weinberger] in order to make it a comprehensive problem. We began to
divide it into a group of sensible bites-the front end of which was largely descriptive:
what's there? What does the system now look like in programmatic content? And then
go on to say: "Okay, what can we say out of all of the research that's been done? What
are the characteristics of this population? How do they behave? What do people allege
and how much research do we have to underpin any particular view of an issue of
either a purely analytic or empirical nature?"
In other words, the analysis was carried out with the informational needs of a
definite audience kept clearly in mind.
3. The analysts were generally careful to distinguish between facts, evidence
derived from various analyses, and conjectures and other subjective assess-
ments, though these elements were often intertwined in their communications.
• In assessing the nature of the financial squeeze on schools, school finance
analysts noted, for example, that
In general, the meaning one should imput to the "taxpayer's revolt" is not clear. We
may simply be facing a change in consumer preference (based on widespread doubts of
educational effectiveness) or a scapegoating (where educational finance issues are the
only opportunity for voters to express directly a more general taxpayer's discontent).
At another point, the analysts said that they "continue to have doubts about
the merits of such [an initiative].... We have little confidence that increased
expenditures in the range we envision will produce additional achievement for
the average child." "You may anticipate," they said, "that [the Office of
Education] will have a somewhat stronger view as to the fiscal predicament of
our schools and will be more inclined [than we are] to promote additional net
expenditures for education...."
• Welfare reform analysts needed to address the question of whether
various welfare reform alternatives would discourage work. Evidence from
experiments conducted in New Jersey suggested that there would be little work
withdrawal, but many doubted the validity of these results. Faced with this
situation, the analysts said:
What we argued was that while the experimental results were not conclusive, they were
consistent with [other] results. In other words, a totally different methodology yielded
similar results. Viewed in isolation the New Jersey results were not that influential, but
viewed in the context of a whole range of evidence, they're one more factor that seems
to indicate that large-scale withdrawal from the labor force or work reduction is not
going to result.
4. The analysts employed skill and discernment in carrying out what
Meltsner has termed their social role in the bureaucracy. It would be too much
to claim that they had convinced even hostile audiences-those who did not
share the analyst's value orientations remained unconvinced-but respect for
the communication process and sensitivity to organizational needs were evi-
dent. "During the past two weeks [Office of Education (OE)] and [Office of the
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Secretary (os)] staff have worked extensively with Domestic Council staff to
prepare an education finance initiative for the consideration of ... the
President," the education finance analysts reported to Richardson at one point.
It is not certain what, if any, major decisions you should be asked to make. What
appeared to be major conflicts and problems a few days ago are, slowly but surely,
submitting to analysis. There are, at this point, no c1earcut differences among OE, os
and Domestic Council staff, that require your intervention.
Welfare reform analysts were especially sensitive to Weinberger's instincts,
which tended to be more conservative than theirs.
Our conscious effort was not to push a viewpoint, but to present as broadly and objec-
tively as possible the background information that the Secretary needed.... There
were certain kinds of questions that he was going to ask: obviously you tried to an-
ticipate those questions so that you were doing good staff work for him and giving him
what he wanted.
In the end, because of the analysts' efforts, disagreements centered on
questions of values and goals much more than on the nature of the issues, alter-
natives, and evidence.
In both cases, considerable, if not decisive, credit must be given to the in-
telligence, integrity, patience, and administrative skills of the users of the
analysis. They achieved a high degree of rapport with their analysts but did not
coopt them. The craftsman benefits greatly from a discerning and forbearing
patron; indeed, the discerning craftsman will seek out just such a patron.
CONCLUSIONS
The central conclusion of this survey of pitfalls is that systems analysis often
does not matter in decision making because systems analysts do not know
what matters to decision makers. The usefulness of analysis will increase to the
extent that analysts develop better understanding of decision-making contexts
and conduct their work in the light of that understanding.
But in following this advice analysts encounter yet another pitfall. Gaining
an understanding of the decision maker's problem may shade into learning to
think exactly like the decision maker, into adopting uncritically the decision
maker's point of view and sharing his or her biases and blind spots. This would
be a mistake on two grounds. First, it would be fundamentally irresponsible.
The systems analyst, no less than any other craftsman, must maintain integrity.
One can argue, without reintroducing the myths of scientific detachment and
objectivity, that integrity for the analyst consists of what Rein has termed
"temporary detachment" from one's own values and from the values of one's
superiors or patrons while examining the policy problem critically.70 Second,
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decision makers are not interested in analysis solely because it can solve
problems. Carol Weiss concludes on the basis of her study of the uses of
research by government decision makers:
Evidence suggests that government officials use research less to arrive at solutions than
to orient themselves to problems. They use research to help them in thinking about the
issues and defining the problematics of the situation, to gain new ideas and new
perspectives. They use research to help formulate problems and set the agenda for
future policy aetions.71
Officials, she is saying, use research and analysis for enlightenment as well as
for getting solutions to specific problems.
It must also be recognized that decision makers frequently make mistakes in
their use of systems analysis. The responsibility for avoiding pitfalls in the use
of systems analysis does not rest solely with the analysts. Decision makers
share that responsibility. They should monitor the performance of their ad-
visory systems to eliminate what George72 refers to as "malfunctions." They
should avoid judging studies solely on the basis of the conclusions that are
reached, second- or third-hand opinions that may be unreliable, the credentials
of the analysts, or the elegance of the models that are employed.
The most important questions systems analysts face are: Toward what pur-
pose am I working? Whom am I trying to influence and in what directions?
What types of analytic products are needed? What approaches to the perfor-
mance of these analytic tasks are most likely to be successful? These are
matters more ofjudgment than of technique, and it is by the perceptive exercise
of these types of judgments that the pitfalls in producing useful analysis can be
avoided
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8 Don't Slight Communication: SomeProblems of Analytical Practice
Arnold J. Meltsner
Analysis is a social process. Normative accounts implying that analysis is
some objective exercise uninfluenced by human feelings, values, and beliefs
could not be more mistaken. Analysis is produced by people operating in social
contexts. Analysts work together as colleagues to produce analysis. They con-
sult one another and review one another's work. They interact with many
people besides analysts to secure data and to understand different perceptions
of a problem. They report to a client whose values and predispositions strongly
affect the conduct and outcome of analysis. With that client's support, and
sometimes without it, they disseminate their results to many people. That
analysis is a social process is at no time more apparent than when we try to
communicate the results of our work.
By communication, I mean the act of gaining acceptance and asserting a
claim on another person's beliefs. Now this definition is inadequate, and I am
sure it will not satisfy those who are used to the jargon of sources, messages,
channels, and receivers. Its ambiguity allows me to stress a number of points,
however. First, communication involves human interaction; in its simplest form
communication between an analyst and his immediate client is the relationship
of two people. Neither participant can completely control this relationship or
determine its effectiveness. Second, my subject here is one side of this
relationship--namely, the analyst and his means of gaining acceptance for
himself and his work. Third, I interpret the results of analytical work to be
"assertions" about reality or desirable changes in reality. These "assertions"
mayor may not be grounded in theory and evidence. In either case, the analyst
makes a claim on his client or the person with whom he is trying to com-
municate. "A man who makes an assertion puts forward a claim," Toulmin in-
forms us, "a claim on our attention and to our belief. Unlike one who speaks
frivolously, a man who asserts something intends his statement to be taken
seriously " (Toulmin, 1964, p. 19).
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In making my own assertions about communication, I have felt the lack of
empirical literature dealing with the communication of analytical information.
Ideally, I would have liked to discuss a range of behaviors associated with
communication. This range could be determined by the kind of analyst (e.g.,
policy analyst, systems analyst, planner), the analyst's role in a specific
organizational context (e.g., a research technician working as a contractor for
a large governmental agency), the type of client (e.g., a business executive with
little patience), and the choice of different means of communication (e.g.,
memoranda, briefings, formal reports, movies). Instead, I have fallen back on
my own experience in working with governmental agencies and have sought to
identify common errors in communication that cut across the wide range of
'possible analytical behavior.
Generally, communication has two highly interrelated parts: social and sub-
stantive. One way to understand the distinction between them is to think of the
skills of the analyst. Writing and speaking are social, while modeling and
analyzing data are substantive; formulating and defining a problem require
both substantive and social skills. The social part, the context in which com-
munication takes place, encompasses such factors as the persuasiveness and
credibility of the analyst, the feelings of trust between analyst and client, and
the extent to which values and beliefs are shared by the analyst and his various
audiences. The substantive part has to do with the logic and content of the
study itself, with the validity and reliability of the knowledge it contains, and
with its policy and organizational implications. When an adequate study is
believed and accepted or when an inadequate study is not believed and is
rejected, the substantive and social parts of communication usually are com-
patible-and the acceptance or rejection can be validated for the analyst by his
peers. When a problem of communication exists, the two parts usually are in-
compatible. This may mean, for example, that the analysis contains an
adequate policy direction for the given context, but fails to convince or gain the
acceptance of the client. Or it may mean-a problem analysts sometimes
ignore-that the analysis contains misleading information, which the client
accepts.
In the situation of easy rejection (see the table below) the analysis fits the im-
peratives of the organizational context. It follows the canons of current
analytical practice; it is adequate in the sense that most analysts would have
done it in the same way in the same environment. Yet the client and other
organizational decision makers are not willing to accept either the study's
assessment of a problem or its recommendations. In the situation of easy
acceptance the study does not follow the standard practice; it is inadequate in
the sense that other analysts would have done it in a different way in the same
environment. If they were asked to judge the study, they might call the analysis
"sloppy" or "incomplete." Neither the analyst nor the client may be aware that
the study's information is misleading and inappropriate for the organization.
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The client and other organizational decision makers accept the implications of
the study and act on them. For the client, the analysis as presented does fit the
imperatives of the organizational context. Thus communication problems can
be depicted simply, as in the following table:
Credible
Social
Noncredible
~ Adequate
.~
CIS
....
~ Inadequate
::3
ell
No communication Easy rejection
problem
Easy acceptance No communication
problem
Accepting inadequate information is a serious problem for the client. Of
course, many clients are too intelligent and perspicacious to be easily deceived,
but some can be. Other than developing the skills to evaluate analytical
products, assessing analysts on the basis of their past records, and resorting to
multiple and independent sources of information, a client can do little to protect
himself against a social context that encourages his tendency to accept what he
is being told. The analyst also has something to lose in this situation. In his
desire to promote his study, he may be trading off short-term acceptance for
long-term ridicule by his peers and abuse by his client if the recommendations
of the study do not have the intended effect. In short, the social part of com-
munication may have an empty victory over the substantive part.
A more familiar problem-and my chief concern here--is the domination of
the social by the substantive: high-quality studies are rejected because the
social part of communication is slighted. A number of years ago Kahn and
Mann (1957, p. 45) identified the pitfall of "hermitism": "The problems of
communication and persuasion are often ignored though they are central to
getting recommendations translated into policy." According to them, the
analyst must have the ability "to sell" his study and must spend a great deal of
time doing so. Usually, some member of an analytical team writes well, talks
well, or has the personal attributes to secure the trust of a number of clients
and decision makers. The ability is there, but what is often lacking is an ap-
preciation of the extensive time and effort that must be devoted to communica-
tion if it is to be persuasive.
Besides underestimating the resource requirements for communicating-
money, as well as time and effort-analysts frequently do not understand when
they should spend these resources. All too often, only when a lengthy project
nears completion does the analytical staff belatedly turn its attention to
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documenting results and disseminating recommendations. Considerable
resources are expended on publications, illustrations, charts, slides, and other
paraphernalia of professional systems and policy analysis. Yet much of this
effort may be wasted because such communication is an afterthought. In order
to be effective, communication must be an integral part of the analytical activi-
ty itself. As a relationship, communication is a two-way process: the par-
ticipants must have the opportunity to listen to each other. Therefore, to
enhance the receptivity of an analysis and also to obtain information and other
assistance, the analyst should involve the client and other likely members of the
study's audience in the project from the beginning. Determining who will be
members of the study's audience and sizing up their perceptions of the problem
are communication strategies central to the initial steps of analysis.
Unfortunately, far too many analysts perceive communication as something
outside analysis. Even so experienced a practitioner as Edward Quade makes
this mistake when he identifies some failures of communicating with a client as
"external pitfalls" or "factors or actions that handicap the analysis but do not
originate within the analysis itself' (Quade, 1975, p. 312). Some handicaps do
result from the analysis itself; for example, a tight and logically structured
analysis is easier to communicate than one that is loose and fuzzy. And a
model that represents reality with simplicity but without doing violence to that
reality will be easier for a client to understand and accept. For some purposes it
is useful to make inside-outside distinctions, but in the case of communication,
to do so is dysfunctional to our understanding of the analytical process. Com-
munication and analysis are interdependent activities. Not to recognize this
interdependence and its social implications is a primary error. Difficulties in
communication are inherent in situations where there is conflict over values,
objectives, and beliefs. Although a certain amount of rejection of quality work
is to be expected, the difficulties in communication should become less severe
as the participants in analysis begin to appreciate the social context of their
endeavors.
Having pointed out the importance of understanding communication as part
of the social process of analysis, I will now discuss certain errors involved in
the conception and choice of audience (recipients), argument (content and
form), and means (techniques and media) of communicating analysis.
AUDIENCE
Although the choice of whom to communicate with is a central decision, it is
one that analysts too often leave to the client. They may not be given a choice,
but in order to improve the effectiveness of communication, analysts should not
let this decision be made by default. Once they commit themselves to getting in-
volved in the making of this decision, analysts will see that what is needed is a
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strategy for selecting and sequencing audiences. Such a strategy is not a simple
matter to devise. It encompasses an appreciation of the organizational context
of the analysis and of the fact that neither the client nor the analyst is the sole
audience. The audience for analysis is seldom a single person.
IGNORING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
Analysis is conducted in an organizational context. All too often analysts sit
"outside" the organization and have little exposure to the organizational im-
peratives that will influence their communications. To be outside means that
the analysts are located so as to be distant from critical information and cues.
Contractors and consultants often have this problem, but so do employees. For
example, analysts who work, as employees, for the head of a large complex
organization may be quite naive about the rest of the organization. They may
not understand that the rest of the organization not only is a source of informa-
tion but also has to be included, in some way, in the calculations about the
audience for analytical communication. To convince the client is hardly
sufficient when acceptance and implementation rest on these other members of
the organization. What are some of the organizational factors that influence the
conduct of analysis and its communication?
Time
One important factor is time. Through its routines and rules the organization
sets the schedule for the analysis. Such rules not only place constraints on per-
formance but also establish when it will be best to communicate. For example,
an analysis that is intended to influence a decision obviously should be
presented before that decision is made and frozen. If the analysis is predicated
on reallocating resources, it may be necessary to be aware of budgetary
routines in order to catch the appropriate part of the cycle of financial manage-
ment. An analyst can be highly proficient in the art of communication, but if he
has little sense of time-that is, if he does not know when it is opportune to
communicate-his skills will not be worth much.
Organizational Structures
Another important factor is organizational structure and its capacity to absorb
information. Over the years, an organization will develop a certain structure
for the processing of work. Let us consider a fairly typical structure, a
hierarchy composed of many levels, specialized offices, and centralized deci-
sion making. As part of its processing of work, such a structure also processes
large quantities of data. In so doing it absorbs and filters that data. Hence an
analytical report that is inserted into the organization will be modified as it goes
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through numerous levels before reaching its final destination. Modifications can
take place as each level either rewrites the report or encloses transmittal
memoranda that select certain aspects of the report for treatment. This
digesting of data occurs simply to avoid placing an informational overload on
central decision makers, but it also serves as a protective device to prevent
damaging information from being communicated to one's superiors. In any
event, organizational structure introduces a measure of distortion into the com-
munication of analysis.
Competition of Information
Analysts generally value their information more highly than do members of the
organization. Not perceiving that the organization is already flooded with in-
formation, analysts are seldom sensitive to the costs of absorption. Of course, a
single report will not overload the informational capacity of an organization.
Assuming that the communication of analysis takes place in an informational
vacuum, however, can lead to miscalculation. One can easily forget, for exam-
ple, that competing information is available from the communication lines of
the organizational structure, and that such information may be in conflict with
the direction and findings of an analysis. The analyst must take into account in
his analysis and in his communication of it that his audience will have received
information that has been processed by the organizational structure. Although
the analyst may circumvent the organizational structure to get his data, he will
still have to contend with the sometimes distorted views of others.
Circumventing a number of superiors to reach a sympathetic ear or reaching
directly down several levels to a friend for data are common tactics for
avoiding the effects of organizational structure. While such tactics can be effec-
tive, they also have high personal costs in terms of the analyst being marked as
disloyal or being denied access in the future. Analysts who have some
perseverance might be better off if they cope directly with the organizational
structure in their conception of the audience and in the design of the means of
communication.
Identity
Organizations also have a self-image that asserts, "This is what we are, this is
what we do, and this is how we do it." In communicating to an audience, the
analyst has to tailor his message so that it is consistent with this organizational
identity. Suppose an organization's identity involves a conservative streak and
a respect for traditional ways of doing things. Analysts, usually biased toward
significant change, will have to cloak their recommendations for divergence
from that tradition. What is new will have to appear old or only slightly
different from present practices. Effective analysis is the product of a number of
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people and must be put into a framework consistent with the organizational
identity.
Environment
Organizations also exist in a larger environment. They have permeable boun-
daries and are subject to the external influences of articulated interests. By act-
ing as if these influences do not exist, as if the organization is a "closed"
system, the analyst may make the mistake of concentrating his efforts at com-
munication solely on sponsors and other members of the organization. Sup-
pose an analyst examining alternative early childhood development programs
focuses the report only in terms of the organization's perceived and stated in-
terest in cognitive achievement, while downplaying or omitting his analysis of
the other interests of parent and teacher groups. Such a report may not be well
received by those groups when they review it; and, what is more important, the
report may not be well received by the members of the organization, because
they also perceive the problem through the lens of these environmental
infl uences.
Functions
Finally, the analyst should be sensitive to the variety of functions that a par-
ticular communication fulfills for the organization or a component of the
organization. A common error is to assume that the communication of analysis
serves only a single function-transmitting policy and programmatic informa-
tion. Sometimes communication is used to establish the jurisdiction of the
organization, to show that the organization has control over, and is working in,
an area. Sometimes communication serves to maintain the analytical unit and
to secure resources for its activities. At other times it is used to develop political
support and to neutralize the opposition of the organization. And then there are
times when the communication of analysis is strictly a symbolic act indicating
concern about a problem that the organization actually intends to do nothing
about.
Conclusions
In short, in choosing and calibrating their audience, analysts must be sensitive
to the organizational context of communication-to such factors as timing,
structure, competition of information, identity, environment, and functions.
ASSUMING THE CLIENT IS THE AUDIENCE
Analysts would do much better at communicating if they used the notion of
audience rather than of client. Audience is a neutral term; it does not prejudge
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the situation of decision making. The use of audience allows the analyst to
regard potential recipients without bias and frees the analyst to attempt to in-
fluence the selection of the audience's members. Assuming that the client is the
only member of the audience, however, can lead to serious errors.
One such error occurs when the analyst assumes his client to be tlte policy
maker. Generally we think of clients as policy makers-persons who instigated
analysis and are expected to use its results. They are our links to policy
making. Yet, all too frequently, the person who sets the process of analysis in
motion-the immediate client-is merely one link in a complicated chain of
advisors and policy makers. Indeed, that person may not be a policy maker at
all, but a manager who has arranged and monitored an analysis for someone
else. In complex organizations and political systems, the immediate client is, at
best, only one of numerous policy makers who comprise the analyst's
audience, and the analyst may be mistaken in focusing his communication on
that single client.
Related to this often erroneous idea of a single policy maker is the analyst's
belief that his client will be the sole recipient of his communication. No com-
pletely foolproof way exists for preventing the dissemination of analytical infor-
mation. Whenever the analyst commits his information to paper, the informa-
tion takes on an independent existence. Any reader of a study can become a
member of the analyst's audience if he chooses to use the information. If the
analyst recognizes that the material he is communicating is sensitive and can
be misused, however, he can take some small steps to restrict its utility to
others. For example, a study can be written so that it applies only to a specific
context from which it would be difficult to extract the findings.
Shaping analytical communication to fit the audience is a highly desirable
practice, but one partially dependent on appropriate selection and understan-
ding of that audience. Thus, as we have seen, treating the immediate client as
the sole member of the audience may lead to errors. In the first case, the
analyst unduly restricts his communication so that it is not likely to appeal to
other policy makers. In the second case, the analyst does not restrict his com-
munication enough, and other policy makers misuse it.
Concentrating on the immediate client as sole recipient implies that the
policy process is more or less constant. The analyst assumes that the person
who contracted with him will be there to receive the product and that the deci-
sion will wait for his research. Yet all too often, when the analyst is ready, the
immediate client has been replaced by an uninterested monitor, the key elected
and administrative officials have left office, and the current crop of actors are
on to another problem. Because policy and decision processes are fluid and
dynamic, analysts cannot afford to tie themselves to a rigid conception of the
audience.
In developing a strategy for the selection of the audience, the analyst should
not become entangled in legal niceties. All too often, I have seen analysts
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restrict themselves and their communication because the contract called for so
many copies to be delivered to a particular person. A contractual or formal
arrangement may in fact exist between client and analyst; t~ere is no reason to
assume that such arrangements have to be breached, but there is every reason
to augment them. No one is suggesting that the analyst ignore the wishes ofthe
client, whether they be contractual or otherwise; it would be foolish to do so.
Indeed, it is in order to protect the interests of the client that the analyst has to
examine the potential audience for his work. Whatever the sophistication and
intelligence of the client, most of us would agree that in the practice of analysis
it is inappropriate to accept only the client's definition of the problem without
examining other definitions. It is also important that the analyst have room to
maneuver in selecting the audience and in communicating the results of
analysis.
Thinking strategically about the selection of the audience leads us to con-
sider the "sequencing" of the audience. Sending the results of a study to the
wrong person can cause the premature death of that study. The selection of the
initial audience is crucial in this respect. Reaching a supportive staff person, for
example, can do more to influence a decision maker than a more direct ap-
proach by the analyst. In a large agency with a well-established analytical
office, the analyst can sometimes create a climate of receptivity for his work as
he goes along. This process of building consensus can start quite modestly,
with the analyst convincing first his fellow analysts, then the head of the
analytical office. After having built up a cadre of supporters inside the
analytical office, he can proceed to communicate with superiors and subor-
dinates outside the office and eventually with peers and policy makers outside
the agency.
In sum, when an analyst assumes that his immediate client is his audience,
he gives up the opportunity to influence the choice of audience. From the view-
point of communication, who is reached and when they are reached is as
critical as what is said. Making up a distribution list for a report should not be
treated as a trivial mechanical exercise. If analysis is to affect decisions, the
analysis must reach the decision makers and those friends and enemies who
can influence them. This is not to say that an analyst can always anticipate all
those who will be in the audience, but that thinking strategically about the com-
position of the audience is essential for effective communication. There are
many clients to be reached; some may be peripheral, some remote, some in the
future, yet all are part of a potential audience (Meltsner, 1976, pp. 200-210).
ASSUMING THAT THE CLIENT IS AN ANALYST
One of the common errors in communication occurs when the analyst assumes
that his audience or client is like himself, sharing his beliefs and values, his
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definition of the problem, his language and education. In the particular client
who requested the study he will expect a sympathetic and empathetic audience.
Such expectations may be unrealistic. Running for office is not the same
experience as running a computer. Policy makers and decision makers, while
perhaps competent judges of analysis, have seldom been analysts. They may
come from a different class and social background than the analyst. They may
not even remember that they instigated a study. Even in situations where the
client is a former analyst, the analyst should not assume that the client is still
an analyst. True, the client and the analyst may share a common language, but
it is unlikely that they will completely share policy preferences and definitions
of the problem. Differences in perceptions and values are bound to arise
because of the client's position in the decision-making system. Sitting where he
does, the client develops concerns different from the analyst's-concerns about
politics, administrative feasibility, and personal advancement.
The analyst should assess rather than assume the degree of similarity
between himself and his client. Two general situations can bracket this assess-
ment, as Rogers and Shoemaker (1971, p. 39) point out:
Heterophily is the degree to which pairs of individuals who interact are different in cer-
tain attributes, such as beliefs, values, education, social status, and the like. The op-
posite of heterophily is homophily, the degree to which pairs of individuals who interact
are similar in certain attributes. Generally, most human communication takes place
between individuals who are homophilous, a situation that leads to more effective com-
munication. Therefore, the extent of ... heterophily ... leads to special problems in
securing effective communication.
If Rogers and Shoemaker are correct in their inference that "most human
communication takes place between individuals who are homophiJous," the
analyst's assessment should indicate the necessary specific elements for effec-
tive communication. If these elements are lacking, it is the analyst's respon-
sibility to adjust the situation. Obviously, the client does much to determine the
effectiveness of communication; our focus here is on the analyst and what he
should do--namely, increase the degree of similarity between himself and his
audience. Analysts who have had experience in dealing with numerous clients
usually do this without much thought: they listen sympathetically to the client,
respect his knowledge of the situation and problem, and are able to convert the
technical language of a report into the language of the client. They do not
assume that the client is naive and easily manipulated, but they try skillfully to
couch their arguments in terms that increase the appearance of shared values.
They are so knowledgeable about their client that they read his mind. This
ability to anticipate the reactions of a client is difficult to acquire and may de-
pend on considerable prior exposure to the client. As the Chinese philosopher
Han Fei Tzu (Watson, 1967, p. 73) reminds us:
On the whole, the difficult thing about persuading others is not that one lacks the
knowledge needed to state his case nor the audacity to exercise his abilities to the full.
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On the whole, the difficult thing about persuasion is to know the mind of the person one
is trying to persuade and to be able to fit one's words to it.
How to increase homophily between analyst and client is not at all clear. We
seem to know what direction to take but not what steps will be effective in a
variety of situations. The exact prescription rests on the skill of the analyst and
the idiosyncratic aspects of the situation, not on empirically based
generalizations. If the analyst stops attempting to make the client over in his
own image and instead puts himself in the position of the client, communica-
tion will at least be enhanced.
ARGUMENT
Once the analyst knows his audience, he can determine how to communicate.
He will have to develop arguments that combine the substantive aspects of his
study with its social context. An argument is the theme that holds the various
parts of the study together and leads them to a particular conclusion. The con-
clusion may urge the acceptance of a specific policy alternative or of a novel
way of perceiving the problem, or it may suggest promising avenues of
research. When the argument is well executed, we usually say that the con-
clusions of the study followed from the analysis: the argument has been so con-
structed that the study appears to be correct and its conclusions compelling. In
short, an argument should be persuasive.
Now when I say compelling and persuasive, I do not mean that an argument
as used in the practice of analysis is or should only be a strong appeal to the
emotions of the audience. Commonplace techniques such as the use of analogy
and comparison can also be persuasive. The use of a fortiori analysis, where
we place our preferred alternative at a disadvantage to see if it is as good as we
thought, is not only an analytical technique but also an effective argument in
communicating with an audience.
Many mistakes in communication derive from the unwillingness of the
analyst to recognize that his study's argument is not neutral, that it leads to
some conclusion, and that it is meant to be persuasive. Other mistakes related
to argumentation result from the difficulty of constructing an argument that
tells a client something he does not want to hear or from the analyst's in-
sistence on dragging the audience through an obscure methodological or
mathematical line of reasoning.
ASSUMING AN ARGUMENT IS NEUTRAL
The argument of an analysis should be balanced, but this does not mean that it
should not be persuasive. By definition, the communication of analysis is an act
of persuasion. It is not the simple transfer of information from analyst to
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reCIpIent-as if information could be aseptically transferred by itself and
acceptance depended solely on the quality of information. Is it not false humili-
ty to assert-as many analysts do--that we merely provide information to
help the decision maker or to improve the quality of decision making? Even
where the directional or steering content of the information is minimal, analysts
are engaged in an act of persuasion. Our analysis has led us to accept an
altered view of reality and that is the view we present to the recipient. We say:
Here is our new reality; here is cause and effect; here is A and if you do A, B
will follow. We do not have to ask the recipient to choose A, only to accept that
if A is chosen B will follow. Essentially, we are asking the recipient not
necessarily to do something, but to accept our view of reality and to change his
framework of understanding. When we sincerely believe that our view is cor-
rect, and not clouded with uncertainty, and especially when we believe that our
analysis indicates the correct path, what then? The most detached, un-
emotional, objective analyst cannot avoid seeking some confirmation from
others. No matter how neutral he tries to be in his communication, he is
engaged in persuading the recipient to believe him, and his problem is to do it
well, convincingly, and evenhandedly.
Some analysts may object to the assertion that communication is an act of
persuasion, because to them persuasion implies a manipulative appeal to
emotions, and they see themselves as appealing solely to reason. Appeals to
reason can also be manipulative, but as long as analysts recognize that they are
appealing to something it will be sufficient for my purposes. Consider the scien-
tific analyst who expects that giving his report to the decision maker is the end
of his responsibility. Compare that analyst with one who advocates a particular
policy and expects that with considerable activity and skillful communications
the decision maker will adopt the policy. These analysts have differing views of
what is being communicated, and they have different styles or employ different
means of communication; but, oddly enough, they have similar expectations.
They both expect the decision maker to embrace the communication and to
behave differently because of it. In a sense, both analysts are advocates,
although one of them is unaware of it.
TELLING THE CLIENT WHAT HE WANTS TO HEAR
It is a sad commentary on the state of analysis, but all too often a client will
listen if you tell him what he wants to hear and will not listen if you tell him
what he needs to know. Why should this be so? It has to do with a person's
tendency to select and distort what he perceives on the basis of his
predispositions. Analysts, of course, are subject to the same tendencies, but
norms of professional practice and review usually eliminate or modify many of
the possible distortions. Perhaps clients do not like suprises.
Research on mass communications, in the laboratory and the field, have
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come up with several generalizations that seem applicable to the communica-
tion between analyst and client. Consider these generalizations from Berelson
and Steiner (1964, pp. 529-541):
People tend to see and hear communications that are favorable or congenial to their
predispositions; they are more likely to see and hear congenial communications than
neutral or hostile ones.
People tend to misperceive and misinterpret persuasive communications in accordance
with their own predispositions, by evading the message or by distorting it in a favorable
direction.
People respond to persuasive communications in line with their predispositions. and
they change or resist change accordingly. Communications will be most effective-that
is, will secure the response most in line with the intention of the communicator-when
they are in accord with audience predispositions; when they tell people what they
(most) want to be told.
Analysts clearly have a great deal to contend with if the behavior of clients is
similar to that of most people. Of course, sometimes the client's predispositions
are congruent with the analyst's, and in such cases the problems of com-
munication are fewer. But what about a client whose predispositions are in con-
flict with the recommendations of the analyst? No amount of prior consulta-
tion with the client about the definition of the problem can prevent such a situa-
tion from arising. What then can be done to ensure a fair hearing of an analysis
and increase the chances of its acceptance? What alternatives are open to the
analyst?
First, the analyst can decide to make no attempt to understand why the
client's predispositions are in conflict with his recommendations. He can ignore
the conflict and present his facts and recommendations with the expectation
that the study will speak for itself. This alternative operates on the assumption
that human beings are reasonable and that knowledge can prevail. Second, the
analyst can recognize the c,onflict and present his study with the same facts and
recommendations, but do so using a personal style and form of communication
that smooths out the abrasive aspects of the situation. This alternative operates
on the assumption that human beings enjoy flattery and are prone to listen to
those they trust. "The important thing in persuasion," Han Fei Tzu tells us, "is
to learn how to play up the aspects that the person you are talking to is proud
of, and play down the aspects he is ashamed of" (Watson, 1967, p. 75). Third,
the analyst can recognize the conflict and modify his study so that the argu-
ment, with its selected facts and proposed recommendations, is more con-
gruent, though not completely so, with the client's predispositions. This alter-
native operates on the assumption that it is preferable to compromise oneself
partially than to be completely compromised or not listened to at all. Fourth,
the analyst can recognize the conflict and change his study so that it is com-
pletely consistent with the client's predispositions. This alternative operates on
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the assumption that future influence depends on present submission by the
analyst and acceptance by the client.
As in many policy problems, not one of these alternatives is attractive. Each
raises serious issues of both ethics and practicality regarding appropriate roles
and standards for analysts. Yet surely we recognize that communication, by
definition, does involve manipulation, anticipation of the client, and planned
reaction by the analyst. The real question of professional ethics is not whether
to manipulate the client but how much manipulation is acceptable. The first and
the last alternative in all likelihood result in the client not hearing or accepting
what he needs to know-a dubious ethical choice at best. The other alter-
natives, in which the analyst slightly changes his behavior or his study, offer the
best chance for effective ethics and communication. Oddly enough, when
viewed in this context, the second alternative, modifying the style of the analyst
and the form of his presentation, seems most appropriate because it leaves the
content and message of the study intact. The analyst does not have to settle for
a less than preferable solution. Form is changed but not substance. Rather than
telling the client what he wants to hear, the analyst tells him what he needs to
know by making it appear that what is being said is what he wants to hear.
To do this involves tactics that orators and advisors have known and used
throughout the centuries: making sure the time is right, stating the argument in
terms familiar to the audience, presenting a departure from present policy as
merely a slight extension of it, coupling the recommendation with the possibili-
ty of personal advancement for the client, and pointing out that the recommen-
dation is really the client's and that he will be identified with it and get the credit
for it. Add to this choice of clothes, haircut, and appropriate regional speech
pattern, and the nuances of persuasion are endless. When John Stuart Mill was
a young boy, he enjoyed reading the orations of Demosthenes. His father
pointed out (Mill, 1924, pp. 14-15)
the skill and art of the orator-how everything important to his purpose was said at
the exact moment when he had brought the minds of his audience into the state most
fitted to receive it; how he made steal into their minds, gradually and by insinuation,
thoughts which, if expressed in a more direct manner would have aroused their
opposition.
No doubt many analysts will be uncomfortable with the notion that they
may have to manipulate a client or audience. They will argue that it is impossi-
ble to change form without changing substance, and they will consider
attempts to do so expedient and unethical. They may well be right, but one
thing is certain: if they do not use the manipulative arts of persuasion, their
communications will be effective only in situations in which the values, at-
titudes, and beliefs of the participants are reflected in the analysis. With the
exception of somewhat trivial and technical problems where such congruence
by definition exists, such situations are not common.
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TELLING THE CLIENT WHAT YOU DID
It is an axiom of the analytical world that clients are busy, impatient, and have
short attention spans. They want to know only as much as they will need to
explain their decisions to others. With the exception of crises-when the de-
mand for information is real and urgent-a client often reacts to the com-
munications of the analyst with feelings of boredom and indifference. In a face-
to-face situation, he may do so because he does not want to appear committed.
Reading a report in the privacy of his office, he may easily be distracted by
more pressing items on his agenda; even though he continues to read, his mind
and heart are likely to be elsewhere. Keeping the client's attention is a struggle,
and many an analyst loses it because he insists on telling the client what he did
rather than what he learned.
It is true that a client will not completely understand the analyst's con-
clusions and recommendations if he does not know how they were reached, but
is total understanding what we are after? I would suggest that often what we
are after is acceptance. Now most of us would agree that acceptance with un-
derstanding is preferable. The two ends are not always compatible or at-
tainable, however, and thus we usually settle for acceptance with an illusion of
understanding.
On the other hand, many analysts feel that acceptance itself is closely linked
to a detailed documentation of methods. They reason that a presentation of
methodology is one way of establishing the expertise of the analyst and the
value of his analysis. The rationale here is legitimation and not necessarily
enhanced understanding. The analyst believes that he will not be trusted or his
work approved unless he presents his expertise in detail. How can one be
viewed as an expert unless he shows the paraphernalia of his models, statistics,
and the like? If the point of such demonstrations is to maintain one's reputation
as an expert, then surely there must be other ways to do so. Association with a
prestigious university or research firm, necessary credentials in terms of educa-
tion and experience, and recommendation by well-known former clients also
contribute to the maintenance of reputation. Indeed, if one has to demonstrate
repeatedly that he is an expert, he is likely not to be-at least by reputation.
How an analysis is conducted can also affect the ease of communication.
Consider the analyst who is taken with a new and sophisticated analytical
method. He can hardly wait to try it out. When he does, he may find that he
has trouble explaining it and why he used it. Generally, the analyst should
choose a simple method that fits the problem and the quality of the data. The
more obscure, specialized, and complex the method, the more difficult it will be
to explain it and the more the analyst will be forced to provide detailed
documentation so that the study can be validated by others.
The client is more likely to listen if the material is directly related to his con-
cerns. If he wants to know how a program is operating, tell him about what
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contributes to the success and failure of the program. If he has to make a deci-
sion, concentrate on the policy choices and their consequences. If he wants to
enhance his knowledge of underlying causes and relationships, show him the
products of research, not the methods. Of course, if he wants to hear about
methods, to enhance his knowledge or perhaps to calibrate the analysis, then it
is appropriate to inform him. But even in such situations, the sequencing and
the amount of attention devoted to methods should be carefully controlled.
Generally, methodological details. are better left for footnotes and appendixes
or for special meetings of staff and technicians.
MEANS
The forms of communication include not only many media but the numerous
ways of using them. All too often, the analyst has a limited view of the
available choices. He settles for a particular method and makes do. Having
learned that a communication technique worked in one situation, he somewhat
slavishly continues to use it. The analyst seldom realizes that he needs to
develop multiple means of communicating with diverse audiences, rather than
simply following mechanical rules.
The analyst is often not given the time, money, or other resources to break
out of prevailing communication practices. Audiences and clients want to
swallow some "instant analysis" pill, yet they usually are not willing to pay for
it. Both clients and analysts are to busy to make the effort that would improve
the effectiveness of communication. What can be done about this neglect? I
have no satisfactory answer, other than that as analysts we must start with
ourselves. We should not so overemphasize communication that our efforts are
counterproductive, but we certainly can do more to seek out new ways of
reaching out audiences. At the same time, we can educate our clients about the
importance of communication.
ASSUMING ONCE IS ENOUGH
There is a trade-off between the resources used for the analysis and those used
in communicating the results of the analysis. I have been arguing that analysts
do not spend enough of their resources on communication and that they cer-
tainly do not make creative use of the resources they have allocated for com-
munication. With a modicum of arrogance, analysts assume that the world of
policy is anxiously waiting for their work. They put their results in one final
report, do a few briefings, and assume that that will be enough. But how can
one report be sufficient when the analyst is dealing with multiple audiences?
Usually, the analyst is aware of at least two audiences, his client and his
peers. In fact, the client represents a number of decision makers, and the peers
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represent numerous technically minded staffs, advisors, and fellow analysts.
The former will participate in the formulation of a policy or the making of a
decision. The latter, f:'iendly or not, will review the study for its technical com-
petence and elegance. The informational needs and standards of the two
audiences are in conflict and tension, and yet, armed with a single report, an
analyst attempts to address them. The logic of the situation would argue,
however, that he should have multiple reports to communicate with multiple
audiences. But this I do not mea" a reshuffling of the material in a single report,
but the actual execution of a number of separate communication
products-different reports for different readers and different briefings for
different audiences.
To many analysts, multiple communication seems unnecessary work and a
waste of time. Besides, they argue, the immediate client has not provided
sufficient resources, in time or money, for them to do more. From the perspec-
tive of most participants, a single product seems sufficient. In the face of this
erroneous consensus, it is up to the analyst to assert the need for additional
resources for communication. By thinking strategically about the different
audiences, analysts can reach effective compromises with their clients and
make effective use of available resources. Audiences can be grouped and
matched with particular communication media. Nor must analysts stay
wedded to traditional reporting formats and briefings. Indeed one analytical
team, for example, made a documentary film to promote and disseminate its
work (Brewer, 1977, pp. 28-32).
It may appear that such actions will cause redundancy and a clogging of
communication channels with excess verbiage and paper. But while the analyst
may find himself covering the same material, he will not do so in the same way.
The language and the forms of communication will be different, and the results
will not be entirely repetitious. Redundancy in communication, in any event, is
a practical way of dealing with the audience's tendency to selective perception.
When the analyst describes his work in terms-language and form-that will
appeal to a specific audience, his analysis is not as likely to be screened out by
conflicting predispositions.
Actually, what I am suggesting is only an extension of present analytical
practice. Do we not create both reports and briefings? In reports, for example,
do we not include a summary for the busy reader? Our reports also have a fair-
ly stylized format: in the introduction tell the reader where he is going, take him
there, and then conclude by telling him where he has been. In their efforts at
communication, analysts too often behave like the characters in Lewis
Carroll's poem "The Hunting of the Snark":
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true.
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I do not want to be accused of comparing the pursuit of analysis to a Snark
hunt, and I certainly do not believe that repetition creates truth. Yet redundan-
cy, both within a communication product and through a number of such
products, can facilitate acceptance of the analyst's message.
FOLLOWING MECHANICAL RULES
Giving advice about communication is a hazardous business. Few people
besides students of rhetoric and social psychology have studied what works in
communication, and to my knowledge no major study or body of literature
evaluates the communication of analysis. In addition, communicating the
results of analysis is very much grounded in the specific situation. Few rules of
writing and speaking are universally applicable. As we have seen, many idio-
syncratic factors seem to influence the effectiveness of communication: the
analysis, the structuring of the argument, the client and the audience, the
organizational and social context, and the choice of media and technique.
While it is easy to set forth some rules that work in some situations, it is easier
to set forth exceptions. That is why no analyst should follow in a mechanical
fashion a rule of effective communication from me or anyone else. A few
examples will illustrate the problem.
I teach my students that using short declarative sentences in their writing
allows easier communication with most audiences and clients. Simplicity
usually pays. One of my former students is now experiencing a certain amount
of frustration because she insists on following my rule while working for a
client who does not prefer simple, straightforward sentences. In reviewing the
work 'If other analysts, I usually urge that the analyst use ordinary language
and get rid of the jargon and technical terminology. Such esoteric language can
easily mislead nonexperts. Using ordinary language is a good rule when the
policy makers in an audience do not share a common technical vocabulary,
and, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 153) put it, "ordinary
language can help to promote agreement on the ideas." When the audience
does share a technical vocabulary, however, using ordinary language is not a
good rule because the technical vocabulary is a useful shortcut. I also believe
in avoiding weasel words, such as probably, tends to, perhaps, likely. We use
such words to qualify our inferences and to make up for some inadequacy in
the study. If these words are used with skill, the reader will never know what
the analysis is suggesting. Yet when the inference stands alone without the
benefit of such trappings, it may appear not only naked but flat-footed to some.
A client who, because of education or culture, is accustomed to convoluted
language would never appreciate such a practice.
Because analysis is fairly abstract, I have found it helpful to supplement the
definition of the problem with a vivid example or story. Making things as con-
crete as possible seems effective, particularly in an oral presentation. But a con-
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crete example can also deflect an audience's attention or cause disagreement.
An analysis that stays at an abstract level may be more difficult to understand,
but it also promotes agreement
Sometimes it is difficult to know operationally whether one is following a
specific rule. Consider the rule that a study report. should stand on its own, that
the reader should be able to go from a statement of the problem to the
recommendations without having to look at anything else. It would be silly to
expect total self-sufficiency of a report; yet because communications are con-
strained-in terms of pages or time, for example-the rule hints at a degree of
self-sufficiency. How much should be included? What should be excluded?
Should topics generally known and agreed upon be omitted? How is the
analyst to identify such topics?
In short, follow a rule if you can, but only if the rule is congruent with a
specific communication situation. This last rule supersedes any other
mechanical rule you may confront.
OVEREMPHASIZING COMMUNICATION
An essay on communication all too easily overemphasizes the importance of
communication at the expense of substance. The same sort of thing happens in
the practice of analysis. Some experienced analysts are likely to appear too glib
when communicating their results. Some analysts try to substitute communica-
tion for substance; words like overselling and snowing describe such a situa-
tion. As one perceptive reviewer of this essay recently told me:
Many analysts, perhaps because of their own needs for esteem or prestige, perhaps
from pressures by their organizations, tend to pack or puff up analytic reports with un-
necessary material which-it seems-is intended to impress but often has the opposite
effect. It was a standing joke among my colleagues ... that the fanciest "packaging"
usually indicated the poorest substantive quality. Everything from the binding of the
report to special type fonts gets used to dress up shabby work, and it's quite easy to
spot the analysts who are trying this ruse.
What is needed is balance between skills of communication and skills of sub-
stance. Obviously, one depends on the other. Without some substance, there
will be nothing to communicate. Without clear and reasoned thinking, the
analysis will be very difficult to communicate. Frequently, for example, what is
put forth as a communication problem is in reality a thinking problem: fuzzy
thinking makes for fuzzy communication. For our purposes, however, let us
assume that the substance exists. In what other ways does an overemphasis on
communication lead us astray?
One way is by encouraging us to omit embarrassing information. Analysts
are often reluctant to admit the weaknesses in their work. In our desire for a
tightly reasoned argument in which data and analysis directly support con-
clusions, we may be prone to leave out nonsupportive information. We believe
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our conclusions to be correct; to ease the process of understanding and accep-
tance we want to leave out whatever detracts from that conclusion. Such a tac-
tic may backfire, however; a third party to a communication may be delighted
to point out the contrary evidence, thus undermining the main thrust of the
study and calling into question the honesty of the analyst. My own practice is
to sacrifice a little on the communication side by preempting the future critic. It
often pays to include the adverse example and to admit the limitations of one's
work, regardless of the minor difficulty in communication this causes. Such
candor provides a measure of balance and softens an unnecessary tone of
advocacy.
Another quite different way we can be led astray is by overemphasizing a
particular medium. We become media freaks. First, we narrow our choice
down to written reports or briefings and tend to slight other forms of com-
munication-such as writing memoranda, and using the telephone, and taking
advantage of social occasions. Then we put our energies into making sure our
reports are neatly bound, with appropriate dividers in color. Or we develop
briefings that make use of three projectors and artistic slides with numerous
overlays allowing easy digestion of complex information.
These techniques work fairly well with many audiences. The problem arises
when technique displaces what we were trying to do in the first place-com-
municate. Consider that one central aspect of effective communication is feed-
back. The analyst has to know whether his message is getting across to his
audience and, if it is not, how to make suitable adjustments. The question then
is not only which technique to use but how a particular technique enhances
communication and provides the condition for feedback. Obviously, a face-to-
face, informal situation would be best from this perspective. Both the analyst
and his client could then engage the substance of the analysis and at the same
time build mutual understanding and trust. Short of this ideal situation, the
analyst has to ensure that his formal briefing, for example, is not so formal and
simplistic that it entertains without engaging the audience or encouraging the
audience's reponses to substance.
CONCLUSION
Concern about communication usually masks concern about the lack of one's
influence: "The analysis is sound. Why is it that no one pays any attention to
it?" Worse than the analysis not being used is the analysis being misused or
used in unintended ways. What can be done about this? Some would argue that
the analyst must be his own client and assume a political role. In this vision, the
analyst can become a master coalition builder, seeking allies and neutralizing
enemies in the pursuit of a study's recommendations. Yet I do not think most
analysts have the stomach for the rigors of politics. Some more modest
prescription is needed.
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Here is where an appreclatlon of communication and its social context
comes in. Helping to choose the audiences, designing arguments to fit those
audiences, and employing effective means of communication will increase the
use of analysis. To this end, analysts will have to improve their understanding
of rhetoric and the psychology of communication. They will also have to
accept the necessity of spending as much time on communication as they do on
the analysis itself. Communication cannot be effective with meager resources
or as an afterthought. Paying serious attention to communication is, so to
speak, being political in the small, a sensible strategy consistent with present
analytical practice and the analyst's limited resources. Analysts who then come
to appreciate the art of effective communication will be in the good company of
Aristotle, who pointed out the uses of rhetoric (Rhetorica I. 1. 1355'):
Rhetoric is useful ... because things that are true and things that are just have a
natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are
not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they
must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, ... before some audiences not even the posses-
sion of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction.
For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one
cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument,
notions possessed by everybody.
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9 On Designing Implementable Programs
Eugene Bardach
A well-known law of policy implementation holds that "whatever can go wrong
will." This law is affirmed by universal experience, and there is no use
protesting against it. Acceptance of this law need not imply defeatism,
however. Our task must be to design policies with fewer things that "can" go
wrong. This is not, alas, a goal easily attained. For one thing, we understand
only imperfectly the theoretical limits of those institutions and processes we
normally rely upon to implement policy-bureaucracies, grant-in-aid mechan-
isms, government procurement contracts, profession-dominated markets,
legislative oversight committees, administrative audits, and so forth. Second,
even when we have a fairly good grasp of the theoretical limits of implementa-
tion mechanisms, we are bound to be uncertain about what these limits are in
any concrete and specific case. Finally, neither theory nor practical wisdom
can obliterate the simple fact that sometimes we have little choice among im-
plementation mechanisms. We can limit the number of things that "can" go
wrong, or limit the damage they inflict when they eventually do go wrong, but
in the end we are always stuck with certain irreducible risks posed by the im-
plementation process.
SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERAnONS
TO WHAT SHOULD ''IMPLEMENTATION'' REFER?
Scholarly and professional interest in the problems of policy implementation
has grown very rapidly in recent years, with the result that it is no longer clear
(if it ever was) what the term "implementation" refers to. I would identify at
least four referents:
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• Adoption of a policy recommendation by an authoritative individual or in-
stitution, as in "The client has endorsed our analysis of airport landing fees and
will soon promulgate regulations to implement it." This is typically an
operations researcher's or planner's usage (Vertinsky; Huysmans, 1970;
Alterman and Hill, 1974).
• The empirical details that reflect, or represent, the application of a policy
principle, as in "Effluent taxes are fine in principle, but when it comes to im-
plementing them, we see that they are often set too low." (It should be noted
that "implementation" in this sense is bound to be somewhat imperfect, for the
same logical reason that there is always a slippage between a theoretical con-
struct and the operations that are used to measure it empirically.)
• The operating routines of an organization, or a network of organizations,
that have been brought into being or have been modified by some policy man-
date, as in "Over the years we have found it necessary to shift our implementa-
tion methods away from a reliance on regular audits to voluntary compliance
and self-reporting."
• The process of rearranging patterns of social conduct so as to honor the
prescriptions set forth in some policy mandate, as in "We are implementing the
new workmen's compensation law just as fast as we can."
In this essay "implementation" will mean only the process indicated by the
last definition. We shall attempt below to give greater conceptual clarity to this
process, but at this point it is worth emphasizing where it fits into the larger
process of policy development and execution. To put the matter simply: first
there are words and then there are deeds. The implementation process is the
social activity that follows upon, and is stimulated by, an authoritatively
adopted policy mandate, which prior to implementation is only a collection of
words. l This policy mandate might be a piece of legislation, a court decision, or
a bureaucratic command. If the implementation process is bounded on its near
side by the policy adoption process, it has an analogous boundary on its
farther side: at some point in time it turns into a relatively fixed set of operating
routines (one of our rejected definitions, above). At this farther point the man-
dated program is no longer in the process of "being implemented": it is es-
tablished; it is in place.
The implementation process, therefore, is a transition process. It takes
whatever social, political, and economic arrangements exist before the policy
mandate is adopted and sets them in a different configuration. To the extent
that this latter configuration resembles the arrangements intended by the policy
mandate, the il\lplementation process has been successful.
THE MEANING OF "SUCCESSFUL" IMPLEMENTAnON
If success has a relationship to intentions, we should here note certain of the
objectives that lie behind all policy designers' "intended arrangements." They
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are (a) to achieve the goals defined by the policy; (b) to hold delay to
a reasonable level; and (c) to hold financial costs to a reasonable level. The
first two of these concerns are well documented in the seminal scholarly
work on the implementation process, Implementation, by Pressman and
Wildavsky (1973). They report that in 1966, the V.S. Economic Development
Administration (EDA) announced that it would spend over $23 million in Oak-
land, California, and create 3,000 jobs for unemployed inner-city (mostly
black) residents, but 3 years later only $4 million had been spent and 68 new
jobs created. The two main projects were to be built by the Port of Oakland.
One was an airport hangar and support facilities to be leased to World Air-
ways, and the second was a marine terminal and access roads. EDA financing
was contingent on the agency's approving minority-hiring plans to be sub-
mitted in advance by the prospective employer. But it proved immensely
difficult for the many concerned parties to reach agreement over these
plans.
Frustration of the third of our postulated major policy design intentions,
holding costs to a reasonable level, is frequently observed in large-scale public
works projects. Capital spending on the new San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit system was originally (in 1962) estimated at $792 million, but before it
is done, the actual system cost will have doubled this estimate. In 1961 the new
administration of President John F. Kennedy canceled research and develop-
ment activity on a nuclear-powered plane. By the time of Kennedy's decision,
however, the V.S. Government had spent more than $1 billion, over a lO-year
period, on what many scientists and engineers had long believed to be a losing
proposition.
If implementation success occurs when the intended results are achieved on
time and within the original cost estimates, should we say that the reverse of
any of these outcomes is to count as an "implementation failure"? Not
necessarily. For one thing, cost estimates are often too low not because of im-
plementation problems but because of systematic downward bias in the initial
estimates. Moreover, if policy implementation runs into trouble with respect to
goal attainment or delay, cost escalation is sometimes what bails the policy out.
A bridge or tunnel only 80 percent complete does no one any good, after all,
and it is often worth putting up with cost inflation to get the job done. As for
failure to achieve the initially intended results, this too is not necessarily a
failure of the implementation process. Indeed we should sometimes count it as
a success, particularly if the original objectives were ill considered or the
method of administrative control ill chosen. Rhetoric is cheap, after all, and
policy mandates, which are rhetoric almost by definition, can drastically un-
derestimate political as well as economic costs. Federal government officials in
West Germany, for example, regularly mandate state officials to make rapid
strides in controlling pollution. Federal officials have very little power or official
authority in this policy area, however, and it seems inappropriate to attribute
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the failure of the policy to "problems of implementation." (Mayntz, 1976,
p.584.)
Nor should we necessarily count as a failure of the implementation process a
result that originates in a more fundamental conceptual defect in the policy
design. If a policy of rent control, for instance, leads in the long run to housing
shortages and deterioration of the housing stock, it would probably be mis-
taken to blame these outcomes on the way the policy was implemented.
Similarly, if after a period of growing dissatisfaction with rent control it is
decided to adopt a policy of rapid decontrol, whereupon rents rise steeply and
drive middle-class families out of tile city, no one should blame the implementa-
tion process. "Good" implementation cannot by itself offset the ill effect of
"bad" policy any more than a more perfect compass and straight edge can help
us square the circle.
To the extent that the implementation process "fails" under such conditions,
it does so because it does not help the key actors in the policy process to
recognize their conceptual mistakes and to take constructive measures to cor-
rect them. It is necessary to emphasize this special case of failure-as-success
because policy making is often not a straightforward matter. There is inevitably
a certain amount of trial and error, and sometimes the opportunity for trial and
error is~r ought to be-built in. A successful implementation process,
therefore, not only avoids known pitfalls but seeks better and perhaps un-
predictable paths to new and perhaps unforeseen destinations.
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AS
COLLECTIVE ACTION
Policy implies program, and program implies an ordered relation among in-
teracting elements. Normally, the required programmatic elements are quite
diverse and are controlled by many different parties. Although obviously every
different policy entails a different set of program elements, we may suggest a
list of some that commonly occur:
• Bureaucratic management functions
• Administrative regulations and guidelines2
• Administrative and financial accountability mechanisms
• Privately provided goods and services, e.g., professional services, land, office
supplies
• Willing participation of presumptive clients or beneficiaries (in the case of
service programs)
• Bureaucratic inspection and surveillance forces (in the case of regulatory
programs)
• Permits issued by public regulatory agencies or elected officials
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• Various political "clearances" from officials in levels of government or in
public agencies not assigned principal management functions
• Innovative ideas in the realm of program conception and design
• Sources of funds
.. Troubleshooting that irons out difficulties and assists in mediating
negotiations
• Political support that sustains and protects the entire program and policy
Note that the above list-which is, of course, suggestive and not
exhaustive-catalogues program elements or functions, not actors. Who is to
furnish the requisite program elements is one of several "implementability"
questions that a policy designer must answer. Sometimes the answers are ob-
vious, e.g., "No agency other than the Tax Collector should be assigned the job
of collecting a new sales tax." Sometimes the answers are not obvious but are
unimportant, as when private goods and services are to be purchased from a
competitive and largely undifferentiated set of suppliers. And in some cases the
answers are highly problematic and uncertain. These last are the elements that
a designer must attend to most closely, particularly if they are critical to a
program's success.
We take it as axiomatic that no potential supplier of valued program
elements will cooperate unless it is in his (or his organization's) interest to do
so. Policy designers would do well to remember that they are launching a new
mandate on a world already in motion. Their policy will almost surely be less
important to others than it is to themselves. For many, it will be but a minor
blip in their field of vision. For those who notice it at all, some will think it
altogether objectionable and a good many others will view it primarily as a
vehicle whereby they can advance policy and nonpolicy interests that have no
special standing in the eyes of the mandate designers.
It is not clear to many potential suppliers, however, where, in fact, their in-
terests lie. This uncertainty arises because, typically, so many other parties are
potentially involved and so many of them are ready and able to bargain,
maneuver, and procrastinate in order to extract the best possible terms for their
cooperation. The result is often confusion and delay.
Agreements among the many diverse parties build up slowly and unevenly.
Bilateral and multilateral negotiations have many ritualistic elements that add
to the delay, like haggling over the exact words in planning documents that no
one will pay attention to anyway, and often create as many difficulties as they
resolve. As time passes, events overtake the implementation process and make
certain tentative agreements obsolete or unacceptable to one or more of the
parties. For example, elections shift the party in power, or inflation raises costs
relative to budgets, or widespread governmental reorganization suddenly
removes managers who had been counted on to assume major program
responsibilities, or new civil service rules force a drastic slowdown in recruiting
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technical specialists. In any case, even as some agreements build up, others
decay, and evidence of the general tenuousness of things imperils even those
agreements already reached. Inevitably, there are insinuations of negotiating in
bad faith, of treachery and deception, of stupidity and incompetence. Such
recriminations poison the atmosphere and make the implementation process
even more chaotic and sluggish. In short, then, the process suffers from the
well-known defects inherent in collective action, potentially to an extreme
degree.
COLLECTIVE ACTION AS A LOOSE SYSTEM OF GAMES
Two metaphors capture the essential spirit of what we have said so far about
the sources of implementation problems. One is "games," in that the implemen-
tation process is dominated by many actors, all maneuvering with and against
each other both for end results and for strategic advantages. The second is
"system," in that many of these games have some sort of connection with each
other-the outcome in one, for example, affecting a party's strategic resources
in the play of another-and all (or most) are related to each other more dis-
tinctly than they are related to games "outside" the policy area. To be sure, the
"system" is quite loose, but there are enough interdependencies to warrant
using the term.
Unfortunately, neither game theorists nor systems analysts are likely to find
their standard tools relevant to understanding, much less controlling, such a
complex system as an implementation process. The relevant human behavior is
too subtle, the political texture too rich, the chances for actors to err or mis-
calculate too numerous. We must be satisfied with heuristic aids. I have
therefore compiled an inventory of some of the most common implementation
games and given them tag-line names. Each game is identified principally by
the stakes for which the players compete. Our concern, of course, is only with
those games that have adverse effects on the process of assembling needed
program elements. These adverse effects are of four general types: (a) the diver-
sion of resources, especially money, that ought properly to be used to obtain,
or to create, certain program elements, (b) the deflection of policy goals
stipulated in the original mandate, (c) resistance to explicit, and usually in-
stitutionalized, efforts to control behavior administratively, and (d) the dissipa-
tion of personal and political energies in game-playing that might otherwise be
channeled into constructive, programmatic action. It should be emphasized, of
course, that a game may have more than one type of adverse effect. The
grouping of games in the following list is ultimately, therefore, somewhat
arbitrary.
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THE DIVERSION OF RESOURCES
Easy Money
Governments raise and spend vast sums of money. Government contracts are
the mainstay of many firms, particularly in the defense industry; and the larger
the public sector relative to the private, the more the government's likely
procurement practices stand out as a salient feature of any new policy.
Pressures for wide distribution of the patronage inherent in such procurement
activity may be taken for granted and are not necessarily a cause for concern.
The problem arises when unqualified, unmotivated, or overpriced contractors
are given key responsibilities in the execution of a policy. Compounding the
problem of the initial mistake in awarding the contract is the difficulty of get-
ting the government out of it once the mistake is discovered. Program
managers are always reluctant to admit error, and private contractors are often
able to exercise a kind of blackmail power in the circumstances.
Budget
In general, bureau chiefs like large budgets.3 Because incremental budgeting is
practiced nearly universally, the more a bureau spends, the more it can hope to
get. In addition, the political allies of a bureau in the legislative branch or in the
higher levels of the executive branch tend to favor higher expenditures by the
bureau and will reward the bureau for its ability to spend money with higher
budgets. Such incentives always lead to unproductive expenditures, of course,
but in no case more so than when a bureau's mission is almost solely to act as a
financial intermediary, commonly as a distributor of grant-in-aid funds to other
levels of government. In such cases the performanct: of the donor bureau is
evaluated almost exclusively in terms of its ability to "move money," and so
more of it moves to less effect than is ordinarily the case.
Funding
This is a game played by a grant-receiving bureau (or nonprofit organization)
against a grant-giving bureau (although occasionally in covert collaboration
with it). The object of Funding is to secure not only money but flexibility in its
use. The recipient bureau seeks to maximize the size of its grant while
minimizing the constraints on how it must spend the monies. Maximizing the
grant level is done by padding requests for funds. Minimizing constraints is ac-
complished by foiling the surveillance and monitoring routines of the donor
bureau. These routines are typically rather ineffective, primarily because
programs in the public sector so often aim for effects that are hard to measure
and therefore hard to hold agencies to account for.
145
Easy Life
Bureaucrats play this game in many different ways. One obvious way is to in-
vent ways not to work very hard while appearing to do so; but this is not nearly
so debilitating to a policy as working hard but only within convenient, and
therefore habitual, modes. If successful policy implementation requires
bureaucrats to make a daring break with customary practice, or to invent in-
genious ways to carry out a new responsibility, the policy is probably in
trouble.
Pork Barrel
We said above in our discussion of Easy Money that political pressures to
spread patronage around are not necessarily detrimental, but one circumstance
in which they are is when resources need to be concentrated in order to reach
some threshold level of effectiveness. In the United States, because legislators
are tightly bound to their individual geographically defined constituencies,
there is usually enormous pressure to spread resources around. The original
conception of the Model Cities program of the late 1960s, for example, was to
saturate a few selected cities-as few as two and no more than ten---with
federal dollars to assist in reinvigorating declining urban areas. By the time the
Congress was finished, however, the number of target cities had risen to 150
while the available funds had shrunk to half the originally conceived amount.
THE DEFLECTION OF GOALS
The goals embodied in a policy mandate typically undergo some change during
the implementation phase. They might have been ambiguous and therefore
might have required, or at least permitted, further definition. Or they might
have been based on a very weak consensus, hastily, and perhaps insincerely,
contrived during the contest surrounding the adoption of the mandate. Indeed,
interests opposed to the goals of the mandate might have stayed quiet during
the adoption contest precisely because they counted on subsequent oppor-
tunities to achieve more decisive, and less publicized, victories during the
struggle over implementation. In an important sense, implementation is the
continuation of policy-adoption politics by other means. The politics of
renegotiating goals can lead in several directions: trimming them back, distor-
ting or perverting them, or even adding to them in a manner that eventually
leads to an unsupportable political burden.
Keeping the Peace
The new wave of "social regulation" in the United States has created many
new programs to extirpate real or imagined evils in respect to consumer
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product safety, worker health and safety, environmental protection, fair hiring
practices, and other areas as well. This new wave follows an older wave of
economic regulation exemplified by agencies such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board. Such programs create oppor-
tunities for "zealots" to seize control of the regulatory apparatus. They also
create incentives for "counterrevolutionaries" to move in and attempt to
neutralize the legislative mandate during the implementation phase. The
counterreformation usually proceeds through maneuvers aimed at (a) installing
sympathizers at or near the top of the enforcement agency (Bernstein, 1955);
(b) writing regulations, standards, rules, and guidelines that tend to condone
existing practices either explicitly or through generous l:::xemptions (Mayhew,
1968); (c) lightening the penalty structure for violations (Majone, 1976); (d)
setting high standards of proof for violations, and throwing the entire burden of
proof on the regulatory agency (Jones, 1975). Such maneuvers are often not
vigorously resisted by political leaders in the executive branch or in the
legislature, who do not relish continual turmoil, and many of whom, although
they may have supported the new program initially, were more interested in
making a political gesture than in seeing that much regulation is actually ac-
complished (Edelman, 1966). In many cases the regulated firms do not so
much "neutralize" the agency as convert it into an instrument that helps them
achieve cartelizing objectives (MacAvoy, 1970; Stigler, 1971).
Upfor Grabs
What Keeping the Peace is for regulatory bureaucracies this game is for
service-delivery bureaucracies. The conflict here is not between proponents and
opponents, as it is in Keeping the Peace, but between two or more different sets
of policy proponents, each of whom has a somewhat different conception of the
desirable policy objectives for the agency. A case in point here is the U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA), which began in 1953 as a concession to a cer-
tain form of liberal' and populist congressional opinion that wished to subsidize
"small business" (Zeigler, 1961). The Eisenhower administration made sure
that the agency was administered by "big business" sympathizers in the
Commerce Department, however. In the later years of the Johnson administra-
tion, the SBA made more efforts to channel funds to minority businessmen, but
this orientation was largely reversed by the more conservative Nixon ad-
ministration (Blaustein and Faux, 1972).
Piling On
If a new program enjoys certain initial successes, it naturally expands its
political support. It then becomes a target for interests who may have only
minimal commitment to the program's objectives but who wish to capitalize on
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its growing political assets. Such a program is vulnerable to Piling On in much
the same way that a cash-rich corporation is vulnerable to being taken over by
another firm through a merger or a tender offer to shareholders. By the time the
Piling On process is over, the original program goal may have become greatly
submerged or the supporting coalition may have collapsed under the weight of
the new interests. For example, the concept of "affirmative action" in the
United States once meant a commitment to give preferential treatment to job
applicants from racial minorities when in other respects they were "equal" to
applicants from nonminority backgrounds. Over the course of the last 10 or IS
years, however, the concept has come to mean quotas and a deemphasis on the
"equality-in-other-respects" criterion. Many traditional liberals who supported
the more restricted "affirmative action" concept have become resentful and
frightened at its maximalist redefinition and, in effect, have withdrawn their
energy and attention even from the initial goals.
In some sense, Piling On is just another name for the normal processes of in-
crementalist politics. In that sense, implementation processes and mandate-
writing processes are all of a piece in the long run. Thus the United States over
the last 15 years has moved from limited health insurance for the poor to the
brink of comprehensive health insurance for all persons.
The anticipation of Piling On effects sometimes influences the political
struggle over the adoption of the policy mandate. In the field of pollution con-
trol, many policy analysts would advocate effluent taxes rather than "legal
orders" as a basic administrative device. But industry tends to resist the former
more than the latter, it appears, partly because the latter can probably be more
easily combated, and also because such a tax can too readily be transformed
from a mere Pigovian price adjustment to a powerful revenue-raising device
(Ackerman et al., 1974; Kneese and Schultze, 1975; Majone, 1976).
THE DILEMMAS OF ADMINISTRATION
Many of the program elements at issue in an implementation process are
assembled under the central direction of an administrative agency. Administra-
tion is a control process, however, and as such it inevitably sets in motion
games of evasion. Anthony Downs (1967, p. 147) has stated the process as the
"Law of Counter Control. ... The greater the effort made by a sovereign or
top-level official to control the behavior of subordinate officials, the greater the
efforts made by those subordinates to evade or counteract such control."
Counter-control is occasionally exercised through outright defiance-usually
when it is possible to coordinate a resistance movement-but it usually takes
the form of playing Tokenism or Procrastination, games that are familiar
enough not to require description here. If the objects of control have near-
monopoly power over important organizational resources, like direct linkages
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to the clientele population, the would-be controllers may have a very hard time
indeed against these games.
The literature on the administrative process and the exercise of authority in
organizations is vast, however, and it would serve no purpose to recapitulate it
here. Suffice it to say that because most of it refers to private business
organizations, it does not convey the true magnitude of the control problem in
public organizations. The essential difference is that most business firms are ul-
timately subject to the discipline of the marketplace, which is a sterner master
than public institutions like legislatures or central budget offices. The reason for
this difference, of course, is not that government somehow fends off market
tests of its activities-though it does sometimes do so---but that it would not
have undertaken many of its functions in the first place had they been carried
on in the private market.
THE DISSIPATION OF ENERGIES
FinaIly, we may mention a number of different games that generally have the
character of maneuvering for position in other games. an activity that creates
delay and drains personal and organizational energies away from more con-
structive activities.
Tenacity
If participants in the implementation process have different preferences for how
fast the program is to get under way, those with stronger preferences for speed
are vulnerable to manipulation by others who are less concerned with speed.
The great danger is that the holdout parties will overplay their hand and that
everyone will become discouraged. The result can be total collapse (Pressman
and Wildavsky, 1973, pp. 45--47, 110) or the erosion of financial and political
support (Marris and Rein, 1967, pp. 94-119; Greenstone and Peterson, 1968,
pp. 286-287).
Territory
Bureaucratic organizations normally wish to maintain and enhance their legal
authority and political status (Banfield, 1961). Bureaucratic competition for
this sort of "territory" can be constructive, but very often it leads to difficulties.
For instance, it can interfere with efforts to coordinate different agency's
responsibilities at the operating level. This occurs frequently in social service
programs (Bardach, 1977, pp. 151-152; Rocheleau, 1976). Other documented
cases of interest are in regional transportation systems design (Zwerling, 1974)
and civil rights enforcement (Orfield, 1969; Radin, 1977).
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Not Our Problem
This game is the mirror image of Territory. Instead of trying to grab more
territorial responsibility, agencies shrink from it (Williams, 1975, pp. 549-552).
Some responsibilities, after all, are so burdensome and so unglamorous that not
even the most imperialistic program manager would want them. Three Califor-
nia state agencies spent almost a year trying to avoid the task of writing licen-
sing regulations for community care facilities for the mentally ill, for example
(Bardach, 1977, p. 161). Not Our Problem is particularly likely to occur if new
assignments are being heaped on an agency without a concomitant increase in
budgetary resources.
Odd Man Out
The inherent uncertainty that attends collective action makes it useful for ac-
tors in the implementation process to preserve their options to withdraw and
cut their losses. This strategy sometimes entails maneuvering other parties into
foregoing their own withdrawal options, typically by imposing "sunk costs" on
them that they will hesitate to abandon.4 Because parties resist being
maneuvered in this way, the result can be stalemate. This is the scenario that
seems to have occurred in connection with the development of the V/STOL (ver-
tical and short take-off and landing) technology (Sayles and Chandler, 1971, p.
210).
Reputation
The games described so far are the public side of the implementation process.
But the world of implementation games is populated by human beings with
private as well as public lives. Their private games proceed simultaneously with
their public games. Private needs and desires are, of course, manifold and
diverse. We postulate, however, that the most significant private games are
those that have to do with career aspirations and ambitions. And the crucial
strategy in playing this game is to protect and augment one's reputation.
A reputation for what? That depends on the player and his personal situa-
tion. Presidents of the United States seek reputations for being sensitive to their
power stakes (Neustadt, 1960). Reporters seek reputations for being "in the
know." Policy analysts seek reputations for being sophisticated, "high-
powered," and-let us now hope-for being able to avoid the common and un-
common "pitfalls of analysis." Highly placed policy makers, engaging in what
Allison (1969) calfs "bureaucratic politics," seek a reputation for being sound,
discreet, and loyal, and for having been able to shape whatever consensus
might have emerged.
Reputation games do not necessarily have more deleterious-or even
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different~ffects on implementation outcomes than other games. Because
reputation is built largely on performance in relevant public games, any
player's tactics in his private Reputation game are likely to be coincident with
his tactics in the more public games. An exception to this rule, however, occurs
when actors seek out means of persuading an audience that they are doing
more or doing better than they really are, and more concretely still, when ac-
tors seek a reputation for boldness, toughness, or innovativeness. This sort of
posturing can be extremely demoralizing to individuals doing more construc-
tive but less visible work trying to implement a program (Gross et at., 1971).
COPING WITH IMPLEMENTATION GAMES
We have identified, for heuristic purposes, over a dozen common implementa-
tion games. No doubt the list could be expanded, but these are trouble enough.
Coping with them goes on in three somewhat different ways. First, there are
strategies premised on field-level mediation and persuasion. Second, there are
strategies premised on intermittent intervention by powerful agents who are
spokesmen for the political legitimacy of the original policy mandate. Finally,
these are preventive measures that can be taken at the policy design stage, prin-
cipally by ana1ysts and planners who have the foresight to design policies
robust enough to withstand the buffeting of the implementation process.
FIELD-LEVEL MEOlAnON AND PERSUASION
Organizational Development
An increasingly popular view among policy designers is that "if you can't beat
'em, join 'em." After all, people who "resist" your allegedly superior wisdom
might be wise in their own way. They know their organization's strengths and
weaknesses, its peer group alignments, its needs and priorities. Given the
chance, and a little encouragement, they will successfully adapt whatever you
have to offer to their own context and setting-in ways you could neither
predict nor ordain. Such, at any rate, is the basic conclusion of a lengthy and
very well documented study by researchers at the Rand Corporation of the im-
pact in the classroom of federal programs supporting educational change and
innovation (McLaughlin, 1976). Certainly there is much to be said for this
point of view theoretically (Beckhard, 1969). It does run the risk, however, of
legitimizing unacceptably large distortions of the goals enshrined in the policy
mandate, particularly in policy areas in which (unlike education) we can count
on considerably less consensus over basic program goals (e.g., penal in-
stitutions, unemployment insurance, worker safety regulation).
lSI
Negotiations
A very common means of attempting to reduce the delays, the misunderstand-
ings, and the confusion attending the implementation process is bilateral or
multilateral negotiations. Instead of simply maneuvering other parties at a dis-
tance through a whole succession offairs accomplis, people sit down and talk
about what they might be able to do for each other. This is so commonplace,
indeed, that we hardly notice it. We take it for granted that communication,
persuasion, and face-to-face bargaining is more efficient than unilateralism and
action without discussion.
On balance this is probably a sound assumption, supported by the broader
principles of democracy as well as by the efficiency criterion. Yet we should
note as well that the negotiating process has almost as much potential for
creating problems as for solving them. If the process creates and sustains an at-
mosphere of mutual trust and cooperation, all will be well. If the reverse oc-
curs, however, the outcome might be worse than if all parties took their
chances on a less direct method of interaction (Crozier, 1964; Raven and
Kruglanski, 1970; Schelling, 1963). Another problem with negotiations is that
they can acquire a ritualistic autonomy. They become a substitute for con-
structive action rather than a prelude to it, as they serve important psy-
chological functions for the participants, like relieving anxiety, symbolizing the
"essential ambivalence" of all intimate relationships (Coser, 1956, p. 65), and
releasing tension.
It is sometimes possible to reduce the cost of negotiations by using in-
termediaries. This is, of course, a common practice in the private sector, where
there is a specialized profession skilled in "mediation and arbitration." By con-
trast, the use of mediation in the public sector is haphazard. One reason is that
public sector negotiations are generally more multidimensional and political,
and therefore lend themselves less readily to mediation; a second reason is that
there is usually a scarcity of third parties who carry the requisite moral authori-
ty and who are willing to assume the politically unrewarding role of go-between
(Bardach, 1977, p. 241).
USING THE POWER OF THE MANDATE
As we have seen, the implementation process is the continuation of "politics"
by another name. Implementation politics have a somewhat different character
from the politics of the policy-adoption process, however, for in the former
case there exists an authoritative policy mandate that creates expectations--if
nothing else-that "something" will be done. These expectations can be used
to affect the "something" that eventually results.
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Project Management
This concept comes from the history of large-scale government projects based
on advanced technology, e.g., building the Polaris submarine fleet, sending men
and satellites into outer space (Sapolsky, 1972; Sayles and Chandler, 1971). It
represents a way of overcoming the limitations of the traditional division of
organizational labor along "functional" lines (sales, production, research, for
instance) when the organization must undertake a large, novel, and costly
project requiring specialized and unpredictable inputs from several such de-
partments and possibly from suppliers outside the organization. Although the
idea of project management has come to be associated with particular technical
paraphernalia like PERT charts and computerized information systems, the es-
sence of the concept is in how it concentrates power and responsibility
(Sapolsky, 1972, especially chapters 2, 3, 4, 8). In our terms, the project
manager is the human expression of "the policy mandate." His authority rests
on the presumption that he, and no one else, is its legitimate interpreter and
spokesman.
There is some question about just how transferable project management
might be from essentially technical projects to projects with a more "political"
character, in which not only are the outputs laden with mUltiple and sometimes
conflicting values but the inputs are acquired in political rather than economic
markets. Under such circumstances project managers would tend to become
just another set of players in the larger implementation game. They would have
to play their own Budget, Territory, and Reputation games (especially the last).
The Political Fix
If project managers are too susceptible to being drawn into mere game playing,
it is in part because they do not speak with enough authority. First, if their
authority derives from the presumption that they are the sole legitimate inter-
preters of and spokesmen for the policy mandate, the presumption is highly
rebuttable. After all, they are not the originators of the mandate, nor its
political trustees, but mere agents, delegates. Secondly, whatever rights they
exercise to distribute rewards and punishments (so as to induce cooperation in
the collective enterprise), these rights are only derived from a higher source.
Hence, while it is not easy to do so, it is possible to appeal from their verdicts
to individuals even more powerful and authoritative-individuals in a position
to play such a role I call "fixers."
Typically, fixers are influential legislators or top political appointees in the
executive branch who were intimately associated with the adoption of the
policy mandate. Such persons are ideal for playing the mediating role in the
negotiating processes described above as well as for arbitrating controversies
that result from the interplay of interests maneuvering against, and with, one
153
another out in the field. Moreover, fixers do not need to be exclusively reactive.
They can, if they desire, playa "proactive" role as well: coaxing, bullying,
troubleshooting, propagandizing, and so on.
The "fixer" does not and cannot act alone, particularly if he plays a proac-
tive role. He needs staff who can handle the detail work, and he needs a widely
dispersed network of informal "eyes and ears" out in the field that will register
and report information on which he would wish to act (Bardach, 1974; Bar-
dach, 1977, pp. 275-278; Kaufman, 1973).
The most severe limitation on "fixing" as a solution to the problems of the
implementation process is that, for individuals with the requisite political
resources, there are rarely enough incentives to do the necessary dirty work. It
is behind-the-scenes work, for the most part, and legislators find this intrinsical-
ly unattractive as well as unrewarded either by constituents or by fellow
legislators. Top political officials rarely stay in one spot long enough to master
the details of the implementation process that need fixing, and in any case their
own Reputation games are not particularly well served by investing much time
and energy in "fixing" activities (Bardach, 1977, pp. 278-282; Hargrove,
1975, pp. 110-115; Levin, forthcoming).
PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES AT THE POLICY DESIGN STAGE
The policy analyst, and whoever else is involved in the design process, can take
steps to design policies that have at least a fighting chance to survive the rigors
of the implementation process. First, the basic social, economic, and political
theory behind the policy must be reasonable and sophisticated: it will not do,
for instance, to pretend that most people do not act most of the time in accord
with a rather restricted notion of their self-interest; nor will it do to ignore in-
convenient features of the world, like the sparse supply of managerial and
technical competence or the enormous variety of local circumstances that
policies must serve or the immense difficulty of coordinating large-scale ac-
tivities on the basis of plans and promises rather than market signals (Devons,
1951; Goode, 1967; Wilson, 1967).
Second, a basic administrative strategy must be selected. Such a strategy
should be simple. It should entail as little reliance on bureaucratic processes as
possible, relying instead on actual or simulated markets, e.g., tax manipulations
of existing price patterns (Kneese and Schultze, 1975; Levine, 1972; Pressman
and Wildavsky, 1973). Bureaucracy cannot, of course, be avoided altogether;
but its methods can be tailored as closely as possible to the task at hand. In
particular, the heavy and usually uncritical reliance on audit-and-control
mechanisms, extensive and detailp.d written procedures, and the like, should
generally be avoided. In programs heavily dominated by professional service
workers like doctors or teachers, indeed, such methods are likely to be irrele-
vant at best and destructive at worst (B ardach, 1977, pp. 109-141).
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The third step is to make a list of requisite program elements and to note
beside each one who--whether organizations, groups, or individuals-might
be in a position to contribute them. With this list at hand, the fourth step is for
the policy designer to go through the list of implementation games provided
above (and elaborated in Bardach, 1977) or any other games that come to
mind and ask: "Who, if anyone, is likely to play this game? With what effects?
If the effects are unacceptable, is it possible to stimulate other actors whose
games will neutralize these effects, either by preventing them from occurring or
by compensating for those effects that are unavoidable?" For better or for
worse, I do not believe there are any simple conceptual answers to these
questions; and even if there were, it would require a great deal of effort and
sophistication to derive their policy implications for the concrete problems at
hand.
The fifth step is to think about how to establish some of the facilitative and
fixing mechanisms described above, if appropriate, e.g., third-party mediators,
project management, encouragement through agents of "organizational
development," a fixer and his immediate staff, the fixer's network of "eyes and
ears" in the field (see also Iglesias, 1976).
Finally, the policy designer should think about how to "phase in" a new
policy so that it makes more friends than enemies, especially in its early and
vulnerable months (or years, or weeks, as the case may be). More to the point,
perhaps, it must make more influential friends than influential enemies; and the
former must be led to mobilize still more support on behalf of the emerging
policy or program while the latter must be combated, dispersed, and
neutralized. At its highest and most comprehensive level, therefore, the political
dynamics of the implementation process resemble the dynamics of the policy
adoption process (Bardach, 1972, pp. 241-261), though in neither case are
these dynamics well understood.
PITFALLS IN ANALYZING IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
The single most important pitfall surrounding implementation analysis is the
belief that it is not worth bothering about. Implementation issues sometimes
seem to be of slight practical consequence compared to basic theoretical or
political issues like "Do we really want to treat heroin use as a crime?" or
"How much should we spend on exploring outer space?" or "Who should bear
the financial burden of national health insurance?" Also, implementation issues
tend to come up (when they do come up) toward the end of an analytical
process, when professional and political investments in resolutions of more
basic issues may already be in place and are very resistant to being disturbed
by "mere" considerations of implementability. People who insist on raising
these issues at this stage risk being called small-minded or being accused of
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defeatism or of conspiring with the opposition. One way to avoid this pitfall is
to make room for implementation analysis from the very earliest stages of the
project. Although it probably helps to assign primary responsibility for im-
plementation analysis to one individual, all participants in the project should
become sensitized to the importance of implementation difficulties.
A related pitfall originates in the belief that implementation difficulties are
usually minor, if they occur at all, and that, if not minor, they are in any event
remediable. If this is so, then it follows that even justified skepticism about im-
plementability should not be permitted to exclude a policy option that looks
favorable on other grounds. Although this line of reasoning is sometimes
sound, it more often leads to a treacherous pitfall. To a thoughtful implementa-
tion analyst, for instance, the wreck of the 1976 swine flu vaccination cam-
paign in the United States was utterly predictable.
Implementation analysis is an exercise in concentrated pessimism. It is
sometimes a psychologically difficult undertaking and is on that account
shunned. There is no simple way to overcome this psychological obstacle, but
a sense of humor, or better still a sense of irony, helps.
Although analytically it is often convenient to work with a model of a
"closed system," in the real world of social, economic, and political action
significant systems are almost always "open." Hence every policy "solution"
potentially stimulates new and only vaguely predictable "problems" of its own,
some of which merely impede the "solution" and some of which alter the essen-
tial character of the system itself. I have attempted to sketch some of the more
common such problem-generating processes under the headings of Easy
Money, Pork Barrel, Up for Grabs, Piling On, and Reputation, though there
are surely many others as well. Precisely because these effects are new and un-
predictable, analysts are tempted to ignore them.s Another reason analysts
tend to ignore them is that it takes an active imagination coupled to a "dirty
mind" to have a reasonable chance of foreseeing them. Analysts who, after due
introspection, recognize that they are not thus equipped should find
collaborators who are.
A fifth pitfall concerns the relationship of the policy adoption process to the
implementation process. For numerous reasons, success or failure of the latter
depends in part on how closely, and in what way, it is linked to the former. Too
tight a linkage may have provided potential saboteurs with enough ammunition
and allies to destroy the policy. Too loose a linkage may have put key im-
plementers in an uncooperative frame of mind. In any case, once the policy is
designed and authorized, it is too late to ponder the issue of whether and how
to include or to exclude any implementers in the design process.
A final pitfall has to do with the methodology of implementation analysis
itself. A certain amount of contemporary discussion of this topic prescribes
overly formalistic and quantitative methods. It is sometimes recommended, for
instance, that for all relevant implementers, coefficients that measure their
156
probable level of support, their degree of interaction, and so on be displayed.
Similarly, there are recommendations to assess "the density of the in-
terorganizational field," and hence "the need for coordination," by counting
organizations and estimating their "interdependencies." Unfortunately, the key
concepts in such a prescription are at worst meaningless and at best am-
biguous. It should be recognized that the very nature of the implementation
process-it is relatively unstructured, and its evaluation is very sensitive to the
effects of errors in political judgment and defects in skill-requires that im-
plementation analysis be handled as art rather than as science.
NOTES
I. Note that we do not say that the implementation process "translates the policy mandate into
action" or "transforms prescriptions into results" or "realizes policy goals." All such
locutions, common as they are, misleadingly suggest that words become deeds. Implementa-
tion is difficult, to be sure, but it need not depend on miracles.
2. Regulations and guidelines can be conceived as program elements that help to implement a
higher-level policy mandate, like a statute. But it should be remembered that, like statutes.
regulations and guidelines are only words. In keeping with our usage of the term "implemen-
tation," these words are merely stimuli to a subsequent, and conceptually distinguishable, im-
plementation process or, more precisely, a subprocess within the larger procesS. To put the
point another way, the implementation of regulations and guidelines can be just as
problematic as the implementation of statutes or judicial decisions or any other set of words
stating a policy mandate. (Cf. Rabinovitz et al., 1976.)
3. The main exceptions, I believe, are (a) when rapid budgetary growth would destabilize
existing intrabureau power and status relationships, (b) when the corollary of budget growth
is greater political visibility and vulnerability to attack from outside, and (c) when the condi-
tion of accepting the larger budget increment is to undertake a difficult and unpleasant task.
4. No matter what economists say, people are often reluctant to treat sunk costs as irrelevant. In
certain contexts this is not as irrational as it might appear, since writing off a sunk cost is an
admission of failure that could carry independent penalties.
5. In another context Aaron Wildavsky has observed that most "new" policies these days repre-
sent attempts to straighten out problems created by "old" policies from the not-toe-distant
past.
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10 Pitfalls of Evaluation
Harry P. Hatry
Program evaluation is a term that has been commonly used in the United
States to refer to an assessment of a government program's past or current per-
formance, usually to determine the impact, or effectivness, of that program.
Program evaluation should be considered a vital element of systems analysis
when public officials are attempting to determine whether a current or new
program (or a variation of a program) should be continued, modified,
expanded, cut back, or terminated. The term "program" evaluation has not
typically been used in the private sector. Private firms, however, routinely
evaluate past performance by examining sales, profits, and share of the market,
and many of the procedures sometimes used in program evaluation, such as
various forms of experimentation, are used by the private sector, for example,
in marketing research. This chapter, however, focuses on program evaluation
of government-sponsored programs.
The key issues in program evaluation are (a) to attempt to determine what
the effects (impacts) of the program have been over a specific period of time
and (b) to determine the extent to which the specific program, rather than other
factors, has caused the effects. Both issues are typically subject to considerable
uncertainty, particularly in the great majority of government programs that are
not undertaken under controlled laboratory conditions. Program effects are
often unclear, are often ill defined, and can be quite messy to measure.
Dealing with the second issue-to what extent the effects identified can be
attributed to the specific program-also presents considerable difficulties,
because outcomes can be affected by numerous other factors in addition to the
program itself, and the effects of these external factors will generally be difficult
to determine without careful analysis.
Throughout this chapter the term "program" will be used to encompass both
relatively narrow activities and broad-scale major programs. Examples com-
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mon to most nations and for which program evaluation principles apply are
programs for use in such basic governmental services as police and fire protec-
tion, solid waste management, the delivery of physical and mental health ser-
vices, provision of transportation services, water supply and treatment, parks
and recreation, library services, employment and training programs, and
education.
Evaluations may be of ongoing programs-programs that have been in
place for some time and have been operating at full scale. Or evaluations may
be of trials of new programs (or program variations)-perhaps where the scope
of that trial is limited to a portion of the ultimate target population.
Many of the pitfalls discussed in earlier chapters also apply to the form of
analysis called program evaluation. Most of these do not need to be dealt with
again here, though a few will be, where they are particularly applicable to
program evaluation.
The intent of this chapter is not to discourage those who want to undertake
program evaluation, but rather to encourage evaluators to make their work as
meaningful as possible, and to keep both their own and their customers' expec-
tations within reasonable bounds. As with systems analysis in general, it is
seldom that evaluators will be able to provide conclusive findings about the im-
pacts of current programs. And, as with systems analysis in general, it is
almost never possible for the evaluators to say that a particular program will
continue to have the same consequences.
TYPES OF PROGRAM EVALUATIONS
In the past few years there have been numerous publications about various
aspects of program evaluation. This chapter is not the place to describe in
depth the content of program evaluation. We hope that most readers will at
least be somewhat familiar with the concepts of program evaluation. l Probably
the form of evaluation most written about is the "controlled experiment," the
Cadillac (or Mercedes-Benz) of the evaluation world. It is also, however, the
form of evaluation that is probably the least often undertaken because of its
special requirements. In the controlled experiment, each member of the target
population (or a random sample) is randomly assigned to either a group that
receives the treatment or to other groups that receive no treatment or some
alternative treatment. Each unit in the population of interest should, to the ex-
tent possible, have the same probability as all other units in that population of
being assigned to each group.2 The program intervention (treatment) is then
applied for a period of time, and the impacts on the groups are compared to
determine the extent to which the groups differed. The random assignment is
intended to ensure that the groups have similar characteristics at the beginning
of the experiment.
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There are less demanding forms of program evaluation. These, in general,
provide less conclusive evidence that any impacts observed were actually
caused by the program intervention. These include such variations as (a) mere-
ly looking at the values of the evaluation criteria before the intervention is
made and then looking at them again some time thereafter to see what changes
have occurred; (b) deriving a historical time series based on several years of
past data, extrapolating the trend into the future, and comparing that
extrapolation to what actually happens after treatment (this controls for certain
types of underlying long-term conditions); (c) using "natural" comparison
groups when there is a group that did not get the treatment that is sufficiently
similar to the treated group that different outcomes are probably due to the in-
tervention. Evaluations that are not controlled experiments are likely to be used
considerably more often, because of their less demanding requirements.3
Some of the pitfalls presented below apply more to certain of these types of
evaluations than to others. This will be indicated where appropriate.
PITFALLS OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
The pitfalls briefly discussed below are arranged according to the time at which
the pitfall generally occurs: before the beginning of actual data collection for
the evaluation, during the process of data collection, or after the data have been
collected (when findings are to be presented and use is to be made of the find-
ings). Numerous categories and groupings of pitfalls could be used. What
follows is merely one person's perspective.
PITFALLS BEFORE DATA COLLECTION
PITFALL 1 Not doing an assessment of the potential utility and evaluability of
evaluation candidates to assure that it is likely that the program can be
evaluated in sufficient time for the evaluation findings to be useful and within
available resources.
Not assessing the potential utility and evaluability of programs may be one
of the major causes of frustration in program evaluation in the United States
(see, e.g., Horst et al., 1974). Programs probably should not be the subject of
substantial program evaluation effort when (a) the program has vague objec-
tives; (b) even though the objectives are reasonably clear, the current state of
the art in measurement does not seem to permit meaningful measurement of
impacts, or (c) the program's major impacts cannot be expected to show up un-
til many years into the future, by which time the information is not likely to be
useful (when, for example, it seems likely that, by the time the evaluation is
completed, all relevant important decisions will already have been made and
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whatever is found cannot be acted on). An illustrative list of criteria for
assessing candidates for evaluation is presented in Table I.
In many instances, eValuability problems can be alleviated. The evaluability
assessment should be careful not to overreact to apparent hurdles. For exam-
ple, with persistence it is often possible to identify major specific objectives for
TABLE 1 Criteria for Selecting Issues for Program Evaluations
Can the results of the evaluation influence decisions regarding the program?
• Programs for which a decision regarding continuation, modification, or termination need to
be made are obvious candidates.
• Poor candidates are those where decision-makers have strong preconceptions of program
value or where there is considerable support by influential vested interest groups-if these
circumstances make it very unlikely that the program would be altered, regardless of
evaluation findings. (However, in some cases the program may be of such great importance
to a community that government officials may proceed with an evaluation and be prepared
to seek changes despite political risks.)
• Can the evaluation be completed in time to be helpful to decision-makers? Evaluations
which are completed after public officials become committed to a decision are likely to be
useless.
Can the evaluation be done?
• Is the particular innovation sufficiently defined, including both what the innovation is and
its purposes? To what extent are there clear linkages between the innovation and its desired
impacts? Note that it is not necessary that everything about the project be spelled out com-
pletely in advance, but only that they be sufficiently specific so that evaluators \;Quid deter-
mine whether a project actually had been implemented and have enough information to
identify adequate evaluation criteria.
• Are sufficiently reliable and valid data obtainable on important effects of the program?
• Can sufficient resources be obtained to meet the time schedule and technical requirements
of the evaluation?
• Has the program been stable enough so that an evaluation will provide relevant infor-
mation? If the program is constantly changing, or is about to change, in significant ways, it
is not a good candidate for evaluation.
Is the program significant enough to merit the evaluation effort?
• Programs which involve a large amount of resources or those programs which have impor-
tant benefits and possible important negative consequences to the public, should be given
higher evaluation priority. Thus, the likely cost of the evaluation should be compared to the
possible decreased cost or improved effectiveness that could result from evaluation findings.
• Is the program suspected by the government of being marginal in its performance? If so,
there may be opportunities for making major improvements or cost reductions.
Is it a new program whose potential benefits and costs are highly uncertain?
SOURCE: Matry et al. (1973).
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programs that seem vague at first; it is often possible to obtain rough but
adequate impact information about characteristics that at first glance appear to
be too subjective (such as by using structured interviewing of systematic
samples of clients on various aspects of program services); and often even
evaluations conducted over prolonged periods may be useful for decisions in
later years even though they are not useful to the current government
administration.
Proper evaluation requires adequate staff, money, and time, and the evalua-
tion plan clearly needs to be compatible with the resources available. However,
though some corner-cutting and less sophisticated approaches can often be
used when resources are scarce, too many such compromises can weaken an
evaluation to the point where it is not worth doing.
Seldom discussed in the literature is the need to distinguish whether the
program to be evaluated is under development or is operational: Evaluations of
projects in a developmental stage, in general, seek less definite information on
impacts and are likely to be more concerned with determining the
characteristics of the preferred program and its basic feasibility. Ignoring this
distinction appears to have resulted in inappropriate expectations and inap-
propriate evaluation designs in some instances, especially for U.S. federal
agency evaluations. Technology-oriented programs are particularly likely to go
through a formal developmental stage. (Perhaps planning for "human service"
projects should also include both a development and operational test stage,
though this prolongs the period before an innovation is introduced into
operation.)
PITFALL 2 Starting data collection/or the evaluation too early, e.g., prior to
shakedown 0/ the program, and not allowing enough time to assess a stable
operation.
This pitfall is encountered particularly in the evaluation of new programs.
There seems to be a chronic temptation to begin collecting data for evaluation
as soon as the initial attempt at implementation begins. For many new or
revised programs, however, the shakedown period may last many months,
during which program procedures stabilize, new people become adjusted to the
new procedures, and the new program begins to operate under reasonably nor-
mal conditions. Thus, enough time must be allowed before beginning collection
of the post-program data and enough time thereafter for an adequate test of the
new program. Evaluation periods of less than a year, in addition to often not
providing enough program experience, can also be affected by seasonal
differences; for example, tests of a new street repair procedure might not un-
cover the special effects of the bad weather season. The appropriate timing will,
of course, depend on the nature of the program and the setting into which it is
introduced. To illustrate a likely typical timing: A minimum period of perhaps
6 months might be appropriate before the program is assumed to have been im-
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p[emented, and at least I year of subsequent program operation should be
covered by the evaluation.
PITFALL 3 Not planning the evaluation so as to try to help program managers
improve the program in addition to merely measuring its impact.
Some evaluators may not agree that this is a pitfall. Trying to avoid it will
probably require extra effort that could dilute the impact evaluation. It appears,
however, to this author that one of the major obstacles to the undertaking and
use of evaluation is that often too little attention is paid to identifying construc-
tive ways in which programs could be improved. Unfortunately, this is easier
said than done. There are usually a large number of factors, in addition to the
program procedures, that can affect program success. These include such
things as the quantity and quality of the staffing used to operate the program,
the success in motivating the employees who will implement it, and the
organizational structure in which the new program operates. Evaluators often
are in a particularly good position to obtain insights into reasons for problems.
If the evaluators can take advantage of this and act as a constructive force for
program improvement, over the long run the credibility and utility of the
evaluation field will increase, and perhaps the innate hostility of program
managers to being evaluated will be diminished.
PITFALL 4 Expecting too much/rom evaluations and not,from the beginning,
making clear to potential users the likely limitations.
Evaluations of any kind seldom give definitive, conclusive, unambiguous
evidence of program success (or failure). Even with experimental designs, as
will be noted later (see, especially, Pitfalls 5 and 14), there are inevitably
numerous problems in keeping the experiment uncontaminated and, sub-
sequently, in extrapolating and generalizing the results beyond the experimental
scope and time period. The evaluators should be careful to make it clear to
their customers and to potential users of the evaluation findings that such
limitations exist. Unrealistic expectations by customers can cause rapid dis-
iI1usionment with the immediate evaluation, which may discourage future
evaluation support.
PITFALLS DURING EVALUATION
PITFALL 5 Not knowing what the intervention has really been . .. what has
really been implemented.
The best laid plans of evaluators can come a cropper when they are placed
in real-life settings. Particularly for long experimental periods, the chances of
deviation from the original intentions increase. For example, in evaluations of
neighborhood police teams, the assignment of teams to specific neighborhoods
may depart from the plan if dispatchers assign those police officers too
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frequently to other neighborhoods. In some cases, if the program planners and
evaluators watch carefully, such deviations can be corrected, but in other
situations this may not be possible. Another example involves the difficulties of
maintaining random assignment procedures in an experiment when
assignments have to be made throughout the period by personnel other than
the evaluation team. In an experiment to test the effects of requiring
appearances for moving traffic violations before a judge, the court clerk who
had responsibility for the random assignments had firm ideas about the need
for a court appearance for young drivers and did not adhere to the random
assignment procedure (Conner, 1977; other examples are also provided in this
paper). Random assignments of clients in controlled experiments may initially
be done appropriately but may subsequently, under the pressure of heavy
workload, be altered.
Because of such potential problems it is important that the evaluators
carefully monitor the program over the period of the evaluation. At the least,
they should check periodically to ascertain that there have been no major
departures from the plan during implementation. When substantial deviations
occur, adjustments should be made (such as, in effect, beginning a "new"
evaluation if a major overhaul of the program occurs during the evaluation). If
such adjustments cannot be made satisfactorily, and if the changes are of
major importance, the evaluation should be terminated or at least the
alterations should be explicitly considered when assessing the findings.
PITFALL 6 Use of inadequate measures ofprogram effects.
The credibility and usefulness of an evaluation can be called into con-
siderable doubt if inadequate measures are used. Variations of this pitfall in-
clude limiting the assessment to only one criterion or a very few criteria when
others are also relevant (perhaps because a decision is made to evaluate only
those criteria agreed on ahead of time with program officials), and neglecting
possible unintended, sometimes beneficial and sometimes detrimental, con-
sequences of the program. For example, an evaluation of a program for placing
mental patients in their own homes and communities rather than in large
government institutions should consider not only changes in the condition of
the clients but also the effects on clients' families and the community into which
the clients are transferred.
This criterion problem is a well-known one and applies to all systems
analysis; it already has been discussed in an earlier chapter. Its great impor-
tance, however, requires it to be singled out in a discussion of evaluation as
well. Before establishing the final evaluation criteria, evaluators should review
the objectives of the program from the viewpoint of the agency installing the
program and of the clients of the program and should look for significant
effects that were not initially anticipated. The danger that evaluations will be
overly affected by the evaluator's own preferences (see, e.g., Shaver and
I
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Staines, 1972) suggests that evaluators should strive to obtain various perspec-
tives on the objectives (both explicit and implicit) of the program to be
evaluated. For example, opinions might be sought from supporters and op-
ponents, program operators and clients, budget officials and program
managers. (This assumes that evaluators will, in general, have sufficient leeway
from the sponsors of the evaluation to try to be comprehensive.)
An important variation of this pitfall is failure to assess the impact of the
program on the various major client groups. Inevitably, programs have
differing effects on various groups, helping some groups significantly more than
others and, perhaps, harming other groups. Aggregating all groups together
will hide such differences and prevent users of the evaluation findings from con-
sidering equity issues. Evaluators should look for, and report on, any signifi-
cant differential impacts on the various population groups affected by the
program.
Finally, the lack of an assessment of program financial costs can also be an
important omission. Evaluations often neglect costs, but such information can
be of considerable use to public officials.
PITFALL 7 Failure to identify, and adjust for, changes in data collection
procedures that occur between pre- and post-program data collection.
This problem typically occurs when the evaluation depends on data that had
been collected before the evaluation began or when it depends on the use of
existing government records (rather than when both pre- and post-program data
are collected especially for the evaluation). Government data definitions and data
collection procedures change periodically, and such changes can cause important
differences in the meaning of such data. Evaluators using data for which they
themselves have not determined the data collection procedures should be careful
to look for, and adjust for (if they can), such occurrences. As has been noted
(Riecken and Boruch, 1974), "Too often a new program is accompanied by
changes in record-keeping."
PITFALL 8 Letting those whose work is being evaluated, in effect, evaluate
themselves.
This is a well-known pitfall. Nevertheless, there are often temptations to ig-
nore it. Government agencies with tight resources (especially subnational
governments such as state and local governments in the United States) are par-
ticularly tempted. It is desirable for any agency as a matter of good manage-
ment to undertake some internal evaluation of its own programs. For example,
mental health and social service agencies frequently use caseworkers' ratings to
assess the progress of the caseworkers' clients. This procedure is reasonable
when the information is solely for internal purposes, such as for use by the
caseworkers themselves and their immediate supervisors. Such procedures,
however, do not provide data on client improvement after clients have left the
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programs (to determine the longer-term effects of the services), and such
procedures seem to be expecting too much of human nature (asking employees
to provide objective information that will be used to make judgments about
continuation of their own programs).
PITFALL 9 Not lookingfor other plausible explanationsfor the outcomes.
After outcomes have been measured, the key dilemma in program evaluation
is to determine the extent to which the outcomes can be attributed to the
program itself. When controlled-experiment designs are used, this problem is
substantially reduced, though not fully eliminated. For noncontrolled-
experiment design, this problem is of major importance. Inappropriate attribu-
tion is a major pitfall for nonexperimental evaluation designs. A number of
variations of this pitfall have been the subject of frequent discussion in
publications on program evaluation4 :
• Initial conditions may be so extreme that, even without program in-
tervention, a natural shift toward improvement (or deterioration) can be
expected even without the new program (this is sometimes called "regression
toward the mean"). Clients who at the outset have the greatest need (e.g., are in
crisis situations) are likely to show a greater amount of improvement than
others. Conversely, the less needy, most able clients, will tend to show little, no,
or negative improvement, regardless of the program (Conner, 1977). For
example, a program initiated because of a very recent rash of problems [e.g., a
high traffic fatality rate (Campbell and Ross, 1968)] might show an im-
provement merely because the chances of recurrence are small.
• Similarly, in some cases there might be a normal "maturation," in which
the group acted on would improve normally even without program interven-
tion, perhaps because of aging. For example, as criminals, alcoholics, or drug
addicts age, there often appears to be a reduction in their adverse behavior
even without treatment programs. Another example: An evaluation of com-
munity alcoholic treatment centers included a follow-up 18 months after intake
of a sample of persons who had an intake record but for whom only nominal
treatment was provided (Armor et al., 1976). Of this group, 54 percent were
identified as being in remission. Neglecting dropouts from programs aimed at
helping clients can result in overestimating the results of the programs.
• The lack of a comparison group, or the use of an inappropriate com-
parison group, can distort the interpretation of the findings. Even when con-
trolled experiments are not utilized, examining groups that were not the object
of the program can often be helpful in providing evidence about whether the
outcomes were due to the program. Thus, in the classic evaluation of the
Connecticut highway speeding crackdown, the large reduction in fatalities in
Connecticut was compared with other nearby, and presumably similar, states
to see if similar reductions had occurred (Campbell and Ross, 1968). Such
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a comparison helped rule out some other possible causes of reduced fatalities in
Connecticut, such as special weather conditions in the region during the period
or the introduction of safer automobiles.
An example of a situation where the effects of a program would be un-
derstated if no comparison group were considered occurred in a study of the
treatment of arthritis (Boruch, 1976). The study indicated that the severity of
arthritis increased after the introduction of a treatment program. However, in
this case there was a control group. The experiment showed that the control
group's conditions worsened even more than the treated group, indicating that
the treatment program was a success rather than the failure which might
otherwise have been reported.
The example cited earlier, the evaluation of community alcoholism treatment
centers, followed up not only those who received significant amounts of treat-
ment but samples of two comparison groups: (a) persons that had made only
one visit to a treatment center and who received no further treatment and (b)
clients who had received minimal services (usually detoxification) but who then
left the center and never resumed contact (Armor et al., 1976). The evaluators
identified 67 percent of all treated clients as being in remission at the time of an
18-month follow-up. But, as noted above, even the nominal-treatment group
showed a 54 percent remission rate. Thus, it appears possible that a substantial
portion of the remissions in the treatment group might have occurred with only
nominal help. Considering only the treatment group remissions might lead one
to overstate the effects of the treatment.
When comparison groups are used, however, they should be used with con-
siderable care to avoid misinterpretations. If the programs' clients differ from
the comparison group in some potentially critical characteristic (e.g., persons
entering the program may have considerably greater motivation than those
with apparently similar problems who did not enter the program), differences in
impact could be due to that characteristic and not to the program.~ In using
comparison groups (even in controlled experiments), it is important to check
the comparison groups for similarity of key characteristics, where this is possi-
ble. Unfortunately, adequate data are often not available for such comparison
groups. (A further discussion of problems with comparison groups is given in
Edwards et al., 1975.)
• "Hawthorne effects," where receivers of the service (or program per-
sonnel) become aware of the evaluation and act in special ways, can make the
outcomes of the test unrepresentative and nongeneralizable. This applies to
experimental as well as nonexperimental designs.6
• Similarly, program personnel who are handpicked to operate the new
program can make the outcomes of the test unrepresentative and non-
generalizable. Using specially chosen personnel may be appropriate in the
developmental stages of a program, but it is to be avoided when the program is
to be evaluated for its generalizability. For a representative test, personnel of
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the type that would ordinarily be operating the program after the evaluation
period should be used. Otherwise, any observed advantage to the treatment
group might be due to the use of the special personnel.
• Not explicitly considering, and controlling for, "workload/client
difficulty" when assessing the results can lead to misinterpretation of what has
occurred. The difficulty of the incoming workload can cause success (or
failure) rates to be misleading. Higher apparent success rates for programs that
had a mix of clients who were easier to help compared to programs with a
more difficult workload should not be necessarily labeled as being more effec-
tive. Consider the following hypothetical outcomes (Millar et aI., 1977):
High client difficulty
Low client difficulty
Total, sample I
High client difficulty
Low client difficulty
Total, sample 2
Total Cases
400
100
500
100
400
500
Number and Percentage
of Cases in Which
Dependency Was Reduced
100( 25%)
100 (100%)
200 (40%)
o( ()o;6)
300 (75%)
300 (6()o;6)
Based on the totals alone, the results for the second sample appear superior
because success was achieved in 60 percent of the cases as contrasted with 40
percent for the first sample. Sample I, however, shows a higher success rate for
both "high-difficulty" clients (25 percent, compared to 0 percent for sample 2)
and for "low-difficulty" clients (100 percent, compared to 75 percent for
sample 2). The overall higher success rate for the second sample stems from its
having a large proportion of clients with low difficulty.
Thus the difficulty of the incoming workload can, on occasion, be a major
explanation for observed effects. In controlled experiments, even if workload
difficulty is not explicitly controlled in making random assignments (such as by
stratifying the sample), randomization would likely result in assigning similar
proportions to each of the groups. Nevertheless, the control and treated groups
should be examined after they are chosen to determine if they are indeed
sufficiently similar on "difficulty."
• When applying statistical analysis, correlations can be mistakenly
assumed to represent causality. For example, a regression analysis might in-
dicate that lower performance is positively correlated with the amount of
tutoring received. Concluding that tutoring has a negative effect on perfor-
mance would, of course, overlook the possibility that those requiring the most
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tutoring would likely be substantially poorer performers to begin with; their
subsequent performance, though higher than before, might still not reach the
levels of brighter pupils.
• In general, not explicitly looking for other plausible explanations for
observed differences in effects-for a wide variety of possible circumstances or
factors can cause unrepresentative and misleading findings-is a pitfall.
Another example: Changes in employment status of persons given training
programs might occur because of improved general economic conditions, even
in the absence of the training programs (Boruch, 1976). (If control groups are
used. the evaluation should be able to detect advantages of the training
program that occur despite these changing external conditions.)
PITFALL to Various pitfalls in undertaking sample surveys.
A frequently used procedure in evaluations is to survey samples of program
clients or comparison groups to obtain needed feedback about certain aspects
of the program. Because of its importance as a program evaluation procedure,
some of its major pitfalls are briefly listed below.7
Unclear, misleading, or biased wording of the questions asked of
respondents.
Poor interviewers or interviewing procedures.
Lack of pretesting of the question wording and the order of questions,
followed by correction of any difficulties found during the pretest.
Inadequate sample selection, such as sampling in a way that omits or under-
samples a key group (such as persons without telephones, those with unlisted
telephone numbers, those living in trailers, or those living in multiple dwelling
units when the list from which the sample is drawn includes only individual
structures and not the individual units in each structure).
Inadequate number of callbacks, so that those persons not generally at home
are not heard from. A variation of this is not providing for interviews at various
times throughout the week, so that persons that tend not to be home during
certain hours (for example, during the day) are systematically excluded from
the sample.
Too many persons in the sample who cannot be located or too many
refusals, leading to low completion rates. (This is particularly a problem when
mail surveys are used, especially those without provision for follow-up of non-
respondents-but it applies to all modes of interviewing. Mail return percen-
tages are typically about 25 percent or less; in such cases, even though the
number of mail returns may be quite large, the results cannot be said to be
representative of the population and therefore are not reliable for deriving
generalizations about the population.)
PITFALL II Collecting too much data and not allowing adequate time for
analysis of the data collected.
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These two problems go hand in hand. They are all too prevalent when tight
timetables exist for evaluations-as usually seems to be the case. The tempta-
tion seems to be prevalent to collect data on any characteristic of the client or
situation that conceivably could be relevant, and then not allow enough time
for analysis of the data. The temptation to collect data is a difficult one to over-
come, particularly since in evaluations it is often difficult at the beginning to
know which data will be of importance in the study. The argument is often ad-
vanced that you can always exclude data later. However, once collected, data
pile up and this has a pyramiding effect in terms of data processing and
analysis effort (as well as adding to the costs of data collection).
A particularly good place for restraint is the interview questionnaire. It
seems common that the questionnaire becomes longer and longer as those on
the evaluation team think more and more about what information should be
collected. Suggestions for questions should have to be justified by identifying
the use to which the answers to each question would be put and the likelihood
that the information obtained will shed light on relevant hypotheses. Allowing
enough time for data analysis is complicated by the tendency to impose overly
tight deadlines for evaluations. When implementation difficulties delay the start
of the program, when data comes in later than anticipated, and when computer
processing is later than promised, these all lead to squeezing the amount of
time available for analysis before the deadline for the evaluation. Better
scheduling to allow for unforeseen contingencies and the inclusion of fewer
data to be processed will help alleviate these problems.
PITFALLS AFTER DATA COLLECTION AND INITIAL ANALYSIS
PITFALL 12 Overdependence on statistical significance. particularly at the
expense ofpractical significance.
Too narrow a focus on too much precision and too much reliance on
statistical significance can lead to excessive costs in resource allocation (such
as by encouraging the use of larger samples than needed at the expense of other
evaluation tasks) and to misleading findings. Statistical significance levels at the
95-99 percent significance levels will often be overkill for programs other than
those that involve important safety or health elements. Typically, the informa-
tion involved in evaluations and other factors involved in making program
decisions is not precise, and for most government decisions precision is not
needed. "It doesn't pay to lavish time and money on being extremely precise in
one feature if this is out of proportion with the exactness of the rest" (Herzog,
1959). Even if lower significance levels are used (90 percent and even 80
percent), the use of statistical significance as the only criterion for detecting
differences can be misleading to officials using the information. What may be a
statistically significant difference (at a given significance level) can, particularly
where very large samples are involved, suggest that there are important
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differences, although the differences may be small in practical terms and may
be unimportant to most public officials. With large sample sizes, differences of
even two or three percentage points between the outcomes ofthe treatment and
comparison groups can be statistically significant, but they may often not be
significant to officials making decisions based on that information.
A good practice is to present both the actual differences and the level of
statistical significance, so that users of the information can judge for
themselves. All too often, summaries of findings indicate whether findings are
statisticalJy significant without indicating the actual amount of the differences.
PITFALL 13 Focusing only on the overall (average) results and not con-
sidering the component effects.
Examination of the aggregate data is, of course, useful for assessing the
program's aggregate effect. However, in general, the analysis should not be
limited to the aggregate effects. It may often be more useful to examine subsets
of the data. For example, when a number of different projects are included in
the evaluation, the evaluators should consider whether certain projects or
groups of projects tended to have greater effects than others. Variations in con-
ditions among projects are likely, and an examination may be able to shed light
on possible reasons for variations, possibly suggesting variations that should be
considered further even though the overall program does not appear successful.
As another example, some types of clients served by the program may be more
(or less) successfully served than others, even though such differences were not
anticipated in the original evaluation design. Therefore, in general, the
evaluators should examine various subgroups to detect whether there may be
groups that were substantialJy better (or worse) served than indicated by the
aggregate figures. For example, a particular type of program may work welJ
with more severe cases than with less severe cases, or with older clients than
with younger clients, or with female clients rather than male clients.
Sometimes, samples to be folJowed up in the evaluation may be stratified at the
beginning to ensure adequate consideration of different characteristics. If this is
not done, an after-the-fact analysis of outcomes for various types of client
would need to be undertaken.
PITFALL 14 Overly generalizing (extrapolating) the results beyond the
evaluation.
Even when the evaluation is welJ done and very well controlled, there are
numerous pitfalJs in trying to generalize results to future, possibly more
widespread, usage. "Too many social scientists expect single experiments to
settle issues once and for all" (Campbell, 1969). "The particular sample from
which control and experimental group members are drawn ... may be idiosyn-
cratic in that other potential target populations are not represented. If the con-
ditions ... in the experiment ... differ markedly from conditions which prevail
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in other populations, then it is reasonable to believe that additional testing of
the program is required ..." (Riecken and Boruch, 1974). There are several
variations of this pitfall; recognizing them should temper statements about the
generalizability of findings:
• The trial's results may in effect represent only one sample point-that is,
one trial under one set of conditions. Replication may be needed in other sites,
and at other times, before one can state with confidence the general effec-
tiveness of the program. Of course, to the extent that the initial trial covers a
variety of sites and the evaluation is of a program that covers the entire target
population, this will be of less concern. Often, however, there will be limitations
on the size and coverage of the trial. Not all locations, not all potential client
groups, not all other potentially important conditions are likely to be covered.
Such limitations of the evaluation should be clearly stated in the findings. An
example: The New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive experiment examined
only one type of geographical location-the U.S. urban East Coast-it
covered only male-headed households, and it varied only the level of income
guaranteed and the tax rate (Roos, 1975). The findings' applicability to other
conditions would need to be judged accordingly. Another example: If a test of
a new street-patching material happens to be undertaken during a year with an
unusually low amount of rain, the validity of the findings would be in question
for periods of normal rainfall.
• A special variation of this overgeneralizing pitfall can occur when explicit
or implicit statements are made about the particular characteristics of the in-
tervention that caused the observed impacts. This problem arises particularly
where only one site (and one set of program intervention characteristics) is
used in the trial of the program. As discussed under Pitfall 5, it is vital that
evaluators know what was actually implemented and that they be alert for
features of the trial that appear to be significant in the program's apparent
success or lack of it, even though they were not initially intended to be tested
during the trial. For example, in evaluations of the effectiveness of social ser-
vice casework, such characteristics as the particular technique used, the
caseworker's personality, the amount of time spent with the client, and the
caseworker's style could all affect the outcomes (Fischer, 1976). Unless the
evaluation procedures in some way attempted to isolate these characteristics in
the test, the evaluators would be unable to generalize about the extent to which
these characteristics affect the outcomes. They would not be able to state
whether, for example, apparent successes (or failures) were the result of the
techniques used or the caseworkers' style and personality. This might be less of
a problem if a large number of sites and many different caseworkers were in-
volved in the test. Otherwise there would be substantial ambiguity about what
was driving the observed outcomes and what should be done about the
program. The conclusion might be reached that casework is (or is not) effec-
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tive, whereas what was actually evaluated was only one combination of
casework and caseworker characteristics.
• Behavior may change when the novelty of a new program wears off (for
either program operators or their clients). And client behavior may alter from
that in trials undertaken on only part of the population when the program is es-
tablished so that everyone can receive the program. For example, a program to
determine the effects of the use of group homes rather than large institutions for
caring for children with juvenile delinquency records might be tested in one or
two locations. The findings might not be representative of other settings if the
program were expanded-for example, citizens might become antagonistic to a
large number of homes in their community. (This is especially likely to happen
if the locations are chosen because of the communities' willingness to test the
group homes.)
• Some groups may turn out not to have been covered by the test. In some
instances, this may have been part of the test plan. In others it may be uninten-
tional. The evaluators should determine which types of clients were included
and which were not. They should avoid attributing observed effects to those not
covered in the test unless a logical case can be made for it. Many tests will not
be able to cover all the major target groups that were initially intended for
coverage and that are intended to be covered by the program after it goes into
fun-scale operation. If this is found to be the case, the findings should be
qualified. The New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive experiment, as noted
earlier, was limited to male-headed households and those located in only one
geographical location.
PITFALL 15 Not permitting program personnel to review the findings before
finalization and promulgation.
Permitting program personnel to review the findings before promulgation is
generally a matter of courtesy and good practice. It also, however, has an im-
portant technical purpose: it will provide a review of the data and the findings
from a different perspective. This practice appears to be regularly followed by
audit agencies in the United States, but it seems to be less common in special
evaluations undertaken by administrative agencies. Program people may be
aware of situations and factors that the evaluators have missed, and they can
often add considerable insight into the interpretations of the data, sometimes
identifying misinterpretations and misunderstandings by the evaluators. Even
when program managers are defensive and hostile, they may offer comments
that will indicate that the evaluators have indeed made misinterpretations or
even errors that should be corrected. In one evaluation in which the author was
involved, drug treatment program personnel reviewing the draft report pointed
out to the evaluation team that an important group of program clients had
been left out of the evaluation-requiring the evaluators to follow up what
would otherwise have been a neglected group of clients. Finally, the opportuni-
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ty to suggest modifications may reduce defensiveness by program personnel,
thereby encouraging subsequent implementation of recommendations based on
the evaluation findings.
PITFALL 16 Not indicating the assumptions, uncertainties. and other limita-
tions ofthe evaluation when presenting thefindings.
For example, limitations of the evaluation criteria used, especially those that
may have been identified too late during the process of evaluation, and
limitations of the measuring instruments should be made clear. The amount of
uncertainty in the findings should be identified not only when statistical
analysis is used. but in other instances as wel1. Information about the magnitude
of uncertainty should be presented, even if only in the form of the evaluators'
subjective judgments.
PITFALL 17 Not separating facts from opinion.
In presenting the findings of an evaluation, whether orally or in wntmg,
evaluators should be careful to distinguish those elements that are opinions
from those that are based on objective findings and objective information. (This
pitfall, of course, applies to any form of systems analysis, including program
evaluation.) It is easy for users of evaluation reports to be misled about the
nature of the supporting evidence for findings, especial1y when a series of find-
ings is provided.
This caveat also applies to recommendations: the basis of each recommen-
dation, indicating whether it is based on strong evidence or not, should be iden-
tified. Also, when evaluators attempt to provide insights into why programs are
not as effective as they might be and then provide recommendations to improve
the program, there is a tendency not to distinguish those recommendations
which follow from the major technical examination from those recommen-
dations that have emerged from the more subjective, qualitative insights the
evaluators obtained during the technical evaluation. Under Pitfal1 3, providing
insights into reasons for program problems was encouraged. Preferably, such
insights would be obtained through special technical analyses. However, even
where these are obtained through more qualitative means, it is important that
the basis of the evidence be clearly presented.
PITFALL 18 Poor presentation of findings. so that potential users cannot
readily understand them.
As discussed in the chapter on communications, this tends to be a chronic
problem with analysts. Program evaluation findings, whether presented oral1y
or in writing, should be clear, concise, and intelligible to the mix of users for
whom the report is intended. This should not, however, be used as an excuse
for not providing adequate technical backup (documentation) for findings. The
technical evidence should be made available in writing, either in the body of the
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text, in appendixes, or in a separate volume, so that technical staffs of the
various report users and other reviewers can have the opportunity to examine
for themselves the technical basis of the findings.
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NOTES
I. For those who are not. references such as the following are suggested to obtain details on
program evaluation: Campbell and Stanley (1966), Glaser (1973), Hatry et al. (1973), Her-
zog (1959), Riecken and Boruch (1974), Suchman (1967), Weiss (I 972a, I972b), Wholey et
al. (1970).
2. The groups might be groups of people, groups of locations, or even groups of equipment (for
example, when a new type of vehicle-mounted device is being compared against the existing
device). In practice, pure random assignment often is not possible nor appropriate and has to
be approximated. (See, for example, Riecken and Boruch, 1974).
3. Two illustrations of noncontrolled experiment evaluations are the evaluation of impacts of
community alcoholism treatment centers (David J. Armor et al., Alcoholism and Treatment
(California: The Rand Corporation, June 1976) and the evaluation of automatic vehicle
monitoring equipment systems for police use (Richard C. Larson et al., "Evaluating a Police-
Implemented AVM System: The St. Louis Experience (Phase I)" IEEE Transactions on
Vehicular Technology, February 1977, pp. 60-70. The first evaluation illustrates what can be
done for a "human service" oriented program; the second for a technology-oriented
innovation.
4. For example, discussions of such circumstances (sometimes referred to as "threats to
validity") are included in Campbell (1969), Campbell and Stanley (1966), Bernstein et al.
(1975), Nunnally and Wilson (1975) and Fischer (1976). Not all of the threats to validity
listed in these references have been included here. The list that follows has been selected to
highlight those believed most relevant for a discussion of "pitfalls."
5. Programs whose procedures are such that the clients determine for themselves whether they
will enter a program (and no provision is made for random assignment from this particular
group) raise the question of whether the added motivation is an important characteristic in
determining program success; highly motivated persons might be able to achieve more
progress than others even without the program. Volunteers for experiments tend to be more
innovative or self-confident than the average eligible participant. See Hamrin (1974).
6. However, this particular problem does not apply to some types of evaluations. As Roos
(1975) points out, if the evaluation is retrospective, not requiring new data to be collected, the
trial cannot be affected by the evaluation effort.
7. There are numerous references that discuss survey procedures in greater detail. For example,
see Abramson (1974), Earl R. Babbie (1973), Campbell et al. (1969), Duckworth (1973),
Levy (1972), Survey Research Center (1976), Webb and Hatry (1973), and Weiss and
Hatry (1971). In addition, the Public Opinion Quarterly frequently contains articles on the
problems of surveys. The U.S. National Center for Health Statistics Series 2 reports (on "data
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evaluation and methods research") provide occasional studies on the problems of survey
research, among them Gleeson (1972).
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11 The Pitfalls of Language, orAnalysis through the Looking-Glass
Kathleen A. Archibald
He who does not expect the unexpected will not detect it.
HERACLITUS, B 18.'
Majone reminds us in his introductory paper that policy analysis deals largely
with intellectual constructs rather than physical phenomena. We start from
words, we work with words, we report in words-or to be more exact, in words
and other symbols.
Pitfalls in verbal communication are, in Hogben's view,
due to [the] inadequacy of many words we use to fulfill their ostensible function as
signals, i.e. as meaningful symbols. To speak here of symbols, uttered or written, as
meaningful, signifies that the recipient (listener or reader) can decode the message of
the transmitter (speaker or writer) in terms consistent with the intention of the latter, a
proceeding which would entail no hazards if each of the words we use had only one
meaning in a particular context. This is probably true of no natural language.1
Policy analysts use a natural language with bits and pieces from a variety of
more specialized languages added This addition of concepts and technical
terms from a variety of disciplines is intended to avoid some of the pitfalls
Hogben refers to by introducing words that have a single, specified meaning in
a particular context, that is, univocality in context. This does not always work,
however, even when careful definitions of the terms introduced are provided,
because the meaning of a word often depends on more than the immediate con-
text in which it appears. Words have long roots. When transplanted from the
neat, well-tended garden of one discipline to the communal plot of policy
analysis, large chunks of the root system are likely to be left behind.
These problems are exacerbated when work must be translated from one
natural language into another. There are few translators familiar with the
polyglot nomenclature of policy analysis. The first time an article of mine was
translated into a language foreign to me, I was sent a copy of the translation to
• As translated from Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I, 1960, by Karl R. Popper.
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check. I then had to find another translator to translate the Spanish words back
into English-like the White King in Through the Looking-Glass, who needed
two messengers, one to fetch and one to carry.2 The English words my
translator fetched for me from the Spanish conveyed at many points meanings
my original words were never meant to carry. As I remember, Lindblom's
"disjointed incrementalism" underwent the most peculiar transformation. (On
top of this, or perhaps on its bottom since it is a pitfall, the journal published
the piece before receiving the corrections we so laboriously worked out.) I now
circumvent such pitfalls in transmission by assuming it's the recipient's
problem.
To avoid pitfalls when I myself am the recipient of translated work, I mostly
pray. A dictionary is not of much help. It is difficult to know you are trapped in
a bad translation while you are trapped. Only when a good translator comes
along and sets you free can you see the pitfall. The most stunning example of
this I have come across is in Shapiro's translation of Habermas' Knowledge
and Human Interests. In a translator's note Shapiro explains:
The official translation of Freud's concepts das fcll and das Es as the ego and the id
was a serious mistake that both reflects and has contributed to the scientistic self-
misunderstanding of metapsychology. Das /cit means the I and das Es the it. That is,
they refer to the antithesis between reflexive, personal subjectivity and reified, imper-
sonal objectivity. Freud's famous statement of the goal of psychoanalysis "Wo Es war,
soli Ich werden," should read in English, "Where it was, I shall become," or perhaps,
"Where it-ness was, I-ness shall come into being." The choice of scientific Latin to
render these terms in English reifies the I into an object by making it into an "ego,"
which is not the word used to express reflexivity, self-consciousness, and agency in
English. As an "ego," the I is already an it, and the qualitative distinction between I
and it is not visible in comparing the terms ego and id. At the same time, this scientistic
terminology obscures the connection between the models of reflection of psy-
choanalysis and German Idealism. All this notwithstanding, the weight of recent tradi-
tion has made it seem advisable to retain "ego" and "id" in this translation.)
"The weight of recent tradition" that leaves us with ego and id weighs heavi-
lyon policy analysis too. Quade has written:
Because the term "policy analysis" does not imply anything about quality, rigor, or
comprehensiveness, but merely the purpose and the context of the work, it may seem
desirable to adopt a new name for the type of analysis that incorporates the im-
provements we call for. But we have too many qualifying terms already and another
would simply add confusion. Hence, we continue to use the term policy analysis.4
The qualifying terms that have been put in front of analysis include systems,
systematic, and applied systems. "Analysis" remains the one constant symbol
in the name. This is the one we are stuck with by weight of recent tradition. The
adjectives come and go and multiply, but analysis carries on. There have been
contenders-the systems approach, policy sciences-but they have not caught
on. "Analysis" has staying power, and that's a useful quality when it comes to
names, but is it an appropriate name?
lSI
WHAT'S IN A NAME?
It was on her journey by train through Queen's 3d (Through the Looking-
Glass is, among other things, a chess problem) that Alice first met the Gnat.
On the train it is the size one would expect a gnat to be, but when the train
jumps a brook and Alice finds herself sitting quietly under a tree, she is being
fanned by the wings of "a very large Gnat." Not one hundred feet tall like
Carlos Castaneda's Gnat,' but big: "'About the size of a chicken' Alice
thought." She didn't feel nervous with it because they had been talking together
on the train. The Gnat, however, is a little nervous about Alice's attitudes:
"-then you don't like all insects?" the Gnat went on, as quietly as if nothing had
happened.
"I like them when they can talk," Alice said. "None of them ever talk, where I come
from."
"What sort of insects do you rejoice in, where you come from?" the Gnat inquired.
"I don't rejoice in insects at all," Alice explained, "because I'm rather afraid of
them-at least the large kinds. But I can tell you the names of some of them."
"Of course they answer to their names?" the Gnat remarked carelessly.
"I never knew them do it."
"What's the use of their having names," the Gnat said, "if they wo'n't answer to
them?"
"No use to them," said Alice; "but it's useful to the people that name them, I sup-
pose. If not, why do things have names at all?"
"ea'n't say," the Gnat replied.6
Since Analysis does not answer to her name, it is reasonable to ask what it is
about her name that might be useful to the people who call her that. Our opin-
ion of what "analysis" is, of what the word may mean, is formed from all our
past encounters with the word. If we have not met the word before, or have not
been properly introduced, we may turn to a dictionary. Webster's New
Collegiate gives seven meanings for "analysis," the first two of which are
generally applicable.
I. separation of a whole into its component parts; 2a: an examination of a complex, its
elements, and their relations; b: a statement of such an analysis.
Other definitions apply to specialized fields.
"Systems analysis" is included in the dictionary, and "systems analyst" is
even included as a synonymous cross-reference under "analyst"-the field has
come of age! Here's how the craft is introduced to a collegiate newcomer:
the act, process or profession of studying an activity (as a procedure, a business, or a
physiological function) typically by mathematical means in order to define its goals or
purposes and to discover operations and procedures for accomplishing them most
efficiently. [Emphasis added.]
The "typically by mathematical means" is a characterization that Rand-style
systems analysts have been trying to establish some distance from, at least
since the early 1960s. Quade, in Analysis for Military Decisions, distinguished
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systems analysis from operations research by pointing out that the broader
problems it dealt with were not susceptible to the precise formalism and full
quantification that operations research was striving for as a hopefully nascent
branch of mathematics. In systems analysis, economics had become almost in-
dispensable, and other more qualitative social sciences were making significant
contributions.'
In the 1968 Systems Analysis and Policy Planning, systems analysis was
loosened up another notch. Quade explained that it is broader than "the
application of quantitative economic analysis and scientific methods to such
matters as weapon design and the determination of force composition and
deployment." He went on to say systems analysis is not "a method," not "a set
of techniques," and not "a type of report" It is
a research strategy, a perspective on the proper use of the available tools, a practical
philosophy of how best to aid a decisionmaker with complex problems of choice under
uncertainty. In the absence of a good brief definition, systems analysis, as the term is
intended to be understood in this book, can be characterized as a systematic approach
to helping a decisionmaker choose a course of action by investigating his fu II problem.
searching out objectives and alternatives, and comparing them in the light of their con-
sequences, using an appropriate framework-in so far as possible ana(vtic-to bring
expert judgment and intuition to bear on the problem.s
Quade's most recent book, Analysis for Public Decisions (1975), is about
policy analysis, a term that is likely to be used, he says, rather than systems
analysis "when political and social factors predominate."9 Policy analysis is in-
troduced as one among several functional substitutes for the market
mechanism: what "the market does for business in areas where competition is
relatively free",t° elections, press criticism, scholarly critics, public scandals,
and analysis can do for government. Thus the company Analysis keeps
appears to change with her first name. Also the way she is defined.
We have a looser, analogical introduction now-as is meet and proper in in-
troducing ANA (from Greek '~va-, meaning up, back, or again) LYSIS (from
Greek AVELV, to loose, set free)lI-and a wider definition:
In a broad sense policy ana(vsis may be defined as any type of ana(vsis that generates
and presents information in such a way as to improve the basis for policy-makers to
exercise their judgment. ... In policy analysis, the word analysis is used in its most
general sense; it implies the use of intuition and judgment and encompasses not only
the examination of policy by decomposition into its components but also the design
and synthesis of new alternatives.u
Now this is a loosening up. Analysis implies the use of intuition and encom-
passes design and synthesis. Analysis is often thought to be related to the an-
tonyms of intuition: information, elaboration, induction, experience.13 And syn-
thesis is an out-and-out antonym for analysis, in its everyday sense-"the
composition or combination of parts or elements so as to form a whole"
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(Webster's)-and in its philosophical sense. Quade here has analysis become
so capacious that it now encompasses its antonym, synthesis.
Majone takes a tack similar to Quade's. He has analysis as a weak sister to
science, suffering "from the same limitations . . . without sharing [its]
strengths." He goes on to suggest that "the references to science that figure so
prominently, for instance, in the official definitions of operations research are
not so much methodological indications as they are ideological props." Their
latent function is "to increase the coUective confidence of a group of new dis-
ciplines striving for academic and social recognition."14
"Don't stand chattering to yourself like that," Operations Research said, looking at
her for the first time, "but tell me your name and your business."
"My name is Analysis, but ---"
"It's a stupid name enough!" Operations Research interrupted impatiently. "What
does it mean?"
"Must a name mean something?" Analysis asked doubtfully.
"Of course it must," Operations Research said with a short laugh: "my name means
the shape 1 am-and a good scientific shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you
might be any shape almost."B
Majone, in suggesting why problems of implementation still give us so much
difficulty, points to "the excessive reliance ofmany analysts on normative deci-
sion models and the pure logic of choice, on analysis rather than synthesis and
design."16 If the reliance of analysts on analysis is a fallacy, then the pitfalls of
analysis perhaps include the pitfalls of Analysis, the name.
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument'," Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different
things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."17
Humpty Dumpty's question can be taken in several ways. The question is
turned into "a known fact by linguists" by one commentator on Carroll.
"When new words or usages are introduced into a language, their continued
use often depends on the status of the individual or group introducing them.
One can use words as he likes, but if his usage is to be of significance, it must
be accepted by others. Consequently, he must, in his linguistic usage, be the
master."18 But Humpty Dumpty said "which is to be master" not who,
suggesting the issue is whether words shall be the master or the persons using
them.
PitfalIs in language derive from a lack of mastery in this latter sense. In
calling our craft Analysis, have we put ourselves on a pitfalI-strewn path?
184
LANGUAGE AND PROBLEM SOLVING
What is meant by "analysis" has undeniably changed over the 3D-odd years
since Rand started doing something called "systems analysis." The obeisance
to mathematics and to science has decreased considerably. But honor is still
paid to being as analytic, as systematic, and as objective as possible. And the
embracing of intuition has a strangely ambivalent quality, considering that
many in the field are presumably familiar with the feats of intuition in
mathematics, logic, and science.19
"INTUITION" AS AN EXAMPLE
Quade mentions intuition frequently and defines analysis, in Analysis for
Public Decisions, as implying intuition. His treatment of it, however, is under
"Alternative Sources of Advice." It is brief and ambivalent.
One [alternative) is pure intuition, with or without divine guidance. The intuitive
process is to learn everything possible about the problem, to live with it, and let the sub-
conscious provide the solution. This approach can in no sense be considered analytic
because no effort is made to structure the problem or to establish cause-and-effect
relationships and operate on them to arrive at a solution. But one may use help; read
tea leaves or inspect the entrails of sheep as the Romans did, or even support intuition
with analysis. Later we shall see that analysis must be supported by intuition.
Between pure intuition on the one hand and policy analysis on the other, there are in-
termediate sources of advice that are at least partially analytic, although the activities
involved are ordinarily less systematic, explicit, and quantitative.20
This is a friend of intuition speaking, but one might not suspect it without being
told.
What is characteristic of intuition is that there is no evident step-by-step
process of reasoning involved (the conscious, systematic steps come later, to
test the soundness of the intuition and to put it in communicable form). There
may not even be symbols involved in the critical flash of insight; Einstein said
his theory of relativity came to him first as a kinesthetic feeling. To say that
"no effort is made to structure the problem" is a little off. Intuition often
provides the idea of how to structure a problem that does not fit standard
molds and only after considerable time has been spent struggling with
structuring.21
My intent is not to criticize Quade's treatment per se; he gives more atten-
tion to intuition than most authors. I wish rather to indicate the awkwardness
and ambivalence surrounding the concept of intuition and to suggest that this is
perhaps to be expected among persons who identify themselves as "analysts"
and rejoice in the systematic, the explicit, the quantitative, and the objective.
A craftsman who rejoiced in intuition might well cultivate devices that from
an analytic perspective look a lot like pitfalls. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, the
Oxford mathematician and logician who told the Alice stories, originally
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extempore to Alice Liddell, could be said to have falIen into a pitfall when, "in
a desperate attempt to strike out some new line of fairy-lore, I had sent my
heroine straight down a rabbit-hole, to begin with, without the least idea what
was to happen afterwards."22 Dodgson, or Lewis CarrolI, put himself in a
situation where he had to run, or rave, on pure intuition.
The rabbit-hole as an extemporaneous device is a pitfalI if and only if you
want to plan ahead systematicalIy and thus avoid saying whatever comes into
your head. If you want to stay close to pure intuition, on the other hand, find a
figurative rabbit-hole and jump in. Find a scenario that permits you to expect
only the unexpected.
One of the interesting things about the Alice tales, for those unfamiliar with
them, is that they show CarrolI to have been a better mathematician and logi-
cian than Dodgson.23 Thus they show the strengths of pure intuition or active
imagination.
I am not saying that policy analysts are against intuition; it is part of the
common wisdom that we are dependent on intuition. Hitch has said:
It is utterly wrong to look upon intuition and analysis . .. as rivals or alternatives.
Properly used, they complement each other. We have seen that every systems analysis
is shot through with intuition and judgment.
But Hitch introduced his discussion of intuition, as did Quade, by referring to it
as an alternative: "Concentrating on the second word 'analysis,' the alternative
is, I suppose, intuition."
The problem is, I suggest, one of language. Analysis and intuition are in one
sense opposites. To be analytic is to not be intuitive. People who calI
themselves designers recognize intuition and analysis as different phases in the
design process. People who calI themselves analysts, to be consistent, must
consider alI of what they do as analysis. So intuition and design come to be
considered as aspects of analysis. Semantic confusion follows: in the space of
three pages, Hitch says intuition is and is not an alternative to analysis, is a
complement of analysis, and "is a species of logical analysis."24
This ambivalence and ambiguity surrounding intuition is not peculiar to
systems analysis or policy analysis. It is shared by other fields that value both
systematic reasoning and creativity. Popper has said of science:
Intuition undoubtedly plays a great part in the life of a scientist, just as it does in the life
of a poet. It leads him to his discoveries. But it may also lead him to his failures. And if
always remains his private affair, as it were. Science does not ask how he has got his
ideas, it is only interested in arguments that can be tested by everybody.B
To the extent that our focus on analysis puts intuition out of focus, blurs our
appreciation of it, and makes it a "private affair," we can expect to have more
difficulties with the creative aspects of our work-problem-setting and
program design, for instance-than might otherwise be the case. A major
difference between those who calI themselves designers and those who calI
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themselves analysts is that the former do not relegate intuition solely to the
realm of the private. They are interested in devices, like Carroll's rabbit-hole,
that invite a group of problem-solvers to exercise their intuition jointly. The
connections underlying an intuition may be nonevident; nevertheless, persons
working together in the intuitive mode often stimulate each other.26
Hitch concludes the piece from which I have quoted by saying that systems
analysis provides a framework that permits the intuitive judgments of experts
in many fields to be combined. 27 This is all to the good as long as we do not
confuse this framework with those devices that facilitate intuition, devices that
often purposely turn away from the actual problem being considered.
LANGUAGE CREATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING
Anatol Holt has argued that "language creation" and problem-solving are in-
dissoluble activities" and that this indissolubility hampers the adaptive capacity
of advanced technological societies. His statements were made at a conference
organized by Gregory Bateson on "The Effects of Conscious Purpose on
Human Adaptation."
"We have depended through history," [Holt said], "on a beautifully subtle method, you
might say, of semantic and formal drift in our symbolic apparatus.... The semantics
gradually slip, old meanings decay [and new ones growl and the formal ap-
paratus~nly very gradually and sufficiently slowly-changes. Well, now of course,
the investments in certain symbolic structures have become enormous; our symbolic
methods have become embodied in enormous technological complexes."
"Therefore, hard-programmed," Gregory [Bateson] put in.
"Therefore very difficult to change."28
On the heels of this interchange, Bateson explains his use of the term
"consciousness" :
that which is easily communicable between persons, especially by language, and faces
certain filtering operations or something of the kind, which cut out many attributes of
[the sea of mind]' It was that subtraction that I felt needed discussion. 29
The author of the volume, the linguist Mary Catherine Bateson, then inserts a
segment from her father's earlier writing to clarify further his view of
consciousness.
A peculiar sociological phenomenon has arisen in the last one hundred years, which
perhaps threatens to isolate conscious purpose from many corrective processes that
might come out of less conscious parts of the mind. The social scene is nowadays
characterized by the existence of a large number of self-maximizing entities, which, in
law, have something like the status of "persons"-trusts, companies, political parties,
unions, commercial and financial agencies, nations, and the like. In biological fact,
these entities are precisely not persons and are not even aggregates of whole persons.
They are aggregates of parts of persons. When Mr. Smith enters the boardroom of his
company, he is expected to limit his thinking narrowly to the specific purposes of the
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company or to those of that part of the company which he "represents." Mercifully it is
not entirely possible for him to do this, and some company decisions are influenced by
considerations that spring from older and wiser parts of the mind. But ideally, Mr.
Smith is expected to act as a pure, uncorrected consciousness-a dehumanized
creature.30
I return now to Holt's idea of hard-programming of significant parts of our
symbolic apparatus via their embodiment in interlocking technological com-
plexes. Science and technology, and large formal organizations as well, thrive
on symbols that are univocal-"the reduction of meaning to a single
meaning."3! I would go further and say that our culture, what may be called
Western industrial culture, favors univocality. It is, more often than not, set up
as the ideal we should strive for in our communications.
A common response to a disagreement entangled with the use of words is
"It's only semantics." What is? And why is "semantics" qualified by only?
The presupposition underlying this is that there exists one meaning you are
both focusing on and if you could but agree on a suitable name for this one
meaning, then there would be no disagreement about it. Meaning, in this view,
is a simple thing that exists "out there." Not only can be expressed univocally,
but it is best expressed univocally. Or as Hogben put it in the quotation I
opened with, from a chapter entitled "Semantics in Overalls" from his Mother
Tongue, here given in extended form:
The keyword of the title of this chapter comes from a Greek one which signifies a sign,
whence signal as in semaphore. Today, it most usually refers to the recognition ofpit-
falls of verbal communication due to [the} inadequacy of many words we use to fulfill
their ostensible function as signals, Le. as meaningful symbols. To speak here of sym-
bols, uttered or written, as meaningful, signifies that the recipient (listener or reader)
can decode the message of the transmitter (speaker or writer) in terms consistent with
the intention of the latter, a proceeding which would entail no hazards if each of the
words we use had only one meaning in a particular context. This is probably true of no
natural language.32
As a craft that uses words, we need some "semantics in overalls," that is, a
certain set of signals with univocal meanings. The title of this volume, however,
is not phrased in such a working language. I have demonstrated that "analysis"
is far from univocal. It not only has a plurality of meanings (plurivocality) so
diverse as to include its opposites; it is also defined analogically. This puts
"analysis" way out of the league of univocality.
"Pitfalls" was evidently out there to start with. Univocal meaning is literal
meaning and this volume is surely not about literal pitfalls-"pitl sl flimsily
covered or camouflaged and used to capture and hold animals or men." A pit-
fall of analysis is a figurative pitfall-"a hidden or not easily recognized danger
or difficulty."33 So we are, in this volume, considering a metaphor of a
plurivocal analogy.
We have "of' still to consider. "Of' is one of those words that is so
plurivocal that out of context it does no more than specify some connection.
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Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary gives 12 meanings for "of'; the Oxford
English Dictionary gives 17 main uses and 63 senses, most with subsenses,
going on for 6 pages. We also learn from the OED that the primary sense of
"of' (from Old English, as is 'pitfall') was away. away from. All current uses of
"of' are derivatives.
If we take univocality as our ideal for all meaningful verbal communication,
we would be forced to say that there are a number of pitfalls of verbal com-
munication in any phrase that includes the word "analysis." I have used the
topic of this volume, "pitfalls of analysis," as an example of such a phrase to
indicate that words that ostensibly serve to qualify and thus limit "analysis"
(for example, this volume is not about all aspects of analysis; it is limited to the
pitfalls of analysis and related issues), may do just the opposite. To talk of the
pitfalls of analysis, if"analysis" is construed to mean that which the linguistic
opinion leaders of the Anglo-American speech community (e.g., Webster's,
OED) say it may mean, is to talk about many things that "analysis" is not. It is
to talk about synthesis and design and about rhetoric and implementation.34
Thus "analysis" qualified by "pitfalls of' seems to become broader than
"analysis" unqualified.
THE SYMBOLIC METHOD AND THE INTERPRETIVE DISCIPLINES
If we believe that any lack of univocality in our working language is a pitfall to
be avoided, we had best retire Analysis and adopt a new name. There are
crafts, however, that value plurivocality, and perhaps policy analysis could
learn from them.
Mary Catherine Bateson mentions poetry and psychotherapy:
Poets and clinicians bring to their listening a particular kind of attention [Theodore
Reik calls it "listening with the third ear" in a book of that title I, sensitive not only to
the single logical path between ideas, but to the multiple bonds between symbols. Un-
consciously we all swim in a sea of contexts.... Underlying all our conversation of
logic and abstraction, each symbol or word used is fitted by each person into multiple
contexts deeper than any argument.B
There is a strong symbolist tradition within theology, a field not quite as distant
from policy analysis as one might expect. Augustine was within this tradition.
Taking policy license with his words:
What more liberal and fruitful provision could [our legislators] have made in regard to
[their pronouncements] than that the same words might be understood in several
senses, all of which are sanctioned by the concurring testimony of other passages
equally [enlightened] ?36
Luther, on the other hand, did not appreciate plurivocality. He believed that
Scripture had a "single, simple, solid and stable meaning":
I acknowledge that [legislation] is a most rich and inexhaustible fountain of wisdom;
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but I deny that its fertility consists in the various meanings which any man at his
pleasure may assign. Let us know that the true meaning of [legislation] is the natural
and obvious meaning, and let us embrace and abide by it resolutely.3?
What can the symbolist approach, which values words with "excess"
meaning, with plurivocality and long roots, do that the univocal approach can-
not do? Quite simply, it facilitates the making of new connections and
associations, some of which may break the barrier that systematic rationality
often puts in the way of creativity.
Majone has, fortunately for my purposes, introduced legal argumentation as
a mode analogous to policy analysis in interesting and useful ways.38 Unger, in
a masterful critique of the "liberal tradition" in Western thought, groups "the
reasonings of lawyers and judges" with those of theologians and grammarians
as comprising "the ancient humanistic arts," all of which incorporate "pre-
theoretical experience into theory itself."
"Compare with this," he writes,
the approach of linguistics, or of the sociology of religion or law, when they adopt the
modern view of science.... They want to become the science of language, of religion,
or of law in general, rather than the doctrines of a particular language, religion, or legal
order. As empirical sciences, they treat views about language, religion and law
prevalent in specific societies as part of what has to be explained instead of as part of
the explanation. The greater the independence a science achieves from the
pretheoretical views of anyone group, the more universal and objective it supposedly
becomes.
Another characteristic of these humanistic arts or crafts "is their indifference
to the contrast of description and evaluation." They are "both descriptive and
prescriptive." In adjudicative practice, Unger points out, "every understanding
of how the law stands on a given point depends on a conception of its purposes,
on a view of what the law ought to accomplish." The understandings of the
theologian and the grammarian are similar in accepting and developing a
"unity of fact and value." Compare this approach with "the empirical sciences
of language, religion, and law, [which] for their part, pride themselves on the
strictness with which they hold the line between [explanation] and evaluation."
The third characteristic these "interpretive disciplines" share is that they
must deal with the kind of ambiguity of meaning the earlier (and later) sections
of this paper demonstrate.
[The ancient humanistic arts or] interpretive disciplines must also deal with the am-
biguity of meaning peculiar to the phenomena of consciousness. Every act of speech,
or religious ritual or belief, or rule of law has a meaning or a purpose given to it by the
intention of the original speaker, holy man, or lawmaker. Yet this meaning must always
be rediscovered by an interpreter, who has his own purposes and his own form of
existence. What then guarantees that interpreted and interpreter can communicate?
The resolution of the ambiguity of meaning is possible to the extent that interpreter and
interpreted participate in the same community or tradition of shared beliefs, beliefs that
are both understandings and values. Thus, for example, the judge defines the purpose
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of the laws he applies by a combination of his view of the intentions of legislators or
earlier judges and his sense of the demands of his own social situation at the time the
case is decided. This combination can be achieved only because the judge is able to see
himself as a collaborator of the lawmakers who preceded him, and as one whose ideas
and values are not starkly at variance with theirs. Similarly, the philologist, faced with
a text from an earlier age, can interpret it symbolically if he is able to bear in mind the
literary tradition that leads back from his own perspective to the author's.
Unger points out there is a "wonderful symmetry" in the contrast between
empirical sciences and the interpretive disciplines. "The former distinguish
clearly the dimension of their subject matter [facts, datal from the dimension of
the theory with which they describe it [theory or model]." They treat the sub-
ject matter itself, however, without depth: the subject matter is not set against a
"background of intentions and values." The interpretive disciplines, on the
other hand, place their subject matter and their account of it "within a single,
continuous" network. They give depth to the subject matter by distinguishing
within it "the two aspects of outward symbol and inward intent or value. The
second gives the first its meaning."39
POLICY ANALYSIS AS AN INTERPRETIVE DISCIPLINE
It appears from this characterization of the distinction between empirical
sciences and interpretive disciplines that policy analysis is more like law, gram-
mar, and theology than it is like an empirical science. Majone has written of the
kinship to law and rhetoric. The logic of choice is a close relative of grammar,
as a small taste of a Kenneth Burke or a Lewis Carroll easily suggests. And to
bring the theological analogy closer to home, let us remember Webber and
Rittel on "wicked problems."4o As summarized by Quade:
[Wicked problemsl have no definite formulation and no stopping rule to tell the
problem-solver when he has a solution. Moreover a proposed solution is not true or
false but good or bad. There may be neither an immediate nor even an ultimate test of a
solution-the set of potential solutions is not enumerable; every such problem is essen-
tially unique and is a symptom of another problem.... The problem has to be "struc-
tured" before the traditional methods can apply and in structuring it may no longer re-
main the same problem.41
Wicked problems look very much like the age-old problems of ethics and
morality that theologians deal with.
We recognize policy analysis as having interpretive aspects in many of our
communications to each other and to the users of analysis. We do not,
however, identify policy analysis as an interpretive discipline, i.e., as a
humanistic art, nor should we, since analysis is other things as well.
While it is good not to identify analysis as one of the humanistic arts-not
to say out loud that analysis is more like theology than it is like empirical
science-it may not be so good to disown, or at least not to make our own, the
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tools and methods of these disciplines. Several of these methods are in fact
tools of language-creation designed for solving "wicked problems." (In case my
reader has forgotten-it's been a long way round-this ties back to Holt's
view of language-creation and problem-solving as indissoluble activities.)
To illustrate what I mean by recognizing analysis as an interpretive dis-
cipline while virtually ignoring interpretive methods, I again focus on the
editors of this volume (on the presupposition that they are among the opinion
leaders in the semantics of analysis).
Quade, in talking about "Some Difficulties with Objectives," writes:
Legally, there are few requirements for policy-makers to make clear statements of their
goals. On the other hand, in many circumstances, there are clear political advantages
in being ambiguous about, and even silent concerning, goals and objectives.... In
stating objectives, officials do not always reveal what they really want, sometimes
because they feel they must maintain a position or front, sometimes because it might
mean loss of support, sometimes (maybe most often) because they do not know what
they want.
Quade then asks, "How does an analyst help identify objectives?" Despite the
difficulties described in knowing what the objectives are, the analyst somehow
"must obtain one or at most a limited set [of goals] to use in his analysis." How
is this to be done? "By interpretation," you might say if you considered
yourself a participant in an interpretive discipline. But Quade does not say that.
He says that in helping to set goals the analyst "has only one tool-analysis,
supported by his judgment," and goes on to quote Hitch saying that "nothing
but rigorous, quantitative analysis" can tell us what we need to know about
objectives.42 This may be so, but it assumes that the objectives are already
identified, and the problem Quade started with was how to identify them.
Majone moves in the opposite direction, from something not wanted, i.e., a
problem situation, rather than to something wanted, i.e., objectives:
Systems analysis is concerned with problem solving, but it usually begins with
something less structured than a problem, namely a problem situation. This is an
awareness that things are not as they should be, but without a clear idea of how they
might be put right. Problem setting refers to the translation of a problem situation into
a policy problem, expressing the goals to be achieved and a strategy for their ac-
complishment. Overlooking the importance (or, indeed, the very existence) of this stage
of analysis is a pitfall whose seriousness can be inferred from the following quotation
(Rein and Schon, 1976): "Policy development is essentially about a process of
problem-setting; it is concerned with developing new purposes and new interpretations
of the inchoate signs of stress in the system which derive from the past. ... Problem-
setting is important not only because it is difficult but because the questions we ask
shape the answers we get."
The amount of detail that is useful at the stage of problem setting is different from
what is needed in the phase of actual problem solving. The appropriate styles of
thinking will also differ in the two situations. Because of the unstructured character of a
problem situation, imagination, judgment, and analogical and associative thinking play
a bigger role than rigor and technical skills. (Rein and Schon, 1976, and Ravetz,
1973).43
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Majone then switches to an empirical science perspective and goes on to talk of
"data and information."
Majone does refer here to interpretive tools-to "imagination, judgment, and
analogical and associative thinking." And the Hitch quotation Quade turns to
does refer to "inventive and ingenious analysis." But where in the literature,
and where in the training of analysts, is attention given to methods of im-
proving imagination, judgment, analogical and associative thinking, inven-
tiveness and ingenuity? What proportion of books and articles and classes are
devoted to such topics, compared to the space and time devoted to improving
rigor and technical skills? It is a minute fraction of the total verbiage on policy
analysis.
Now that we recognize the nature of the problems we are dealing with
and the importance of synthesis and design, oughtn't we to explore all the
methods that have been used for dealing with such matters? To take on
such a task presents an enormous challenge. But now that the disjunction
between policy analysis and mathematics and logic, on the one hand, and
between policy analysis and empirical science, on the other, has been recognized,
what other alternatives are there? By responding to the problems confront-
ing policy makers and being willing to break through disciplinary boundaries,
policy analysis has come face to face with those phenomena of culture
and consciousness that do not fit into either a logical or a causal mode ofexplana-
tion. Yet the language of policy analysis, I suggest, still derives largely from
these two modes of explanation. There is an awareness that policy analysis
lacks theoretical foundations and that many of the pitfalls of analysis are attribut-
able to this lack.·· There is another way of looking at this problem,
however. Analysis cannot build securely upon the foundations provided by the
logical and causal modes of explanation; yet it has, not surprisingly, borrowed
from the language and thus the metaphysics of disciplines which rely on
these modes.
This is not a pitfall of analysis per se. It is a pitfall of the Western intellectual
tradition, certainly as it has developed over the last two or three hundred years,
and parts of the problem can be traced back further.4~ To get outside a system
of thought that dominates one's whole culture is no mean feat. Yet any system
of thought is a kind of trap: it influences the kinds of belief persons consider
themselves entitled to hold and the kinds of social order they take for granted.46
It is a particularly insidious kind of trap because it is a net woven with words.
As a system of thought becomes dominant, it dominates the natural language
so that the patterning of the symbolic apparatus is the trap. Yet the only way
out of the trap, and also the only way to come to a shared recognition of the
existence of the trap, is via the use of the very words that are knotted into the
net. If all words had univocal meanings, perhaps there would be no way out.
It is easier to understand why devoting insufficient time to problem formula-
tion is a pitfall of analysis if one understands how the principle of analysis fits
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into the tradition of Western thought. Quade suggests that the leaders of a
project should devote as much as 50 percent of their time to exploring broadly
and deeply al1 aspects of the problem and of policy objectives. "The pitfall is to
give in to the tendency to get started without having devoted a lot of thought to
the problem."47 Where does this "tendency" to get started on the analysis of
particulars come from? According to Unger, it comes from the principle of
analysis, a principle that holds that "the procedures of analysis and combina-
tion exhaust the ways in which we can gain knowledge." Since you cannot
combine until you have parts to combine, you start with an analysis of parts.
The analytical view of knowledge completes the dismemberment of the classical con-
ception of theory.... Its general consequence is to demoralize all attempts to construct
conceptual systems before the patient investigation of particulars, for it is in these par-
ticulars rather than in the system which pretends to describe them that reality lies.
Consequently, the principle of analysis furnishes a priceless defense of the specializa-
tion of the sciences.... It also turns us away from any attempt to understand our
social situation as a whole, a whole that could never be elucidated by the study of parts
alone....
The principle of analysis may owe much of its appeal to a particular form of social
order, to whose perpetuation it in turn contributes: the situation in which each man's
social existence is divided into a diversity of roles. Every role calls for the exercise of
special skills and the satisfaction of special expectations.... When all interests are
viewed as either private and subjective themselves or as combinations of subjective and
private interests, no activity can be seen as the expression of a universal interest whose
realization demands a universal knowledge of society. A fractured social existence can
only produce a fractured knowledge of the social order. The principle of analysis is
therefore the natural limit to its self-consciousness.48
There is no way in a paper such as this to summarize the careful1y con-
structed "total critique" that Unger sets forth nor to consider the work of other
authors who have attempted to demonstrate that we are caught in a
metaphysical belief system that severely limits our vision of alternatives.49 I
wish only to sound the warning again and, more important, to suggest that
policy analysis has already made a number of moves that will contribute to a
disentangling of this net.
The willingness of the best policy analysts to follow a problem wherever it
leads, through disciplinary walls as necessary and even beyond the boundaries
of established disciplines, has done much to bring into question the
metaphysical tenets of the social sciences. The involvement of policy analysis
in grave problems and issues has led the field to recognize, albeit hesitantly and
tentatively, the need for interpretation and the impossibility of separating fact
and value in airtight compartments.
As policy analysis has come of age, however, and attempts are made to
describe what it is and where its boundaries shall be drawn, a confusion of
identity is evident. Rigor and technical virtuosity are admired and often even
set up as the sole ideal, but when it comes to examining pitfal1s, we find that the
most serious pitfal1s will not be circumvented by greater rigor or improved
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technical skills. Competencies usually considered "softer"-imagination, judg-
ment, interpretive skills-are just as important.
WORDS ON THE WAY TO DESIGN
If what we call Analysis is to be about synthesis and design, then it needs a
working vocabulary to deal with problems of aesthetics and ethics, with issues
of "adequacy, harmony and appositeness."so And if it is not to remain
enmeshed in inappropriate metaphysical belief systems, it will also need a
language of metaphysical design. The obvious place to look for help in
developing such languages is outside the community of scientific and logical
discourse.
Such a search would lead analysis into unfamiliar territory; it would, in par-
ticular, lead analysis into the wonderland of symbolic and hermeneutic
methods, old and new. Not everything in this wonderland would be unfamiliar.
Cost analysis of a rudimentary form still exists just over the border on the
other side of the looking-glass.
"Now then! Show your ticket, child!" the Guard went on, looking angrily at Alice.
And a great many voices all said together ("like the chorus of a song," thought Alice)
"Don't keep him waiting, child! Why, his time is worth a thousand pounds a minute!"
"I'm afraid 1 haven't got one," Alice said in a frightened tone: "there wasn't a ticket-
office where 1 came from." And again the chorus of voices went on. "There wasn't
room for one where she came from. The land there is worth a thousand pounds an
inch!"
"Don't make excuses," said the Guard: "you should have bought one from the
engine-driver." And once more the chorus of voices went on with "The man that drives
the engine. Why, the smoke alone is worth a thousand pounds a pum"
Alice thought to herself "Then there's no use in speaking." The voices didn't join in,
this time, as she hadn't spoken, but, to her great surprise, they all thought in chorus (I
hope you understand what thinking in chorus means-for 1 must confess that I don't),
"Better say nothing at all. Language is worth a thousand pounds a word!"ll
What is known in policy analysis as iteration-that is, a circular reasoning
from objectives to alternatives to data and back again as many times as
necessary-finds a more hospitable domicile in hermeneutic territory than on
the other side of the boundary where circular reasoning is sometimes frowned
upon.
Through the looking-glass is no idle metaphor; what better way to imply
self-referentiality than going through a mirror? Self-referentiality is a
characteristic of both culture and consciousness. It can be demonstrated that
this self-referentiality generates a basic indeterminancyS2 that in turn gives rise
to (a) the presence of uncertainty and those serious pitfalls associated with it
that are inherent in analysisS3 ; (b) the possibility of novelty, of creative
solutions; and (c) the indissolubility of language-creation and problem-solving
and thus the need to use old words in new ways.
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Compare the task of the analyst facing wicked problems with that of the ar-
tist. Unlike the elements in logical and causal connections, the elements of a
policy or a painting "are not connected with one another by necessity,"
although as Unger puts it, "their coexistence is ordered."
The concept of style helps illustrate these points. The distinctive elements of a style in
painting do not cause one another, nor are they logically entailed by each other. They
cannot be ordered serially, for there is no feature that comes first. ... The different at-
tributes of the style, as displayed in a work of art, are not necessary conclusions or
effects of one another, but they stand in a relationship of appositeness. What precisely
is the nature of this harmony, and by what standards do we establish and measure it?'4
The elements of a policy or a painting, or more generally of a structure or a
system, "cause" one another reciprocally. To explain such a structure or
system involves an iterative circularity, the parts being explained by each other
and the whole, and the whole being explained by the parts. If you put the policy
or painting in a broader context and relate it to its historical time and place,
you do not avoid such circularity. You merely confront it again on a different
level The explanation, if such it is, is one of mutual self-consistency; the
reasoning is circular.
To create a new style in painting or to design a novel policy solution, who
can say what comes first? Does an idea of the whole bring the parts into being,
are the parts arranged to bring a new whole into being, or do parts and whole
come into being together iteratively and dialectically? Whichever, we have a
circularity or, more precisely, a spiraling that produces novelty.
Policy analysis engages of necessity in such circular or spiraling reasoning.
Problems, objectives, alternatives, data, and information are mutually in-
terdependent. And all are set within and mutually interdependent with the
culture that produces them and the consciousness that attempts to grasp their
meaning. Self-referentiality means simply that an answer is fed back into the
expression from whence it came. A tentative statement of objectives is used to
derive alternatives. An attempt is made to understand the consequences of the
alternatives. Then these consequences are compared with the first tentative
statement of objectives in order to revise it in light of what is now known about
alternatives. And so on, in a bootstrapping fashion.
This spiraling self-referentiality, or iteration, is accepted within policy
analysis, but there has been no attempt in the analytic literature, as far as I
know, to provide a theoretical justification. Such a justification can be found
once we move into the territory of those disciplines that define themselves as in-
terpretive. Within this territory, the method is known as the hermeneutic circle.
As described by Dilthey:
(It] starts from the apprehension of indefinite-definite parts and proceeds to the
attempt to grasp the meaning of the whole, alternating with the attempt to take this
meaning as a basis for defining the parts more clearly. Failure makes itself known when
individual parts cannot be understood in this way. This then creates the need to
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redefine the meaning so that it will take account of these parts. This attempt goes on
until the entire meaning has been grasped.55
The justification of the apparent circularity of the interpretive process lies in
what Habermas refers to as "the peculiar double status" of the words and ac-
tions one is trying to understand. They are both symbols andfacts.H
The hermeneutic circle called iteration in policy analysis is designed to cir-
cumvent a pitfall: the pitfall of inappropriate objectivity. This is the pitfall of
treating meaning (or value) and fact as independent when dealing with
phenomena of culture and consciousness.
Other characteristics of the symbolic and hermeneutic territory will be less
familiar to policy analysis, and it is precisely at these points that the inter-
pretive methods may be most useful in bringing to our attention pitfalls we are
not yet aware of. For instance, the facile assumption that people will behave
selfishly and egotistically, so common in policy analysis, and the equally facile
assumption that people will behave altruistically, more common among
reformers "outside" the system, both ignore the interdependence of individual
behavior and institutions. Such presuppositions also ignore the openness of
both consciousness and culture to reinterpretation and thus to redesign. Policy
analysis is intimately involved in changing both institutions and individual
behavior, both culture and consciousness; thus, to ignore the interdependencies
and to take as fixed that which is in fact open to redesign could be a serious pit-
fall, particularly in an era when we are pressing on the limits of our institutions
and our planet.
In a paper of this length I can do no more than suggest the kinds of pitfalls
that a reconnaissance of the symbolic and hermeneutic territory would help
policy analysis detect. But does a craft called Analysis have any right to move
into this territory and claim its methods for its own? It does, just as soon as it
steps over the boundary.
On the other side of the boundary, the plurivocality of "analysis" is no
longer an embarrassment but rather a resource to be conjured with. "Analysis"
means etymologically a loosening up or setting free. How would one loosen up
a problem composed of intellectual constructs, or a metaphysical net of words,
other than by loosening up one's use of words? That is, by accepting and using
some of the words in one's working language as symbols swimming in a sea of
contexts, as symbols whose value resides in their multiplicity of meanings and
associations-a multiplicity that permits the creation of new meanings and
thus the creation of a new language more capable of coping with wicked
problems.
Kahn and Mann gave us the pitfal1.57 Vickers gave us the lobster pot.
Lobster pots are designed to catch lobsters. A man entering a man-sized lobster pot
would become suspicious of the narrowing tunnel, he would shrink from the drop at the
end; and if he fell in, he would recognize the entrance as a possible exit and climb out
again~ven if he were the shape of a lobster.
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A trap is a trap only for creatures which cannot solve the problems that it sets. Man-
traps are dangerous only in relation to the limitations on what men can see and value
and do. The nature of the trap is a function of the nature of the trapped. To describe
either is to imply the other.38
Man-traps are most often made of words. If analysis is not to be entrapped
by its own name, it may be helpful to remember that, among other things,
"analysis" is
An untangling, a loosening up, a setting free,
With an iterative sense built into the ana-.
It is not a cutting up. That's anatomy.
Nor being beyond feeling-that's anaesthesia.
It's a word of feminine gender with claims to the soft.
And it has for a homonym, An Alice Is.
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